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ABSTRACT 
 
 
TOWARDS A HERMENEUTICAL UNDERSTANDING 
 
OF THE LISTENING PROCESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Molly M. Stoltz 
 
May 2008 
 
 
 
Dissertation Supervised by Dr. Ronald C. Arnett  
This dissertation offers an alternative to the behaviorist understanding of the 
listening process inherent in the models developed by scholars such as Brownell, Wolvin 
and Coakley. Using mostly close-text analysis to examine the trends of the literature to 
date, this dissertation introduces the ideas of Gadamer on philosophical hermeneutics and 
Fuimara on the connections between listening and hermeneutics to the current discussion. 
This dissertation argues that the process actually starts when one makes the choice to 
listen. It distinguishes the choice to listen from the behaviorist concepts of willingness 
and attention and connects it to Gadamer’s understanding of tradition and bias.  This 
work presents a hermeneutical model of the listening process that highlights the choice to 
listen; it compares this model to behaviorist models which suggest the process starts 
when one hears or perceives a message. This dissertation presents the hermeneutical 
model as yet another way to explain the complexities of listening. 
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Chapter 1  
 
 
An Introduction to the Field of Listening  
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
“An ‘I’M A LISTENER’ button is available from the publisher.  
Do not wear it if it is simply a status symbol of the button crowd.  
Do wear the button proudly and conspicuously if you plan on being a listener. 
~ Loretta Girzaits, Listening: A Response Ability 
“Are you really listening to me?” People ask this question of each other 
constantly and numerous scholars have tried to understand the complex issue behind it: 
listening. This dissertation aims to join the conversation about listening already begun by 
scholars such as Paul Rankin and Ralph Nichols and continued by scholars such as 
Andrew Wolvin, Carolyn Gwynn Coakley, and Judi Brownell. The question this 
dissertation seeks to answer is: What lies at the heart of the listening process? This 
dissertation argues, from the perspective of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, that 
at the heart of listening process one finds choice. This dissertation goes on to argue that 
this choice differs from a willingness to listen and the selection of what stimuli to attend 
to because it has as its basis, as per Gadamer, in people’s biases and tradition.  
As an introduction to the general topic of listening, this first chapter of this 
dissertation will look at why people should listening and why people have neglected to 
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 study listening. Specifically some of main reasons to study include the amount of time 
people spend listening as found by Paul T. Rankin, one of the first researchers in the 
field, as well benefits to one’s health, relationships, and community. Turning to why 
people have neglected to study listening, this chapter will examine some misconceptions 
about listening and some other factors influencing people’s ideas about listening. Finally, 
this chapter will provide a description of the methodology behind this dissertation. 
1.2 Why study listening?  
Time Spent Listening – Rankin’s 1929 study  
The fact that people spend so much time listening represents one of the most 
compelling reasons why people should study the topic. One of the first studies published 
about listening addressed the question of how much time human beings spend listening 
on a daily basis. Paul T. Rankin conducted what Harlen M. Adams (1947) calls “one of 
the best” studies on listening; this study, published in 1930 in the Chicago Schools 
Journal and cited by Adams, “shows that listening ability is by far the most frequently 
used ability in communication in actual every day life situations” (p. 209). Rankin was 
the first to study how much time people spend listening in a scientific or objective way. 
In the excerpt of his 1926 dissertation entitled Measurement of the Ability to Understand 
Spoken Language found in Sam Duker’s (1966) compilation of readings about listening, 
Rankin suggests that the study of how much time people spend listening lends itself to 
“objective study” because “individuals can keep a record of their time, and can analyze it 
with reference to the form of communication in which they are engaged” (p. 51); his 
study subjects included 21 people from different backgrounds including teachers, 
housewives, stenographers, students, research workers, and nurses (p. 51, 56).  
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 The results of Rankin’s study into how much time people spend listening clearly 
show that people spend more time engaged in listening than any other communication 
activity. Rankin dissected and reported his findings in a variety of ways. He analyzed the 
results according to the various types of occupations of the subjects and also the different 
types of listening they did during the time they spent listening (Duker, 1966, p. 57). No 
matter how he sliced and diced the data, though, Rankin still had to conclude that people 
spend more of their communication time listening than writing, speaking, and reading. 
The following table represents the basic conclusions of Rankin’s study:  
Table 1.1 Results of Rankin’s Study (Duker, 1966, p. 57). 
Activity % of Communication Time Spent  
Talking 31.9 
Writing11 11 
Listening 42 
Reading 15 
 
In the nearly 80 years since Rankin published this study, scholars in the field of listening 
have documented and replicated this study over and over again; the fact that people spend 
more time listening than any other communication activity remains one of the building 
blocks of listening theory. To add more detail and insight into his conclusions, Rankin 
also categorized the findings according to the occupations of the participants:  
Table 1.2 Rankin’s Results by Occupation (Duker, 1966, p. 57). 
Profession Teachers Housewife Other 
% of communication 
time spent TALKING 
31 35 30 
3 
 % of communication 
time spent WRITING 
7 17 12 
% of communication 
time spent LISTENING 
47 35 40 
% of communication 
time spent READING 
15 13 18 
 
While some may have suspected different results, Rankin has clearly shown the 
importance of listening in any occupation. After reporting these results, Rankin notes two 
points. First, Rankin says that people spend almost three times more time in “oral 
communication” (speaking and listening) than they do in reading and writing (Duker, 
1966, p. 57). Second, Rankin writes: “the receiving forms (listening and reading) occur 
more frequently than the expressional forms, talking and writing” (Duker, 1966, p. 57); 
he claims that this should not surprise anyone “because one person may talk and a 
hundred listen or one may write and a thousand read” (Duker, 1966, p. 57). Clearly, 
Rankin’s study concludes that people spend more time engaged in listening than any 
other communication activity – but what do they listen to? Rankin addresses that question 
in a way that lends much insight into the way he formulates his ideas about listening.  
While Rankin’s conclusions shed much light on the phenomena of listening and 
paved the path for much future research, the way Rankin categorized the communication 
activities he wanted to analyze may represent one of the most interesting aspects of the 
study. In addition to listening, speaking, reading, and writing, he included a category 
called “conversation,” which he defines as “a combination of talking and listening” and 
divided into “high order” (conversation about complex issues such as politics and social 
problems) and “low order” (conversation about the weather or what to eat for dinner); he 
calculates that a person spends half his/her time in conversation listening and the other 
half talking (Duker, 1966, p. 51-52). Further, Rankin divides the category of listening 
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 into the following sub-categories: conversation, conference, oral reading, formal talks, 
directions, vocal music, and memorizations (Duker, 1966, p. 62); one can represent 
Rankin’s findings about the different categories of listening as follows:  
Table 1.3 Rankin’s Results According to Category of Listening (Duker, 1966, p. 62) 
Type of Listening % of listening time 
Conversation, low 56 
Conversation, high 19 
Formal talks 7 
Vocal music 6 
Memorizations 5 
Conference 4 
Oral Reading 2 
Directions 1 
 
These categorizations offer insight into Rankin’s mind and the simple definitions of these 
complex ideas with which he worked. One need not challenge the value or accuracy of 
Rankin’s findings to suggest that deeper questions lie beneath his approach.  
Studies about how much time students spend listening in the classroom  
Rankin’s work opened the door for many other studies into the amount of time 
spent listening. Over the decades, many of these studies addressed specific questions 
about how much time is spent listening in a classroom. For example, Wolvin and Coakley 
(1996) summarize the studies that have been done addressing the question of time spent 
listening; the chart below highlights three studies that deal with the amount of time 
students are expected to listen in the classroom at the three basic levels of American 
education: elementary school, secondary school, and college:  
Table 1.4 Percentage of Class Time Spent Listening (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 14) 
Study Educational Level % of Class Time Spent Listening 
Wilt Elementary 58 
5 
 Markgraf Secondary 46 
Taylor Secondary/college 90 
 
From these studies, one can see that the amount of time spent listening in the class varies 
from level to level. Despite this variation, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) point out that 
“throughout all levels of educational development, listening is the main channel of 
classroom instruction” (p. 13). Other studies that focus on how much time students spend 
listening include Goodland’s 1983 study which found that “teachers ‘out-talk’ students 
by a ratio of three to one” (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 14), and studies by Bird, Baker 
et al., and Perras and Weitzel which studied the habits of college students both in and out 
of the classroom and concluded they spend between 42 and 53 per cent of their time 
listening (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 14). Given the amount of time they appear to 
spend listening, one should not find surprising Bird’s finding that 82 per cent of college 
students deemed listening “equal to or more important than reading for academic 
success” (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 14). Clearly, students spend much of their time 
in the classroom listening; other studies have focused on listening outside the classroom.  
Other studies about how much time people spend listening  
Turning from the classroom back to the home and office, Wolvin and Coakley 
(1996) note the following studies which aimed to replicate Rankin’s study:  
Table 1.5 Time Spent Listening by Occupation (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 14-15): 
Study Subjects Listening Speaking Reading Writing 
Rankin  Adults  42 32 15 11 
Brieter  Homemakers  48 35 10 7 
Weinrauch/Swanda Employees 33 26 19 23 
Werner Employees , students, homemakers  55 23 13 8 
6 
 Barker  College Students  53 16 17 14 
Mean Average  46 26 15 13 
 
When one examines these numbers, one can see a basic similarity between them. While 
these studies averaged together suggest that the average person spends 46 per cent of 
his/her communication time listening. Brown’s 1982 work suggests that the average 
worker spends about 60 per cent of his or her workday listening and Keefe’s 1971 book 
Listen, Management! posits that executives spend as much as 63 per cent of their time 
listening (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 15). When considering the findings of Rankin 
and those who attempted to replicate his work, Walter Loban put the numbers in 
perspective when remarked: “We listen a book a day, we speak a book a week, we read a 
book a month, and write a book a year” (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 15). Clearly, 
based on Rankin’s initial study and the many others conducted on the subject, people 
spend a lot of time listening, but that does not represent the only reason to study listening; 
scholarship suggests that effective listening also has many benefits for one’s health, 
interpersonal relationships, and professional development.  
Benefits of Listening for one’s Health  
 One may find the idea that having good listening skills contributes to physical 
well-being odd, but Purdy (1997) writes: “studies have shown that when we talk our 
blood pressure goes up; when we listen it does down. … When we talk to another person 
our whole system becomes more excited. When we listen we are more relaxed. It would 
seem best then, for optimum health, to balance our listening and talking” (p. 3). Ralph 
Nichols (1957) refers to this as the “therapeutic value” of listening; he writes: 
“appreciative listening to stories, poetry, drama, good conversation, and the like also can 
help us relax, to put aside personal worries and cares” (p. 32). From these remarks then, 
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 one begins to see a connection between listening and health. Next, one can look at how 
listening impact not only health in general but directly on medical treatments and a 
medical professional’s success; further, one finds listening has benefits not only for one’s 
success in the medical field but one’s professional life in general.   
Benefits of listening for one’s professional performance 
In her book The Zen of Listening, Rebecca Shafir (2000) also acknowledges a 
relationship between health and listening, but she comes at the idea from a slightly 
different angle; she writes: “I have seen how the failure [of doctors] to listen adversely 
affects the accuracy of the diagnosis and subsequent treatment. Too often the patient is 
not given a chance to mention what’s on his mind, to share his insight into the health 
problem. Just as often, due to various communication barriers, a patient does not 
understand his doctor’s explanation of his illness” (p. 10). Shafir, then, looks at the 
relationship between listening and health more as a matter of how effective listening can 
help patients and doctors better understand each other and the problem at hand. Shafir 
(2000) also takes the connection Purdy and Nichols’ make between listening and health a 
step further; she writes: “Contact with others promotes well-being and self-expression, 
both necessary for good health. By being good listeners, we promote the good health of 
others by allowing them to reduce their stress and empowering them to solve their own 
dilemmas” (p. 11). In other words, good listening not only helps one maintain one’s own 
health but can also function as a catalyst for improving the health of others; further, one 
can think about how listening has benefits for a person’s career.  
Moving from a specific focus on the medical field to how listening skills 
enhances ones professional performance in general, one can turn to Purdy (1997) who 
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 cites Tom Peters who writes: “Excellent companies are not only better on service, 
quality, reliability, and finding a niche. They are better listeners” (p. 3). Purdy points out 
that this emphasis on listening has particular importance in the helping professions and 
most specifically in the medical field; he cites Westen and Lipkin, who write in their 
book Communicating With Medical Patients that: “Skill in communicating with patients 
is the single most important skill the student physician learns” (p. 3). According to Purdy 
(1997), one comes to that conclusion after considering all of the communication activities 
healthcare professionals do such as recording patient histories and conducting patient 
interviews; Purdy goes on to suggest other professions involve similar activities and thus 
“the ability to listen effectively is essential for professional success” (p. 3). 
While Purdy focuses on the necessity of effective listening in medical professions, 
Brownell and Wolvin and Coakley focus on in benefits in more sales-oriented 
corporations. Wolvin and Coakley (1996) argue that effective listening equals more 
money for salespeople; they also claim that effective listening by workers and managers 
within a corporation leads to increased customer satisfaction as well as increased 
employee satisfaction and productivity (p. 21-22). Along similar lines, Brownell (1996) 
writes: “Your listening skills affect your ability to get work accomplished…The quality 
of your finished product [is] related to the quality of your listening” (p. 9). So, one can 
see how having effective listening skills can help one succeed in one’s professional life, 
but one can also talk about benefits of listening for one’s personal and political life. 
Benefits of listening for one’s relationships and community 
When discussing the effect listening has on one’s personal development and 
interpersonal and communal relationships, John Stewart writes: “The quality of your life 
9 
 is directly linked to the quality of your communication” (Purdy, 1997, p. 4). Purdy (1997) 
writes: “Listening establishes us in our life situation and enables us to maintain 
meaningful relationships with family, friends, and professional associates” (p. 4). 
Psychologist Julie Rogers writes: “If you want a friend for life, listen, truly listen, to each 
other, for nothing so permanently binds two people together” (Wolvin and Coakley, 
1996, p. 23). While these scholars emphasize the importance of listening in establishing 
and maintaining interpersonal relationships, Brownell (1996) notes the importance of 
listening in establishing the environment that nurtures those relationships when she 
writes: “Effective listening often goes even further than building a single relationship. 
The practice of sincere and consistent listening contributes to the development of a 
unique atmosphere or climate that makes further information-sharing possible. It’s called 
trust” (p. 11). So, not only does effective listening help one establish and maintain 
relationships between two people, but it helps create the environment in which those two 
people learn to trust each other. This idea that effective listening works to establish an 
environment in which people can communicate serves as a reminder that listening plays 
an important but often unrecognized role in community development.  
Purdy (2000) begins his discussion about the role listening plays in community 
formation by pointing out that the current literature does not usually take this aspect of 
listening into account; he writes: “Current listening theory is generally caught up in what 
Vernon Cronin (1998) calls the psychology project. This is the tendency of the 
communication studies to follow the lead of psychology in viewing communication (and 
listening) as a product of a thinking individual” (p. 47-48). However, he continues “there 
has been some study suggesting that listening is something more than the results of the 
10 
 assigned meanings of the listener” (p. 48). Purdy (1991) developed a theory of the place 
of listening in community formation around the following premise:  
Community is what we have in common with other in our group and having it in 
common make us related. In speaking we impart and make common, in listening 
we interpret, share in and give personal meaning to that commonality. By 
listening we share in the insight, the vision the knowledge, growth, and 
understanding that is common in the community in the interpretive process of 
listening. We also help create and shape the essence of the community in the 
interpretive process of listening. (p. 51) 
From Purdy’s perspective, then, listening happens in a community. Listening allows one 
to connect to a larger context outsides of one’s own individual understanding. The idea 
that listening happens within community also has resonance with Gadamer’s idea that 
when one listens to or interprets a text one also does so within the horizons or parameters 
of the tradition and community of both the author and the interpreters. So far, one has 
read about the benefits of listening for one’s health, career, relationships, and community, 
but many other positive effects come from listening effectively to others. 
Other Benefits of Effective Listening 
In addition to having benefits for one’s health, profession, relationships, and 
community, effective listening has other benefits as well. First, learning does not happen 
without listening. Ralph Nichols (1957) points out that “opportunity never ceases to 
knock for anyone who wishes to increase his knowledge or broaden his experience by 
listening” (p. 18). Making a similar point, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) remind their 
readers of the Sperry corporation slogan: “Nothing new ever entered the mind through an 
11 
 open mouth” (p. 23). Brownell (1996) looks at the connection between listening and 
learning in the context of decision-making; she writes: “Decision-makers must determine 
who to listen to, what to listen to, and how much information to consider before making 
their choice. Those in key leadership positions have come to realize the consequences of 
poor listening and are quick to identify listening as a key competence for success” (p. 
12). In these passages, one sees the strong connection between listening, learning, and 
decision making. Nichols and Brownell also point out that listening allows one to 
appreciate the beauty in the world that comes from music and literature. 
Talking about the idea of appreciative listening, Brownell (1996) writes: “You 
often listen for simple enjoyment. From poetry readings, theater presentations and music, 
to the sounds of close friends laughing, there are good reasons to take pleasure in your 
sensory environment” (p. 12). Nichols (1957) makes the point that listening can lead to 
an appreciation of literature; he cites a high school teacher who taught students to 
appreciate Shakespeare by having them listen to him read it (p. 21-29) Nichols (1957) 
also points out that one can also take pleasure in listening to television or radio programs 
(p. 21-29). So, listening not only has benefits for one’s health, relationships, and 
profession, but also helps one learn about and appreciate the world; one can say that the 
previous listing represents only few of benefits from effective listening. Yet, despite these 
benefits, listening remains what some would say a lost art; why? The next section of this 
chapter acknowledges that interest in listening has increased in recent years but contends 
it still remains a neglected area of study and outlines some reasons why. 
12 
 1.3 Why Listening Remains Neglected 
After considering how much time people spend listening and the wonderful 
benefits associated with effective listening, it may surprise some to learn that scholars, 
particularly in Western society, have not spent much time studying or teaching the 
listening process; yet, within two decades of Rankin’s study, scholars acknowledged this 
fact. Wesley Wiskell (1946) writes in his article “The Problem of Listening” that 
“Listening, an important and integral part of our everyday communication, has yet to 
become the subject of much scholarly scrutiny” (p. 505). Wiskell (1946) cites Rankin’s 
conclusion that “44 per cent of our waking time is given over to listening” but concedes 
“very little recorded effort has been found which attempts to define listening per se 
except that there is an agreement as to its importance, a needs for an adequate ability in 
this skill, and it should occupy an important place in the educational program” (p. 505). 
The next section of this dissertation will offer evidence of the neglect of listening 
throughout the history of the field, examine some common misconceptions people have 
of listening, and offer some reasons why people have neglected listening. 
1.3.1. Listening as a neglected but increasingly studied topic 
Evidence of neglect 
50 years after Wiskell wrote his article, Wolvin and Coakley see that same 
problem of neglect that Wiskell saw in the 1940s; particularly, they concern themselves 
with the neglect of listening in the classroom. On this matter, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) 
write: “The most neglected language art skill at all educational levels is listening…Too 
frequently the only listening instruction [a student receives is] requests and commands to 
pay attention and/or a few lists of listening dos and don’ts (p. 35-36). Wolvin and 
13 
 Coakley, then, contend that, by and large, the education an American student receives 
from elementary school through high school and into college does not include sufficient 
training in the critical language skills of listening, although students do seem to receive 
sufficient training in other language arts – reading, writing, and, speaking. To provide 
evidence for their argument, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) summarize the findings of 
studies done to determine how much listening training takes place in American schools 
beginning with Markgraf’s 1962 study of teacher-training institutions: 
Table 1.6 Studies of Listening Course Offerings (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 36) 
Study Subjects Findings 
Markgraf (1962) 406 teacher-training 
institutions 
• offered listening courses 
• 134 offered listening 
units in other courses 
• 44% included teaching 
listening in methods 
courses 
 
Wolff (1977) 70 colleges/universities 
with whom SCA members 
were affiliated 
• 10 offered listening 
courses 
 
 
Pace/Ross (1983) 100 survey courses in 
organizational 
communication 
• 60 included a listening 
component 
• Listening ranked 25th of 
the 38 course content 
areas 
Wolvin/Coakley/Disburg 
(1988) 
82 colleges/universities 
with whom SCA members 
were affiliated 
• 44 offered a listening 
course 
• 63 offered listening 
units in other courses 
Wolvin/Coakley/Disburg 
(1989) 
134 colleges/universities 
with whom SCA members 
were affiliated 
• 19 offered a listening 
course 
• 63 offered listening 
units in other courses 
Wolff (1990) 126 colleges/universities 
with whom SCA members 
were affiliated 
• 42 offered a listening 
course 
• 40 offered listening 
units in other courses 
14 
 Smith/Turner (1993) 682 colleges/universities 
with communication studies 
departments 
• 52 offered a listening 
course 
 
While one might find it ironic that so few colleges and universities that would seem 
prime candidates for having a strong listening curriculum – those that have 
communication programs and faculty active in the discipline – do not have such a 
curriculum, it simply provides more evidence of the neglect of listening. 
Wolvin and Coakley also make another point worth mentioning at this time. 
Wolvin and Coakley (1996) contrast the 1978 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 
which “added listening and speaking to reading, writing, and arithmetic, as measures of 
literacy and as needed basic competencies” with a 1991/1992 call on the American 
education system by the Secretary’s Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills (SCAN) 
to teach listening as a one of a set of “foundation skills and competencies that are 
essential to all in the modern world” (p. 37-38); they conclude that SCAN would not have 
had to issue such a call if state school systems of all levels of education had taken the 
1978 legislation seriously. To show what little states did to teach listening post-1978, 
Wolvin and Coakley (1996) summarize the results of a 1990 study by VanRheenen and 
Casmir which measured what actions states had done to teach listening:  
Table 1.7 Actions taken to Teach Listening (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 37-38) 
 
Reported Action Taken 
 
Number of States
Identified listening skills 
 
35 
Developed curriculum materials for teaching these skills
 
31 
Developed listening assessment procedures 
 
12 
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 Clearly, with such low numbers of states taking even minimal steps towards teaching 
listening, schools need to take steps to improve their listening curriculum. Wolvin and 
Coakley also point out that while scholars have neglected listening for decades, 
businesses people have started paying more attention to listening in recent decades.  
Interest in listening on the increase but still lacking  
After talking about the state of listening research in academia, Wolvin and 
Coakley turn their focus to corporate America, where interest in helping employees 
acquire listening skills has increased greatly over the past several decades. Wolvin and 
Coakley (1996) point to the work of Ralph Nichols as the impetus for the Sperry 
corporation (now part of UNISYS) to develop an in-house training listening in 1979 
which sparked the interest of many other corporations; to show how much interest the 
Sperry program generated, Wolvin and Coakley cite their 1988 study which found that, 
59 per cent of Fortune 500 industrial and Fortune 500 service corporations who 
responded to a survey provided listening training to their employees (p. 38). 
While Wolvin and Coakley primarily see the increase in interest in listening tied 
specifically to listening training in corporations, Purdy (1997) sees a more general 
increase in the interest being paid to listening; he writes: “The importance of listening in 
college classrooms and corporate training continues to grow at a rapid pace. At the same 
time, the dynamic of expansion of interpersonal communications via the Internet, World 
Wide Web, internet phones and personal videoconferencing continue to challenge our 
abilities to adapt as listeners. People are seeing an ever greater need to be able to listen 
effectively in every part of their lives” (p. ix). But, whether one agrees more with Wolvin 
and Coakley or Purdy, the fact remains that neither argue that interest in listening has 
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 reached a satisfactory level. One may find the lack of interest in listening surprising 
considering the amount of time people spend listening and the many benefits that have 
been shown to be associated with or come from having good listening skills; several 
scholars have argued that misconceptions about listening have led to its neglect.  
1.3.2 Misconceptions about Listening 
Despite the amount of time that people spend listening and that listening 
effectively has many benefits, and despite the fact that interest in listening seems to have 
increased in recent years, listening still does not attract a lot of scholarly attention. 
Beginning to answer the question about why people do not study listening, Wolvin and 
Coakley (1996) suggest that misconceptions about listening may “contribute to listening 
failures, educators neglecting listening instruction, poor listeners not seeking listening 
training, and society continuing to perpetuate fallacies about listening” (p.11). Thus, one 
could say that people’s misconceptions have caused them to neglect listening. Wolvin 
and Coakley (1996) go on to outline seven misconceptions of listening (p.11): 
1. Listening and Hearing Are Synonymous.  
2. Listening Competency Develops Naturally.  
3. Listening Ability is Largely Dependent on Intelligence. 
4. Reading and Listening Are the Same Process.  
5. Listening is Primarily a Passive Activity.  
6. Effective Communication is the Responsibility of the Speaker. 
7. Listening Means Agreement or Obedience. 
Clearly, one can easily see how believing in any of these misconceptions could cause 
someone not to want to study listening; the three that have the most relevance for this 
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 project are: 1.) Listening and Hearing are Synonymous; 2.) Listening Competency 
Develops Naturally; 3.) Effective Communication is the Responsibility of the Speaker. 
The follow paragraphs will discuss each of these misconceptions in detail.  
Misconception: Listening and hearing are synonymous 
Wolvin and Coakley (1996) suggest some people think that hearing a sound 
automatically means listening to that sound; they refute this idea when they write: “We 
may hear well and be efficient listeners, but we also may hear well and be inefficient 
listeners” (p. 12). The distinction between listening and hearing lies at the heart of this 
dissertation, which agrees that a person may hear well but listen inefficient but argues 
that a person may not hear well but still listen efficiently. While Wolvin and Coakley 
(1996) argue that “hearing-impaired Americans” have an excuse for poor listening habits 
(p. 25-26); this dissertation argues that no one has an excuse for poor listening.  
Misconception: listening competency develops naturally 
Further, many people see listening as a closed issue; they equate developing 
listening skills with learning how to walk and eat: something that most people come to 
learn through everyday experience; not something that requires special training or 
practice. Alder once remarked: “How utterly amazing is the general assumption that the 
ability to listen well is a natural gift for which no training is required” (Wolvin and 
Coakley, 1996, p. 12). This misconception develops when someone reads all the statistics 
about how much time people spend listening and then concludes that people learn how to 
listen properly simply by spending all that time listening. As evidence to refute this 
misconception, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) point to a study by Nichols and Stevens 
which provides evidence to the contrary; according to that study, the ability of students to 
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 recall and comprehend lecture material decreased as they progressed through school, thus 
showing that more listening does not mean better listening skills; explaining this 
phenomenon, Elbing writes: “although we all learn experiences, there is no guarantee that 
we learn from experience. In fact, it is possible to learn downright errors and second-rate 
methods from experience…it is only training in systematic method which enables us to 
correctly analyze situations so that we can truly learn from experiences” (p. 12). Clearly, 
listening more does not mean listening more effectively. At this point then, after 
discussing two common misconceptions of listening, one can begin to understand why 
people have neglected to study listening as much as speaking; however that next section 
of this chapter will present several other reasons why people have neglected listening.  
1.3.3 Other reasons why listening has been neglected 
Misconception: Effective Communication is the Responsibility of the Speaker.  
While one may argue that all of the misconceptions that Wolvin and Coakley 
outline, and particularly the two already discussed in detail, can help to explain why 
listening does not easily capture people’s interest, this dissertation argues that the 
common misconception of listening and speaking as not having equal roles to play in the 
communication process may give people even more reason not to study listening. This 
misconception has at its roots in ideas about the relationship between speaking and 
listening within the communication process; while some may see only one or two ways to 
see the relationship between speaking and listening within the communication process, 
this dissertation sees three different ways to understand this relationship: first, one can 
see speaking as the primary activity in the communication process; second, one can see 
listening as the primary activity in the that process; finally, one can see listening and 
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 speaking as equally critical elements in the that process. The next sections of this 
dissertation will outline the communication process and each of these positions.  
The Communication Process  
Wolvin and Coakley (1996) list the components of the communication process as 
Source, Message, Channel, Receiver, Feedback, Environment, and Noise; by their 
description, the source encodes a message and then transmits it through a channel to the 
receiver, who then decodes it and transmits feedback to the sender; this process happens 
within a given environment; a simple picture of this process would like this (p. 50): 
Illustration 1.1 Communication Process (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996 p. 50) 
 
In addition to naming the components of the communication process, Wolvin and 
Coakley (1996) also suggest variables such as the level of communication skills mastered 
by the sender and receiver, the amount of knowledge the sender and receiver have about 
the subject matter at hand, the attitudes and personal experience of the sender and 
receiver, the complexity and content of the message being transmitted, and language and 
channel used to transmit the message will affect the process (p. 51). From this simple 
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 graphic, one might understand why people would have confusion over the place of 
listening and speaking in the process; Wolvin and Coakley talk about this problem.  
Speaking as the primary activity in the communication process 
Wolvin and Coakley (1996) write “Many people fail to realize that meaningful 
oral communication is a result of both the sending and receiving of messages. If only our 
ears were as actively involved as our mouths, our failure to listen would not be such a 
vital concern to so many individuals” (p. 1). Purdy (1997) suggests that this mainstream 
Western idea that the speaker has sole responsibility for effective communication has its 
roots in expectations of child behavior; he writes:  
“The ability to speak and control speech [is] a source of power in American 
culture. The child learns that the parent has the last word and often cannot speak 
until spoken to. The young student can speak out only when called upon by a 
teacher; the rest of the time, he or she is expected to listen. Our culture has 
learned this lesson only too well. We listen to the voice of authority – be that 
authority a medical or legal practitioner, a manager, an officer of the law, or a 
religious leader. Listening has, consequently, come to be associated with 
passivity, often times with weakness. As a result of this attitude, which trivializes 
listening, listening training has been largely ignored in the classroom, as well as 
business and industry” (p. xii-xiv).  
Purdy (1997) furthers his point when he writes: “Communication has two dimensions: 
speaking (expression) and listening (reception). For most of Western Civilization, 
speaking has been the form of communication regarded as the most important. The first 
books on communication were about how to be an effective speaker. Listeners were 
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 recognized, but only as they were important to the purposes of the speaker. In fact, 
speaking has been championed as the way to success throughout Western history” (p. 1). 
If one accepts Purdy’s assessment, then one can clearly see how this perception of the 
relationship between listening and speaking could influence the likelihood of someone 
choosing to study listening, and how this perception still prevails today.  
The introductory communication course that most college students have to take 
aptly titled public speaking represents one area in which the perceived primacy of 
speaking comes through. Harlen Adams (1946) in his article “Listening” makes the point 
that “The development of good speakers may well proceed by giving attention to the 
development of intelligent listeners” (p. 10). To explain, then, why so many teachers 
neglect to teach listening skills, Adams theorizes that most speech teachers would agree 
with the idea that “speaking and listening cannot be separated,” but then “focus their 
attention upon the teaching of speech and apparently assumed the skills in listening” (p. 
210). One could classify Adams as an optimist on this point. Whether a speech instructor 
simply does not have the proper tools in his/her teaching toolbox to teach listening skills 
or whether the instructor sees simply listening as less important than speaking, the 
connection between the two still remains primary – the primary goals of communication 
(or at least of a speech class) by most standards has to do with effective speaking, so in 
that context, what sense does it make to study listening except as it helps develop 
speaking skills? Wiskell (1946) calls Adams’ bluff when he writes that Adams 
“subordinates listening to speaking so that the emphasis becomes a means towards a 
better ability to speak” (p. 505) but then reveals his own position by not contradicting the 
underlying message of the superiority of speaking one finds in Adams’ work.  
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 One can also see examples of the perception that speaking is the most importance 
aspect of the communication process in more popular and recent books. Tounge Fu!, a 
recently published popular communication text – which John Gray, noted communication 
scholar and author of Men are from Mars; Women are from Venus, states “puts a new 
twist on communication” and  “everyone should read it” – hardly addresses the issue of 
listening. According to author Sam Horn (1997), “Tongue Fu! (a mental art) is a spoken 
form of self-defense – the constructive alternative to giving a tongue-lashing or being 
tongue tied. The goal of Tongue Fu! is to learn how to conduct yourself with confidence 
so you keep from being abused verbally” (p. xii). While Horn (1997) does point out that 
learning to listen “can improve every relationship that you have” and suggests that 
everyone take the time to listen to each other (p. 110), she limits her discussion of 
listening to a section of her book entitled “Turn Conflicts into Cooperation;” thus, 
listening appears a supplementary or superfluous part of her communication strategy. 
Similarly to Tongue Fu!, Verbal Judo by George Thompson (1993), promises its readers: 
“you’ll learn how to speak with anybody without causing or escalating conflict. You’ll 
learn to praise without sounding manipulative. And you’ll learn to criticize so people 
remember what was said, are motivated to change, and still feel like valued team 
members. Verbal Judo also has solutions for dealing with people under the influence of 
liquor, drugs, fear, rage, or plain stupidity” (p. 13). In these examples, one sees that what 
to say in a given situation becomes primary and listening become secondary, 
One of few exceptions to the primacy of speaking one finds in popular 
communication texts is Rebecca Shafir’s (2000) The Zen of Listening; this book seeks to 
explain the metaphor of mindful listening; Shafir writes: “The mindful-listening approach 
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 is a mindset for connecting with people and information that stands up to the challenges 
of communicating in the twenty-first century” (p. 14). While one might find Shafir’s 
emphasis on listening refreshing, one must not to trade one misconception for another.  
Listening as primary in the listening process: another misconception 
While the list of misconceptions about listening highlighted by Wolvin and 
Coakley does not suggest it, one might say that those who see listening as primary in the 
communication process have the same logic as those who see speaking as primary in that 
process. Purdy (1997) offers an example of argument for the primacy of listening: 
“Among the basic skills we need for success in life, listening is primary – there is 
no meaningful communication without listening. Developmentally, we listen 
before we learn to speak, read, or write. Brown, one of the pioneers of listening 
research has noted that ‘Of foremost importance is in the role of listening is 
language acquisition, [itself] the basis of all subsequent communication, the 
foundation of all life-long reading, writing, speaking and listening activities.’ 
Heidegger, considered one of the 20th century’s greatest philosophers, recognized 
the primacy of listening in creating meaning” (p. 4). 
Purdy (1997) bases this point in biology by quoting Eric Havelock:  
“The natural human being is not writer or a reader, but a speaker and a listener. 
This must be as true of us today…as it was 7,000 years ago. Literacy at any stage 
of its development is in terms of evolutionary time a mere upstart, and to this day 
it is in our spoken communication with each other that we reveal and operate our 
biological inheritance” (p. xiii).  
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 Clearly, the emphasis on the idea that humans listen before they learn to speak tends 
toward a position that would see listening as primary to speaking. This dissertation, 
however, holds to a position of equality between speaking and listening.  
Listening and Speaking as Equals in the Communication Process  
If one classifies seeing either listening or speaking as primary within the 
communication process as a misconception, one could suggest that viewing them as 
equally critical activities within that process more accurately describes the complexity of 
the communication process. What does it mean to see listening and speaking as equally 
important in the communication process? Wolvin and Coakley (1996) make this point 
when they explain communication from a transactional perspective; they write: “We are 
constantly involved in a process of encoding and decoding messages in a fairly 
simultaneous sequence. We really function as source and receiver at the same time… 
This perspective of communication as the simultaneous interaction of the roles of source 
and receiver has come to be known as the transactional perspective” (p. 59). Given the 
simultaneous nature of communication from the transactional perspective, Wolvin and 
Coakley (1996) suggest that, rather than sender or receiver, one should refer to those 
involved in the communication process as communicators (p. 59). 
Further illustrating the model, Rhodes describes communication from the 
transaction perspective like this: “As I listen, I simultaneously ‘speak’ to you with my 
nonverbal responses. As you speak, you simultaneously ‘listen’ to the nonverbal 
messages, periodically tune into the verbal messages, and continuously adapt you 
communication behaviors according to your assessment of the extent to which you have 
been understood” (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 62). Other scholars working from this 
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 perspective include John Stewart and Smith and Williamson; they both mention the 
metaphor of meaning-creating in their work; Smith and Williamson state that, from a 
transactional perspective, communicators “are simultaneously and mutually engaged in 
the process of creating meaning” (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 60). Stewart adds “From 
a transactional perspective, human communicating is a process of meaning-creating 
rather than idea-or-message sending. When you’re communication you’re not 
transmitting your ideas to others but evoking their own ideas or meaning” (Wolvin and 
Coakley, 1996, p. 60). One can say, then, that speaking and listening have equal roles to 
play in the communication process as seen from the transactional perspective.  
In order to understand to better understand what the communication processes 
might look like from a transactional perspective, one can to the work of Schramm. 
According to Schramm, an early proponent of the transactional perspective, offers the 
following picture of the communication process from the transactional perspective:  
Illustration 1.2 Transactional Communication Process (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 59) 
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 The transactional perspective allows one sees listening and speaking as equally important 
activities in the communication process. Further, this model includes the complexity 
missing from more linear models highlighting either speaking or listening, which makes 
it more descriptive of the human experience of the communication. Wolvin and Coakley 
(1996) describe this complexity when they write: “It is clear, therefore, that 
communication is a complex process…Too frequently, we tend to sit back and require the 
speaker to assume full responsibility for the communication. Effective communication, 
however, is a shared, meaningful, active process that imposes upon speakers and listeners 
alike equal responsibilities for the outcome” (p. 59). In other words, the idea that the 
speaker has sole responsible for effective communication does not take into account the 
complex, active, and shared nature of the communication process. Further, one can argue 
that the fact that the philosophy of the day has taken what Alasdair MacIntrye would call 
an emotivist turn also contributes to the state of affairs that allows Michael P. Nichols to 
argue that American society has lost the art of listening.   
Modern moral philosophy: why we have lost the art of listening  
 When considering other reasons for the lack of interest in listening, Michael P. 
Nichols (1994) argues in his book, The Lost Art of Listening, that the post-Enlightenment 
conception of the individual as autonomous as well as the chaotic lifestyle led by many 
people has contributed to the what he sees as a complete loss of the art of listening by 
society in general (p. 1-2).  One can connect this to Alasdair MacIntrye’s (1998) notion 
of emotivism, the practice of making moral judgments based on one’s emotional response 
to a statement; he writes: “Emotivism does not attend sufficiently to the distinction 
between the meaning of a statement which remains constant between different users, and 
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 the variety of uses, and the variety of uses to which one and the same statement can be 
put” (p. 259). In other words, an emotivist may find it difficult to listen effectively 
because he/she will have a hard time distinguishing between the content or meaning of 
what the another person has said and his/her reaction to that message. This mindset has 
contributed to Nichol’s categorization of listening as a lost art. Unlike emotivism, making 
the choice to listen involves stepping outside of one’s emotivist reality and opening 
oneself to the perspective of the other. In talking about the role of choice in the listening 
process, this dissertation has as its goal to remind people of the importance of listening 
and offer a way to discover or perhaps rediscover the listening process outside of the 
realm of behaviorism. In order to make the case for the choice to listen, this dissertation 
will rely primarily on the methodologies of hermeneutics and close-text analysis.  
1.4 Methodology: Listening to the Literature 
Now that one has some general understanding of why one should study, the 
discussion can turn to exactly how this dissertation will study the listening process. The 
methodologies at work in this dissertation include philosophical hermeneutics as outlined 
in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and close-text analysis. Before one can 
understanding specifically how these methodologies work and their connection to each 
other, one must first draw a distinction between the philosophical nature of this work and 
the scientific nature of much of the rest of work in this field. Making a distinction 
between philosophy and science, Gadamer (1981) writes in Reason in the Age of Science: 
"It is evident that what we call philosophy is not science. It is not the case that philosophy 
has a positive datum alongside the standard areas of the other sciences to be investigated 
by it alone, for philosophy has to do with the whole. But this whole it not merely, as is 
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 true of any other whole, the whole comprised of all its parts. As the whole, it is the ideas 
that transcends every finite possibility of knowledge, and so it is nothing we can know in 
a scientific way" (p. 1). In other words, this dissertation will not use empirical methods to 
produce statistical results to prove or disprove the work of other theorists in the field. 
This may seem like an uncommon path – the second chapter of this dissertation will 
argue that the majority of scholarship listening has come from a social-scientific 
perspective – but this project takes a more hermeneutical approach.  
Hermeneutics as a methodology  
To more accurately describe the philosophical approach of this project, one can 
see it loosely follows the tenets of philosophical hermeneutics as well as some tenets of 
close-text analysis. Focusing first on hermeneutics and borrowing Gadamer’s words 
again, one can describe hermeneutics as both a practical and theoretical philosophy. 
Gadamer (1981) states that in Ancient Greece, "hermeneutics was primarily a practical 
component in the activity of understanding and interpreting. Books bearing the title 
'Hermeneutics' usually had a purely pragmatic and occasional bent and were helpful for 
the understanding of difficult texts by explaining hard-to-understand passages;" he offers 
Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana as one of the first examples of a work that actually 
began to question the nature of interpretation (p. 94); while Gadamer does see 
hermeneutics as theoretical, he cautions that "this theoretical stance only makes us aware 
reflectively of what is performatively at play in the practical experience of 
understanding;" he goes onto observe that "the universal desire to know does not break 
off at the point where concrete practical discernment is the decisive issue. The connection 
between the universal desire to know and concrete particular discernment is a reciprocal 
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 one" (p. 112). Gadamer, then, believes that any theory must have a practical application; 
vice-versa, any concrete task that humans do, no matter how trivial it may seem, has a 
theory behind it. This project seeks to develop a more textured understanding or theory of 
listening than one finds in the literature. In order to examine the current literature, this 
dissertation will employ some of the principles of close-text analysis. Close-text analysis 
represents an approach to rhetorical criticism; a more detailed analysis will follow.  
Close-textual analysis  
Bernard L. Brock and Robert L. Scott (1980) categorize close-text analysis within 
the category of the “New Rhetorics” perspective on rhetorical criticism; though they 
define close-text analysis as the “focusing on stylistic choices as strategies designed to 
make the acceptance of a proposed action forgone conclusion” (p. 272). While this 
dissertation will not focus on the style of texts and literature reviewed, it will focus on 
looking at them strategically in order to build a case for the choice to listen. Hermann G. 
Stelzner (1980) refers to this as microcosmic rather than macrocosmic analysis (p. 321); 
this means it focuses on details of the text and the thoughts or actions it proposes rather 
than how favorably people perceived the text of any controversy the author or content 
may have caused. Thus, this dissertation will use detailed quotes from the reviewed 
literature strategically in order to provide evidence about the underlying thought patterns 
in the current literature. This approach and methodology may differ to some extent from 
who would seek a macrocosmically prove or disprove theories using other methods; this 
dissertation seeks only to further the conversation about the listening process. 
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1.5 Summary  
 To summarize the first chapter of this dissertation, one can say that it has 
examined reasons why people should study listening as well as some of the factors that 
have caused people to neglect studying listening. Finally, this chapter described the two 
major methodologies at work in this project – hermeneutics and close-text analysis in 
order to describe its approach to the field’s literature. The next chapter of this dissertation 
will focus strategically on the literature of the field of listening in order to provide 
evidence for the underlying behaviorist tendencies in the literature of the field. 
  
 
Chapter 2  
 
 
Trends in Listening Research  
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
While the main argument of this dissertation has to do with the way scholars have 
framed listening as process, this chapter will serve to as a touchstone to the main 
categories of definitions and ideas about listening besides the understanding of listening 
as a process. Specifically in this chapter I will look at the current state of research on the 
topic of listening, which most scholars describe as confused and disconnected. I will then 
look at one of the main reasons scholars cite for current state of listening research: the 
multitude and spectrum of definitions of listening. Finally, I will address what scholars 
have done to try to synthesize those definitions and the field of listening research.  
 “Firsts” in the study of listening  
Before talking about the current state of research in the field of listening, I will list 
some of the highlights of listening research over the past century as compiled by James I. 
Brown from the University of Minnesota. Brown’s (1987) timeline includes:  
1912 – First article (in the sense of earliest) dealing with listening listed in  
Duker’s bibliography – “The Relation between Mode of Presentation and 
Retention” by V.A.C. Hermon, Psychological Review.  
1926 – First major study dealing with listening – The Measurement of the Ability  
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 to Understand Spoken Language by Paul T. Rankin – doctoral dissertation 
(Up to this time, the word listening, as now used, was not familiar.) 
1949 – First study committee on listening – Vertical Committee on listening,  
established by the National Council of Teachers of English Commission 
on the English Curriculum. 
1952 – First publication to contain an chapter entire on listening – “The Program  
in Listening” from The English Language Curriculum published by the 
NCTE. 
 1952 – First collection of readings for college use with one entire section on  
listening, including an early article by Ralph G. Nichols – Efficient 
Reading by James I. Brown.  
 1953 – First standardized test devised to measure listening ability – The Brown- 
Carlsen Listening Comprehension Test for grades 9 through 13.  
 1955 – First educational journal to devote an entire issue to listening – Education  
Vol. 75. No. 5.  
 1957 – First full-length book on listening – Are you Listening? By Ralph G.  
Nichols and Leonard A. Stevens.  
1964 – First book-length annotated bibliography, (880 references) – Listening  
Bibliography by Sam Duker. 
1966 – First book-length collection of articles on listening, a landmark collection  
with over 50 articles – Listening: Readings by Sam Duker.  
1971 – First person to write four book in the field of listening – Sam Duker. In  
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 addition to the two already mentioned, Duker wrote Listening 
Bibliography, Second Edition and Listening: Readings, Volume II.  
(Duker’s 4 books have perhaps contributed more to help newcomers to the 
field than anything else, providing, as they do, the most comprehensive 
view available of early explorations in listening, of important figures and 
major concerns.  
1979 – First professional society established solely for the advancement of  
listening – the International Association of Listening (ILA), brought into 
being through the leadership of Lyman K. (Manny) Steil.  
1980 – First annual convention of the ILA – in Atlanta.  
1984 – First public-supported tax-exempt foundation focused primarily on  
listening – Institute for the Study of Intrapersonal Processes, established 
through the leadership of Larry L. Barker. 
1986 – First award for the best theoretical data-based research award in listening,  
granted by the Institute for the Study of Intrapersonal Processes –  the 
Ralph G. Nichols Award. 
1987 – First professional journal giving exclusive attention to listening – the  
 Journal of the International Listening Association 
This list represents some of the first “firsts” in the study listening; certainly others have 
happened in the two decades since 1987, but Brown (1987) points out one of the facts 
about this list that reveals the most about the development of listening when he writes 
“there are about as many firsts in the last 20 years [prior to 1987] as there were in the first 
50 years [from the early 1900s through the 1950s] of activity” (p. 5).  As one looks at the 
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 history of listening research one begins to see fragmentation as the field matures and 
different theories and approaches are developed. Scholarly summaries of listening 
research highlight the disunity within the field of listening. However, this dissertation 
will argue that, despite the disunity that some see, some underlying tends do exist.  
2.2 The Current State of Listening Research  
Sam Duker (1966) published one of the first summaries of listening research. 
Since then, other scholars have offered their assessment of the current state of research 
within the field of listening. While Duker organizes his around some of the basic research 
questions of the time, Witkin (1990) offered her assessment the state of listening research 
in a special edition of the International Journal of Listening she writes: “We may well 
ask, is research on listening in a parlous state? Certainly, much of it appears confused, 
incomplete, messy, inconclusive—and possibly a lot of what we know isn’t so!” (p. 7). 
To highlight this disunity and confusion, Witkin (1990) cites several different 
conclusions one can draw from the current literature:  
• There may be no such entity as “listening.” 
• There are many definitions of listening, but no one that is generally agreed upon. 
• There is no one theory about listening or how it works.  
• Most research in listening is not based on theory.  
• The extant research is often contradictory.  
• Almost no studies have been done to replicate or verify previous research.  
• There is a very serious question as to whether there is an “art” to listening  
research, and whether indeed the processes can be observed and studied.  
35 
 These points outline some serious concerns that Witkin has about listening research; 
clearly she sees some disconnect among the different approaches to listening; so do other 
scholars. Wolvin et al. (1999) conducted a study assessing what they call the “intellectual 
discussion” on listening theory and research as represented in the International Journal of 
Listening (IJOL); they point to articles published in the IJOL by Brown McKenzie and 
Clark, Fitch-Hauser and Hughes, and Halone et al. that highlight this same concern (p. 
112). One can clearly see the disunity of the field by looking at its definitions, theoretical 
models, and research methods. However, this dissertation argues that by examining the 
same aspects of listening research, one can also see some unity within the field.  
2.2.1 Definitions of Listening  
One can clearly see the disunity that Witkin and other scholars point to in the vast 
array of definitions that dot the listening landscape; they range from the simple to the 
complex and from the scientific to the philosophical. Mark Brady (2003) offers an 
example of a philosophical definition of listening in the preface to his book The Wisdom 
of Listening; he writes: “Listening skillfully is difficult. Full attention is a discipline much 
like meditation. It requires practice, rigor, and resolve. And when our efforts slacken, it 
may require forgiveness, gentleness, and sometimes a bit of creative inspiration to get 
ourselves back on track” (p. 1). Purdy (1997) also takes a philosophical approach with his 
metaphor of conscious listening; he states that listening can give a person power when 
interacting others but cautions: “the type of listening that has power must be a conscious 
listening, listening with self-conscious awareness” (p. 2). Purdy (1997) goes onto explain: 
“We all learn to listen naturally with little striving as we mature, but learning to listening 
consciously takes extra effort. Becoming a conscious listener will make you more 
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 sensitive to the needs of the listener (audience) and hence, improve your competence as a 
speaker. It will also make you more sensitive to the needs of people in general” (p. 2) 
Thus, for these writers, working from a philosophical perspective, listening has less to do 
with the physiology of the human body and more to do with the human spirit   
Moving to a more concrete, simplistic, and practical approach, Madelyn Burley-
Allen (1995) refers to listening simply and in a quasi-scientific way as a “method of 
taking in information” (p. 3).  Burley-Allen (1995) also outlines 3 levels of listening: 1. 
listening in spurts; 2. hearing words but not really listening; and 3. empathetic listening; 
she claims that an effective listener listens empathetically at all times (p. 14). Her idea of 
empathetic listening echoes Purdy’s idea of conscious listening but with less intense 
philosophical connotations. However, early scholars such as Nichols focused on the 
physical aspects of listening. Nichols (1947) first defined listening as “the attachment of 
meaning to aural symbols” (p. 84). In more detailed work. Nichols (1957) offers three 
qualifications to this definition: (a) Since much listening is done in intervals of quiet, and 
since silence frequently carries meaning, silence itself must be accepted as an aural 
symbol. (b) Since the assimilation of meaning sometimes starts before a speaker says a 
word, and since it very frequently continues long after he has said his final one, listening 
is not necessarily limited to the immediate speaking situation. (c) Although meaning may 
be attached to aural symbols with or without the presence of visual cues, listening as a 
medium of learning usually implies the presence of speakers in person, in ‘live’ situations 
in which visual and aural cue complement each other in the mode of presentation” (p. 1). 
Nichols’ ideas – and the ideas of those who take a similar approach – still have currency 
today even though he does not take philosophical aspects of listening into account.  
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 For a complex yet scientifically based definition of listening, one can point to the 
work of Carl Weaver, author of Human Listening. Weaver (1972) defines communication 
as “a process that occurs when an agent receives data;” he clarifies this to mean “any kind 
of agent and any kind of data” (p. 4). Weaver (1972) goes on to say that “listening occurs 
when a human organism receives data aurally” (p. 5); he explains why he has chosen this 
particular wording: “Of course, we could broaden the definition by deleting the word 
“human” [because] other organisms listen too…We could narrow the definition by 
adding the word ‘verbal’ just before the word ‘data.’ This would restrict the definition to 
the reception of one kind of aurally input data; there are other kinds that are part of the 
listening process too” (p. 5). Weaver (1972) does not include visual data within his 
definition of listening because “although the senses work together, often simultaneously, 
to input data into the system [human being] during the process of communication…a 
book on the reception of communicative data that concerned all modes of input would not 
be a book on listening at all, but a book on communication” (p. 5-6).  
Weaver goes on to clarify his definition even more. Describing his notion of 
“data” more specifically, Weaver (1972) says that aural data only comes in the form of 
sound waves and explains: “The energy in these waves is transferred to into electrical 
energy and carried via the eighth nerve to central nervous system, where a very 
complicated process occurs. This process is called cognitive structuring” (p. 6). Moving 
on to the notion of receiving, Weaver (1972) writes: “The listening process concerns only 
the selecting of such stimulus data in order to ‘receive’ it and the cognitive structuring of 
it. [Thus] the term includes both selecting and structuring, or handling, the data. This 
means…that the data will be stored somewhere in your brain and thus will be 
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 remembered. Data that are not selected for attention usually enter the memory system and 
thus are not really received” (p. 6). Clearly, Weaver views listening scientifically, but he 
does define aspects of the listening process that do not have a completely scientific base 
When defining his three aspects of listening – capacity, willingness, and habits – 
Weaver (1972) suggests “habits” and willingness go hand in hand and represent generally 
self-explanative concepts and, characteristically of someone with a scientific bend, turns 
towards the idea of intelligence when he describes “capacity” more specifically; he 
writes: “The capacity to listen concerns the ability to select and structure input data and 
thus remember it. Listening-improvement exercises are usually concerned with this 
aspect of listening. Ability depends partly on intelligence, of course, which tends to place 
some maximum limit on the rate and quality of data handling. General sophistication and 
knowledge of the subject of the message are also factors in this aspect of listening” (p. 7). 
Weaver (1972) also lists “biases” and “sex” (gender) as which affect the “selection and 
handling” of aurally input data” and then ties one’s ability to listen to one’s 
“intelligence,” which he sees as measurable (p. 25). The idea of relating listening to 
intelligence and the question of measuring listening also dates back to Nichols’ work.   
 Other examples of definitions of listening can be found in the work of Ethel 
Glenn (1989) who analyzed 50 of them in an article. These definitions include:  
1. …an analysis of impression resulting from concentration where an effort of will is 
required (Tuker, 1925) 
2. …the ability to understand spoken language (Rankin, 1926)  
3. …the conscious, purposeful registration of sounds upon the mind (which) leads to 
further mental activity (Hook, 1950) 
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 4. …the ability to understand and respond effectively to oral communication 
(Johnson, 1951) 
5. …the process of reacting to, interpreting, and relating the spoken language in 
terms of past experiences and further courses of action (Barbe and Meyers, 1954)  
6. …the aural assimilation of spoken symbols in a face-to-face audience situation 
with both oral and visual cues present (Brown and Carlson, 1955)  
7. …the capacity of an individual to understand spoken language in the presence of 
a speak (Still, 1955) 
8. …a selective process by which sounds communication by some source are 
received, critically interpreted, and acted upon by a purposeful listening (Jones, 
1956) 
9. …a definite, usually voluntary effort to apprehend acoustically (Barbara, 1957) 
10. …the act of giving attention to the spoken word, not only in hearing symbols buy 
in reacting with understanding (Hampleman, 1958)  
11. …the process of hearing, identifying, understanding and interpreting spoken 
language (Lewis, 1958)  
12. …the composite process by which oral language communicated by some source is 
received, critically and purposefully attended to, recognized, and interpreted (or 
comprehended) in terms of past experiences and future experiences (Petrie, 1971)  
13. …the selective process of attending to, hearing, understanding, and remember 
aural symbols (Barker, 1971) 
14. …the process by which spoken language is converted to meaning in the mind 
(Lundsteen, 1971)  
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 15. …a process that takes place when a human organism receives data orally 
(Weaver, 1972)  
16. …the process whereby the human ear receives sound stimuli from other people 
and through a series of steps interprets that sound stimuli in the brain and 
remembers it (Hirsch, 1979)  
17. …the active process involved in attached meaning to sounds (Spearrill, 1962) 
18. …involves actively tapping and drawing upon the senses as receptors and a 
transmitting back of information which can be assimilated and made available for 
future use (Barbara, 1971)  
19. …a nonspeaking, often (but not always) nonvocal, perhaps inaudible activity from 
another person (Ernst, 1973)  
20. …a rather definite and deliberative ability to hear information, to analyze it, to 
recall it at a later time, and to draw conclusions from it (Kelly, 1975)  
21. …the act of selectively discriminating among the available aural inputs within 
any given environment (Colburn and Weinberg, 1981)  
22. ..getting inside the other person and seeing things from his or her point of view 
(Montgomery, 1981) 
23. …the art of getting meaning from a situation in which the spoken word conveys 
meaning (Anasiasi, 1982)  
24. …consists of four connected activities – sensing, interpreting, evaluating, and 
responding (Steil, Barker, and Waston, 1983)  
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 25. …a unitary-receptive communication process of hearing and selecting, 
assimilating and organizing, and retaining and covertly responding to aural and 
nonverbal stimuli (Wolff, Marsnik, Tracey and Nichols, 1983)  
26. …a process that includes hearing, attending to, evaluating, and responding to 
spoken messages (Floyd, 1985)  
27. …the process of receiving, attending to, and assigning meaning to aural stimuli 
(Wolvin and Coakley, 1985) 
28. …receiving and attending to a message, interpreting the message (assigning 
meaning), evaluating the message, and responding to the message (Sayre, 1987) 
29. …detection, discrimination, recognition, or comprehension of speech through 
audition, vision, or both in combination (Berg, 1987) 
30. …the perceptual process by which verbal and nonverbal communication 
(including mechanical sounds) from some source or sources are selectively 
received, recognized, and interpreted by a receiver or receivers in relation to the 
perceptual files of the parties to the process (Anderson, Nichols and Booth, 1974) 
31. …attention to both verbal and nonverbal speech stimuli (McBurney and Wrage, 
1975)  
32. …three interwoven processes: (1) the physical perception of auditory stimuli, (2) 
the perception (symbolic classification) of the stimuli, and (3) the interpretation of 
the stimuli  (Millar and Millar, 1976)  
33. …listening well requires attention, thought, interpretation, and  imagination 
(Shrope, 1979) 
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 34. …the total process of receiving, interpreting, analyzing, and retaining data 
(Zimmerman, 1979) 
35. …the process of receiving and assigning meaning to aural messages involves 
comprehending, interpreting, and evaluating (Brooks, 1980)  
36. …a perceptual process which centers on but which is not to sound begins before 
and continues after our ears receive aural stimuli (Sproule, 1981)  
37. …the whole interpretive process whereby you make sense out of communicative 
stimuli (Ehninger, Gronbeck, McKerrow and Monroe, 1982)  
38. …absorbing ideas in the mind, where they can be stored, interpreted, recalled and 
acted upon (Cohen, 1983)  
39. …the process of selecting, attending, understanding, and remembering 
(Masterson, Beebe and Waston, 1983) 
40. …a conscious effort using mainly the sense of hearing (reinforced by other 
senses), which in turn leads to interpretation and understanding (Ross, 1983) 
41. …involves four interrelated steps – receiving, interpreting, analyzing, and 
retaining certain sound stimuli in the environment (Samovar and Mills, 1983) 
42. …to listen is to act, to be alert to what is heard, to strain one’s ears to catch the 
oral sounds made by a speaker and to let the mind dwell upon their meanings 
(Tracey, 1983)  
43. …equaling hearing – perception (focus) – attention (selection) – recognition of 
cure – understanding – evaluation retention (Weaver, 1983) 
44. …four component parts – sensing, attending, understanding, and remember 
(Hanna and Wilson, 1984)  
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 45. …requires sensing, paying attention, and remember what we hear (Bittner, 1985)  
46. …the process whereby the nervous system interprets (those received) sound 
waves and translates them into understandable messages (Ayers and Miller, 1986)  
47. …an intellectual or active function that involves the mind, eyes, ears, and 
memory (Vasile and Mintz, 1986) 
48. …making sense out of what is transmitted (Gregory, 1987) 
49. …involves four distinct processes: receiving, perceiving, interpreting, and 
responding (Bradley, 1988) 
Looking at the vast differences in these definitions how can one not agree with Witkin’s 
assessment of the state of listening research. When one considers that scholars have also 
outlined different types and functions of the yet-undefined entity of listening, the 
academic water surrounding listening becomes even muddier.  
To further complicate the issue of what it means to listen, one can take that a step 
further and distinguish between types of listening done in different situations. For 
instance,  Nichols  (1957) outlines three different types of listening: (a) appreciative 
listening to any kind of stimuli gratifying to the senses of the hearer; (b) critical listening 
to persuasive speech for the purpose of evaluating the speaker’s argument and evidence; 
(c) discriminative listening to informative speech (usually in an instructional setting)  for 
the purpose of comprehension” (p. 1). By this idea, listening to an orchestral symphony 
requires a different set of listening skills than listening to a political speech or teacher’s 
lecture. Decades later, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) add to Nichols’ list as follows:  
• Discriminative Listening: listening to distinguish stimuli, whether aural or visual; 
it is basic to the other four purposes of listening (p. 113).   
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 • Comprehensive Listening:  listening for understanding; “The comprehensive 
listener is successful if the message that he or she receives, attends to, and assigns 
meaning to is as close as possible to that which the sender intended. 
Remembering plays a major role in comprehensive listening when the listener’s 
purpose is not only to understand the message being presented but retain it for 
future use (p. 161).  
• Therapeutic Listening: listening to provide a troubled sender the opportunity to 
talk through a problem. 
• Critical Listening: listening to comprehend and then evaluate a message; “The 
critical listener makes a decision to accept or reject a message on the basis of 
sound criteria. Listening should be critical especially when the listener is exposed 
to a persuasive message designed to influence a change in the listener” (p. 247).  
• Appreciative Listening: “Appreciative listening is the highly individualized 
process of listening in order to obtain sensory stimulation or enjoyment through 
the works and experiences of others. The process is highly individualized because 
it incorporates…a person’s sensitivities in order to derive impressions and/or 
pleasure from the stimulus. As such, appreciative listening may represent a 
basically emotional response” (p. 281). 
In analyzing these basic types of listening as outlined, one can agree with Wolvin and 
Coakley that” one must decide to listen discriminately before one can listen any other 
way; this fundamental decision represents the key to effective listening.  
Beyond the various types and definitions of listening, Purdy (1997) writes that 
“Equally important are the functions…of listening” (p. 10). Purdy (1997) applies the 
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 work of Dance and Larson, who offer several functions for communication in general, to 
listening. Dance and Larson describe the functions of communication as “(1) the linking 
of the individual with the environment, (2) the development of higher mental processes, 
and (3) the regulation of human behavior” (p. 10). Looking at listening in terms of 
function – what it does – rather than trying to define or classify it offers some unique 
insights into the phenomenon. While one could certainly understand how having so many 
different definitions of listening can contribute to the confusion scholars see within the 
field of listening, one must also take into account the interdisciplinary nature of the field 
of listening and how that has impacted the struggle for unity within the field.  
2.2.2. Different disciplines that contribute to the study of listening 
While vast array of definitions of listening certainly shows the disunity of the 
field, another place that one can see them is in the various theoretical models and 
research methods used by what Witkin (1990) refers to as the several disciplines that 
contribute to the field of listening including speech communication, speech science, and 
cognitive psychology. She outlines her understanding of the disciplines as follows:  
• Speech communication includes information processing and the relationship of 
listening to reading 
• Speech science includes the work labeled phonetics or experimental phonetics, 
auditory perception, and the study of central language disorders 
• Cognitive psychology and qualitative studies includes work primarily from the 
fields of humanistic psychology and therapeutic communication 
Witkin (1990) also distinguishes between what she calls the “micro” view of listening – 
what goes on “inside the head” – from the “macro” view – what goes outside the head (p. 
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 8). Of the four disciplines she has outlined, she claims speech communication and 
qualitative studies take the larger “macro” view while speech science and cognitive 
psychology take the more narrow “micro” view; she acknowledges that much overlap 
exists and her description of the disciplines make somewhat “artificial” distinctions (p. 9-
11). According to Witkin, each discipline that contributes to the study of listening has a 
different theoretical models and a different set of research methods. By examining these, 
one can also see difference and disunity among the various areas of the field of listening. 
2.2.2.1 Theoretical models of listening 
Speech communication models  
When Witkin (1990) begins to describe some of differences in theoretical models 
the result from the different disciplines that contribute to the study of listening, she writes 
that “They are attempts to explain visually the relationship of what the authors view as 
components or phases of the listening process, and are usually not based on experimental 
research. In general, they are intended to be descriptive, not heuristic” (p. 12). When 
discussing the speech communication models, in particular Witkin (1990) cites a 1986 
paper by Wolvin which studied 12 models of listening; she writes that these models range 
“from simple diagrams or hierarchical ordering of listening components to Barker’s 
(1971) complex model of the of listening in the context of the communication process, 
including auditory and visual elements of reception, perception, discrimination, and 
response, and both cognitive and affective elements [or] Lundsteen’s (1979) flowchart 
model of the processes taken by an effective listening, incorporating responding and 
organizing, getting meaning, and thinking beyond listening” (p. 11). Witkin (1990) goes 
on mention other models in this vein such as those of Wolff, Marsnik, Tacey and Nichols 
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 “who consider listening as a unitary process composed of a hierarchical and interrelated 
set of components” and the Sensing, Evaluating, Interpreting, and Response  (SEIR) 
model of Steil, et al. and other models by Goss and Wolvin and Coakley (p.11) 
Cognitive models 
When addressing cognitive models, Witkin (1990) qualifies her summary by 
disclosing that “although [researchers in the area of cognitive psychology] have not 
developed models of listening as such, their models and in depth analysis of the processes 
of memory and attention are important for the understanding of listening” (p.12); she 
goes on to say that a complete model of listening will include both factors. As one begins 
to examine these models closer, one must examine these two concepts. According to 
Oakland and Williams, auditory attention includes “the ability to select a relevant 
stimulus from a background of irrelevant stimuli and to continue to attend selectively to 
this stimulus for an appropriate length of time” (Witkin, 1990, p. 12). Witkin (1990) 
claims that much of the research on attention has dealt with visual rather than auditory 
attention; she writes: “One of the problems with research auditory attention for speech is 
that there is confusion about what stimulus or language to use when testing for attention 
as opposed to memory” (p. 12); explains that “because of the redundancy of language, a 
listener may decode and comprehend a message without attending to every sound, 
particularly if there is a rich context. On the other hand, tests of memory span for 
unrelated words or syllables, where there is no meaningful context, are as much a test of 
attention as they are of memory” (p. 12-13). In other words, a person may pay close 
attention during a conversation (say about a loved one’s explanation of an illness) but 
only recall the discussion in generalities later, while a person may memorize some 
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 random information (say a grocery list) long enough to purchase the correct items but 
then not have any recollection of it beyond that time. So the sticky question for 
researchers of attention and listening becomes: which represents more effective listening: 
being able to accurately recall random information for after a short time or general 
information after a long time? This question and problem relate directly into the other 
components of cognitive models of listening – the issue of memory.  
Turning from models dealing with attention to those dealing with memory, Witkin 
(1990) explains that most models of memory have two stages: short-term memory (STM) 
and long-term memory (LTM) (p. 14). Talking about the relationship between these two 
types of memory and listening, Witkin (1990) writes: “One concept on memory that has 
been accepted for some decades is that of the limits of STM” by which she means the 
“the magical number 7, plus or minus 2,” a standard developed by George Miller in the 
1956 Psychological Review which suggests people can only hold around seven items in 
their STM at any one time (p. 14). Witkin (1990) explains how this limit relates to 
listening when she writes: “The production of an isolated speech sound takes time, and 
this time factor necessitates that, in listening, ‘the internal representation of the acoustic 
event be held in storage as it is progressively synthesized’ (Sanders 209). The capacity of 
both STM and LTM is therefore the utmost importance in understanding how memory 
operates in listening” (p. 14). In other words, not only does memory allow people to 
listen to and recall what they have heard, it represents one of the essential processes 
involved in their ability to string two syllables together in the first place. Next, Witkin 
continues her examination of listening models by focusing on those developed by 
scholars in the area of speech science and qualitative studies.  
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 Speech science and qualitative models  
Focusing first on models of listening from the qualitative perspective, the 
briefness of Witkin’s (1990) summary points out the lack of work in this area; she writes 
that  work in this area “has been based more on phenomenology and observation than on 
experimental, quantitative studies” (p. 18); she points to Purdy’s call for more research in 
this area while at the same time citing Tomilson’s article, “Contributions of Humanistic 
Psychology to Listening,” which outlines several verbal phase models, particularly 
models of empathy, that have come about as a result of contributions of humanistic 
psychology to the understanding of listening (p.18). After discussing qualitative models 
of listening, Witkin moves on to speech science models. Witkin (1990) writes that 
“model development and research by speech scientists have tended to focus on the 
internal, auditory perceptual aspects of listening, specifically the processes that occur in 
the listener at the moment of listening” (p. 15); she describes the generally agreed upon 
components of perceptual models: “Most perceptual models agree that that auditory 
processing includes (a) perception of the acoustic signal and recognition of its language, 
(b) analysis of linguistic units, including attention, analysis, and storage in STM, (c) 
judgment of the pertinence of the units, (d) retention in LTM and (e) associations leading 
to meaning” (p. 16). Witkin (1990) points out that this last component causes a problem: 
“auditory processing in the mature listener always involves an interaction of sensory 
input and past knowledge. There may also be separate but interrelated systems for 
processing speech elements, such as segmental and suprasegmental (intonation) 
phonemes;” she offers Doehring, who proposes a model that does not make a direct 
connection between brief sensory storage and higher-level perceptual systems as a way to 
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 address this issue (p. 17).  In addition to examining the models in the disciplines that 
contribute to the field of listening, Witkin also discusses the research done by each area.  
2.2.2.2 Research Focuses and Methods within the Field of Listening 
Witkin address both the research focuses and the research methods unique to each 
of the four disciplines. Again, one can that the vast differences in these areas have 
contributed to the overall disunity of the field. When discussing research speech science, 
Witkin (1990) writes: “There are two main thrusts to this research: the nature of the 
auditory signal and the nature of the response” (p. 20); “Research in this field is mainly 
experimental [and] often relies on sophisticated electronic equipment” (p. 23). Moving on 
to speech communication, Witkin (1990) says: “Here researchers have been interested in 
the nature of the total listening phenomenon, in how much of a message a listener 
comprehends and remembers and the interaction of listeners/speakers with the message, 
the source, and the environment” as well as effective listening; she writes that “the 
methodology of researchers in the field of speech communication varies considerably 
depending on the model used. Both observation and experimental studies have been 
undertaken. Self-reports, studies correlating listening competencies with personality or 
other traits, and interaction analyses are also used” (p. 22).  
Further, Witkin (1990) writes that research in the area of cognitive psychology 
“aims at understanding the nature of attention and memory, and the ways in which we 
gather, store, and retrieve information in order to make sense out of the environment. 
Other pertinent research explores the nature of semantic networks, the relationship 
between listening and reading, and the development of oral language in children” (p. 20-
21). Looking the methods of cognitive psychology, Witkin (1990) writes: “Research in 
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 this field is also typically experimental, and based on different kinds of models of 
attention and memory, both STM and LTM. There have also been longitudinal studies of 
infants’ children’s listening skills in the acquisition of oral language” (p. 24). Witkin goes 
on to describe the method of “on-line monitoring” developed by Sitcht, et al., and used to 
“identify the automaticity in the reading response” (p. 24).  
Finally, Witkin (1990) writes that, in qualitative studies, research focuses on the 
“transactional nature of listening;” she points to the scholars like Purdy who want to find 
the “philosophical roots of listening;” she also points to research about “the contributions 
of listeners rather than speakers to our understanding of oral communication and 
language” (p. 21). About the research methods used in this area, Witkin (1990) writes: 
“Researchers in humanistic psychology, counseling, and interpersonal growth employ 
more qualitative procedures, including ratings by trained observers. They observe 
behavioral cues, quality of voice, manner of expression, and bodily responses in both 
listeners and speakers interacting in dyads or small groups” (p. 24).  
After concluding her summary of the various models of listening and the theories 
behind them, Witkin (1990) specifically notes the lack of cohesiveness among the models 
and theories; she writes: “Just as there is no generally agreed upon definition of listening, 
and theories and models exist that are not only contradictory but mutually exclusive, so 
there has been a lack of continuity in more than a half a century of research to connect the 
efforts into a unified field of study” (p. 19). Wolvin et al. (1999) contend that “Explaining 
why these claims [of disconnect and confusion within the field of listening] have 
continued to surface throughout the scholarly literature on listening should be of critical 
importance to the continued growth, development, and future of listening theory and 
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 research” (p. 112). In order to provide some of this unity, scholars have attempted to 
synthesize the literature of the field. Several examples of this synthesis will follow.  
2.3 Synthesizing the Field of Listening 
For one example of an attempt to synthesize the field of listening, one can 
examine Wolvin et al.’s (1999) analysis of the intellectual discussion about listening, 
which sought to uncover common but primarily unstated assumptions within the 
literature of the field; these researchers hypothesized that by “understanding the 
intellectual discussion on listening provides enhanced opportunities by which to clarify 
the conceptual domain of listening which, in turn, should clarify the scholarly thinking 
that should result in the conduct of its scholarship” (p. 124). In other words, these 
researchers believe that if they can uncover the mostly unstated assumptions that reside in 
the literature on listening they will also uncover a unified theory at work in that literature 
upon which scholars in the field of listening can base research. Through their analysis of 
the articles published in the International Journal of Listening, they concluded that “the 
intellectual discussion characterizing the ILA’s [Internationl Listening Association’s] 
published research collectively consists of five ‘intellectual discourses:’ (a) listening 
theory, (b) listening research, (c) listening instruction, (d) listening assessment, and (e) 
listening practice. Identifying these ‘intellectual discourses’ implicates those assumptions 
that listening scholars have (in)directly embraced throughout the conduct of their 
listening scholarship” (123). By identifying these content areas, the researchers have 
given further scholars categories in which to place their work; by using these categories, 
scholars will find some of the unity lacking within the field of listening. Wolvin et al 
(1999) then go on to formulate a concept map of these categories:  
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 Illustration 2.1 Concept Map of Listening Discourse (Wolvin et al., 1999, p. 123) 
 
About this conceptual model, Wolvin et al. (1999) write:  
This model provides listening scholars and practioners with the opportunity to 
realize that only through possessing a clear theoretical understanding of the 
phenomenological nature of listening will subsequent research efforts concerning 
the role of listening be comprehensively understood…It is hoped that the 
conceptual map will clarify the research intentions of those scholars interested in 
various forms and functions of listening processes” (p. 124). 
 In other words, these scholars hope that synthesizing the intellectual discussion on 
listening will make it easier for other scholars to describe how their research contributes 
to the overall study of listening and see what other research has been done in a particular 
area. “This, in turn,” they write, “should provide greater opportunities for prospectively 
interested individuals to comfortably enter into, and confidently contribute to, the 
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 intellectual discussion on listening” (p. 124). Witkin, on the other hand, suggests that, 
rather that examining the literature, one should focus on theories of listening; she offers 
an alternative approach to theory building as part of an effort to synthesize the field.   
For her part in the effort to synthesize the various theories about listening, Witkin 
(1990) suggests a systemic approach; specifically, she offers two points of an alternative 
approach to what has been the norm in recent research. These points include: 
1. Listening is what a listener does. (This turns attention away from definitions and 
concern about some abstract entity called “listening” and leaves the way open for 
many avenues of investigation.)  
2. Apparent contradictions in the research can be resolved by taking a system view 
of listening. This approach recognizes that:  
• A system is comprised of many interrelated and dynamically interacting 
parts of subsystems.  
• Any change in any part of the system affects the whole system.  
• The boundaries of any system under study are determined by the 
researcher or interested observer.  
Witkin (1990) refers to the fact that research in the area of listening comes from 
the different disciplines discussed earlier as a “source of confusion” within the field. She 
writes: “the nature of listening research derives as much from the discipline and interest 
of the researcher as from an overarching theory of coherent point of view…The various 
disciplines tend to look at different parts of the system. And possible because of the 
disparate viewpoints, much research applicable to listening is not labeled as such” (p. 8). 
So, in other words, it seems that, while Witkin wants to synthesize the field of listening 
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 under a systemic approach, she also seems to want to warn scholars that theoretical 
synthesis might not bridge all the gaps or clarify all the inconsistencies. 
In another article, “Toward a Synthesis of Listening Constructs: A Concept Map 
Analysis” Witkin and Trochim (1997) try to find relationships between the different ideas 
and definitions about listening and the words most commonly associated by using the 
method of concept mapping; they asked study participants to cluster keywords from the 
literature about listening and then rank the importance of the words and clusters to the 
construct of listening; the clusters which the participants ranked the highest included the 
clusters called active listening, composite process, critical listening, sensory impression, 
and context (84). These clusters included the following words and rankings:  
Table 2.1 Clusters in the Listening Literature  (Witkin and Trochim, 1997, p. 76-79) 
Cluster     
Active Listening (3.60) Active (4.32) Affective process (3.53) Alertness (4.11) 
Composite Process (3.65) Association (3.42) Composite process (3.32) Decoding (4.05) 
Sensory impression (3.76) Attention (4.68) Auditory processing (3.42) Images (3.32) 
Context (3.65) Constructs (3.32) Context (4.0) Experience (3.79) 
Critical Listening (3.86) Concentration (4.47) Conscious (4.05) Critical listening (4.21) 
 
Witkin and Trochim (1997) write that the clusters and rankings have to be examined by 
listening researchers to see how useful they are (p. 84); they recommend the study be 
replicated in several ways; this has not happened yet. After analyzing this data, one may 
notice that not even in the highest ranking cluster did any one cluster earn an average 
score higher than 4; yet several of the words in the top-ranked clusters earned rankings of 
4.5 of better; one can wonder what an exploratory study would like that put the highest 
56 
 ranked words in a cluster and try to find relationships between them. Like Wolvin and 
Witkin, McKenzie and Clark also offer a way to synthesize the field. 
 McKenzie and Clark (1995) attempt another kind of synthesis; in their article 
“The All-In-One Concept: How Much Must Listening Research Include?” they develop a 
model for listening research that they call “symbiotic” rather than based on one unified 
theory of listening. Explaining their decision to argue for what they call a “dual 
typology,” McKenzie and Clark (1995) write: “At times we appear to be asking listening 
to be too much – attending, perceiving, interpreting, remembering, comprehending, 
responding – resulting in comments that suggest perhaps listening research should be 
abandoned… A more parsimonious approach to listening is needed; an approach which is 
comprehensive, but offers the ‘logical simplicity’ necessary in theory building” (p. 35). 
To illustrate their ideas, McKenzie and Clark develop the following theoretical model:  
Illustration 2.2 McKenzie and Clark’s Synthesis (McKenzie and Clark, 1995, p. 35) 
 
McKenzie and Clark (1995) describe the different spheres as follows: “The organismic 
sphere of the model approaches objects primarily as biological and cognitive processes 
… assumed to be relatively fixed and similar across individuals … [and with] an 
existence apart from response and interaction.” (p. 36) In the interactionist sphere, on the 
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 other hand, McKenzie and Clark (1995) write that “listening is ‘holisitc’ (a phenomenon) 
and cannot be interpreted apart from environmental variables…Thus, ‘managing’ 
listening, trying to be a better listener, or practicing listening skills are all part of listening 
and viable areas of research in the interactionist model” (p.36); they describe the benefits 
of their model as: “(a) research is clearly focused in one part of the model or the other, 
(b) no research tries to encompass everything and, therefore, can be more focused, (c) 
what is learned in one part of the model enhances what is known in the other part of the 
model” (p. 40); in short, they write: “Together, the two parts of the model serve to form a 
‘gestalt’ of listening research” (p. 40). While the scholarship just examined has sought to 
synthesize the field of listening either by look at its literature or by focusing more on the 
theories generated by that literature, one has also seen scholars try to synthesize the field 
of listening by trying to develop one definition of the term listeing.  
The quest for the definition of listening  
Nowhere does the desire for unity and synthesis in the field of listening manifest itself 
than in the quest for the definition of listening. After analyzing her 50 definitions, Glenn 
(1989) narrowed the ideas in these definitions to what she refers to as “the aspects of 
listening upon which scholars generally agree;” the terms she uses to represent those 
aspects are perception (which includes reception, hearing, sensing, detecting), attention, 
(which includes concentration, conscious effort, purposeful, selective, voluntary, active), 
interpretation (which includes understand, comprehend, assign meaning, identify, 
recognize, analyze, assimilate, make sense), remembering (which also includes retention 
and recall), response (react, set upon, evaluate, draw conclusions, further activity or 
course of action), spoken sounds (which also refers to oral language), and visual cues 
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 (which includes face-to-face and nonverbal) (p. 24-25). Glenn (1989)  then ranked how 
often these terms appeared in the definitions; she found that interpreting was the most 
common of these concepts, appearing in 36 of the 50 definitions, followed by perceiving 
(32 of 50) and attention (22 of 50) (p. 25). And yet this synthesis, along with the others, 
does not seem satisfy scholars; the quest for one definition of listening continues. 
According to Wolvin and Coakley (1996), “The [their emphasis] definition of 
listening continues to be in the developing stages. Because listening is such a complex 
human behavior, because listening as a covert behavior is difficult to investigate, and 
because research in listening is in an exploratory state, conceptualizing the process of 
listening continues to occupy the process of listening continues to occupy the attention of 
listening scholars throughout the world (p. 68). This dissertation takes issue with their 
implication that scholars should make agreement on one definition of listening the focus 
of research. Purdy (1997) points out that one definition of listening may not work in a 
field in which listening “is conceived differently depending upon how people intend to 
apply the definition. For example, researchers who seek to predict listening behavior, 
versus those who interpret listening, versus consultants who provide listening skills 
training in the workplace may each employ a viable albeit different definition of the term 
listening” (p. 6). As one considers the amount of scholarly activity generated in the 
pursuit of the definition of listening one may legitimately ask: What do scholars hope to 
gain by establishing just one definition of such a multifaceted concept?  
Since the publication of the most recent edition of Wolvin and Coakley’s 
Listening text cited above, one can consider that in 1996 the International Listening 
Association (ILA) officially defined listening as “the process of receiving, constructing 
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 meaning from, and responding to spoken and/or nonverbal messages” (Purdy , 1997,  p. 
6). How long will this definition last before it becomes inadequate? Purdy (1997) 
suggests that “whatever definition of listening we choose we must know that listening is 
based on several premises. Listening: can be learned; is a dynamic process; is an active 
process; involves mind and body, with verbal and nonverbal processes working together, 
and; allows us to be responsive to the needs, concerns, and information of others, 0as 
well as the environment around us” (p. 7). Purdy (1997) combines all of these premises 
into his own definition of listening as “the active and dynamic process of attending, 
perceiving, interpreting, remembering, and responding to the expressed (verbal or non-
verbal) needs, concerns, and information offered by other human beings” (p. 7). This 
definition, Purdy (1997) argues, keeps the spirit of the ILA definition but “is at the same 
time more specific emphasizing the need for attention, perceiving and interpreting, and 
remembering. In addition, it focuses our attention on the important needs and concerns of 
real people” (p. 8). Clearly the search for the definition of listening and one underlying 
theory of listening to unite the field continues. Some may question one’s motives for 
entering the field given its current state. By entering into the current field of listening, 
this dissertation seeks, in some way, to synthesize the field as well, by showing the unity 
that already does exist within the various disciplines and theoretical perspectives 
examined in the chapter. Further, in the spirit of Purdy’s comment the field may not need 
one definition, it wishes to add yet another perspective from which to view the field of 
listening in general and the listening process in particular; it does not do so to further 
divide the field, but to offer a perspective that respects the truth in all the of various ideas 
on the table while at the same time offering one lens through which to view them.  
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2.4 Summary  
As one considers the points that this chapter has made thus far about the trends in 
listening research, one can see that the field has an interdisciplinary natures that includes 
a wide array of definitions, models, and research methods. Attempts to synthesize the 
field have offered much for scholars to consider, but none of them have truly changed the 
way scholars in the field have gone about their work; this disunity still exists. This 
dissertation, however, takes a slightly different perspective on the disunity shown here; it 
suggests that the many of the assumptions undergirding the field of listening in general, 
and particularly the study of listening as a process, do represent a coherent unified 
perspective – that of behaviorism. The next chapter of this project will examine this 
perspective more closely and highlight its prevalence within the field of listening in 
general and the study of listening as a process in particular.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 3  
 
 
The Process of Listening  
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
After examining some of the literature within the field of listening and paying 
particular attention to the state of research in the field, which many scholars have called 
confused or inconclusive, one might think that no unity exists within the field of 
listening, but this dissertation wishes to suggest that, in general, the perspective of 
behaviorism, albeit in many different manifestations, dominates the scholarship within in 
the field of listening in general and specifically the study of listening as a process. This 
chapter will first discuss some of the general tenets of behaviorism and its history within 
the field of listening. Next, it will examine various versions of the listening process put 
forth by scholars such Wolvin and Coakley and Brownell to show that these scholars 
have used a behaviorist approach to study this particular part of the listening field.  
Before outlining the specifics about the various models of the listening process, a 
brief overview of scholarship about the listening process will help to clarify the nature of 
research in this area to date. First, one finds claims of a lack of literature and 
understanding within the field. In an article published in the International Journal of 
Listening, Halone et al. (1998) suggests that “the division between what communication 
scholars propose to know about the listening process, versus what is currently available in 
62 
 
 the scholarly literature is greater that what one might initially expect” (p. 12). Halone et 
al. (1998) goes on cite several scholars on this matter including Bostrom and Waldhard 
who writes: “little is known about the listening process and disagreement exists about its 
measurement (p. 12).” Clearly much work remains in the field. As one considers this, one 
should also consider the dominate perspective of the current literature.  
In describing the scholarship on the listening process, Halone et al. (1998), 
borrowing from work by Wolvin and Coakley, argue that “the process of listening may 
be conceived of primarily in a.) cognitive, b.) affective, c.) behavioral/verbal d.) 
behavioral/nonverbal, and e.) behavioral/interactive terms” (p. 13); the study discussed in 
the article successfully confirmed that claim. Upon reading such a description of the 
listening process in such behavioral terms, one can begin to see the influence of 
behaviorism on the scholarly discussion to date about the listening process. This 
dissertation hopes to bring a new perspective to that discussion. Before that can happen, 
though, one must briefly examine the history and assumptions of behaviorism.  
3.2 Behaviorism in the Field of Listening  
3.2.1 An Overview of Behaviorism 
John Waston (1930) defines behaviorism in terms of its view of the subject matter 
of human psychology as human behavior rather than consciousness, which Watson say 
“is neither a definite nor a useful concept” (p. 2). So, rather than focus on how people 
think, behaviorism focuses on what people do. According to Watson (1930) a behaviorist 
always asks: “Can I describe this bit of behavior in terms of stimulus and response” (p. 
6). Watson (1930) defines stimulus as “so-called objects of our environment” (p. 15). 
When describing the idea of response, Watson (1930) writes: “an organism does 
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 something when it is assailed by stimuli” (p. 14); he also states that each effective stimuli 
(stimuli strong enough for the organism to perceive) incurs an immediate response (p. 
15), which he classifies as either an internal or external response (p. 16). Here then, one 
sees that stimulus and response make up the basic building blocks of behaviorism. 
Watson (1930) also discusses how to measure stimulus and response; he writes that 
researchers rely on observation to see the effects of their experiments, which usually 
involving manipulating stimuli (p. 21). Watson writes that he manipulates the stimuli in 
his subject’s environment “to find out how I could make them behave in a certain way” 
(p. 21). Watson (1930) also sees mental tests, which he describes as “measuring rods for 
classifying masses of individuals according to level to performance,” as another, albeit 
not as effective, way to study human behavior (p. 40). As one on the first people to 
describe and utilize a behaviorist perspective, Watson laid out some of the foundations of 
behaviorism. Other scholars, such as B.F. Skinner, expanded his ideas.  
Taking Watson’s ideas further by focusing on what lies beyond the science of 
behaviorism, B.F. Skinner (1976) writes in About Behaviorism that “Behaviorism is not 
the science of human behavior; it is the philosophy of that science” (p. 3). He goes on to 
explain that many people come under misconceptions about behaviorism; he lists 20 
specific ones. This dissertation acknowledges those ideas and has attempted to take a 
textured view on the topic (p. 208). That said, one of the main tenets of behaviorism that 
this dissertation will call into question comes in the form of Skinner’s (1976) statement: 
“A scientific analysis of behavior must, I believe, assume that a person’s behavior is 
controlled by his genetic and environmental histories rather than by the person himself as 
initiation, creative agent” (208). He acknowledges that “no part of the behavioristic 
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 position has raised more violent objections” (p. 208); he goes on to point out that critics 
of behaviorism “often overlook the fact that human behavior is also a form of control. 
That an organism should act to control that around it is as characteristics of life as 
breathing or reproduction. A person acts upon the environment, and what he achieves is 
essential to his survival and the survival of the species” (p. 208). In other words, Skinner 
acknowledges a place for human creativity and initiative but seems to believe those traits 
only manifest themselves if a threatening stimulus appears in the already given 
environment. Does this mean that human beings create works of art simply so they do not 
die of boredom? Or does all art have a utility? Where does one draw the line between 
what an organism needs to survive and what it does not?  Who or what draws that line? 
This dissertation argues that these questions remained unanswered even after taking into 
consideration Skinner’s defense of his position. This dissertation also argues that these 
basic tenets of behaviorism make up the foundations of much of the current scholarship 
of listening. One can keep in mind that if one takes the idea of behaviorism to the 
extreme one can see language or communication, as Watson (1930) does, as nothing 
more than a manipulative behavior or habit that people do (p. 225). This dissertation does 
not intend to label any particular scholar as a behaviorist; it simply wants to show some 
trends in the scholarship and their connection to some of the basic tenets of behaviorism.  
3.2.2 Behaviorism and the study of listening 
One can see the influence of behaviorism on the study of listening when looks at 
the vocabulary scholars use to define it and the methods that they use to study it. While 
Watson and Skinner represent some of the primary scholars in the field of behaviorism, 
Larry Barker and Carl H. Weaver represent some of the first to use behaviorism to study 
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 communication in general and listening specifically. Weaver (1972) writes in his book 
Human Listening: Processes and Behavior that “listening happens when a human 
organism receives data aurally” (p. 5). One sees clearly here in this definition a 
relationship between data and stimulus, one must receive data just as one must sense a 
stimulus. Further, looking at Barker’s (1971) model of the listening process, published in 
his book Listening Behavior, one will see that it actually starts with a stimulus and ends 
with a response (p. 25). This represents a common thread that this dissertation will 
examine in more detail as it compares several models of the process of listening.  
More recent models of the listening process based on behaviorism include the 
work of Wolvin and Coakley (1996) in their book Listening, Wolff and Marsnik (1992) 
in their work Perceptive Listening, Judi Brownell (1996) in her work Listening: Attitudes, 
Principles, and Skills, and Steil et al. (1992) in their work Effective Listening. One can 
find the influence of the philosophy on the work of these scholars in the way they define 
their terms and secondly in their research methods. One can see an example of this in the 
work of Wolvin and Coakley. Wolvin and Coakley (1996) define listening as “the 
process of receiving, attending to, and assigning meaning to aural and visual stimuli” (p. 
69); as they continue to discuss the listening process, one comes to understand that a 
response follows the assignment of meaning and that this response then, in turn, becomes 
yet another stimulus triggering another response (p. 70). This attention to stimuli and 
response clearly shows their behaviorist roots and tendencies. Nothing can or does 
happen in their depiction of the listening process until an organism senses a stimulus. 
Beyond definitions, the influence of behaviorism on the work of scholars studying 
also comes through when one examines the empirical and quantitative methods they 
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 commonly use. Quantitative tests represent one of these methods. For example, Barker 
and Kittie W. Watson (1988) developed the widely-used Watson-Barker test; this test 
represents one of clearest examples of the generally empirical methodology employed 
throughout listening research. The researchers developed this test “to measure some of 
the important dimensions of the listening process” (p. 21). This harkens back to Watson’s 
understanding of a mental test a “measuring rod” by which to assess a subject’s 
performance of behavior. The idea that one can measure how well one listens underlies a 
perspective that views listening as a behavior. The next section of this dissertation will 
highlight this perspective in several models of the listening process.  
3.3 The Steps of the Listening Process  
3.3.1 A brief introduction to and comparison of models of the listening process 
Moving from general discussion about the behaviorist tenets underlying the study 
of listening to an examination of specific models of the listening process, this dissertation 
argues that these models share behaviorist tendencies. In order to discuss the various 
elements of the models individually as well as comparatively, this dissertation has taken 
the various steps of each of these processes and categorized them around the elements of 
Brownell’s HURIER model. By following the chart below, then, the reader can see which 
steps fall under discussion at a given point in the following section, which will go into 
each of the elements of Brownell’s HURIER model in more detail.   
Table 3.1 Comparison of Models of the Listening Process  
Brownell Wolvin/Coakley Wolff/Marsnick Steil  
Hearing  Receiving and 
Attending  
Receiving and 
Attending  
Sensing  
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 Understanding Assigning meaning  Interpreting and 
Recreating 
Interpreting 
Remembering Assigning meaning Retaining (and 
responding) 
 
Interpreting  Assigning meaning Interpreting and 
Recreating 
Interpreting 
Evaluating Assigning meaning Interpreting and 
Recreating 
Evaluating 
Responding Responding overtly  Responding (and 
retaining) 
Reaction 
  
This chart, then represents a comparison of four different models of the listening process:  
Wolvin and Coakley’s (1996) model published in their book Listening, Wolff and 
Marsnik’s (1992) model published in their work Perceptive Listening, and Brownell’s 
(1996) HURIER model published in her work Listening: Attitudes, Principles, and Skills, 
and Steil et al.’s (1983) SEIR model. One can find illustrations of these models in the 
following pages. The following section of this paper will examine the elements of the 
HURIER model in turn starting with hearing. As one goes through this chart, one sees the 
ideas of stimulus and response already discussed as the foundations of behaviorism as 
Watson and Skinner described them. This dissertation argues that the actions of hearing, 
receiving, attending, and sensing illustrated by these models represent the process of the 
subject coming an awareness of stimuli in the environment; further, the issues of reaction 
and response in these models all represent the action of responding to the original 
stimulus and creating a new one. This argument should become clear as this section 
proceeds to examine the steps involved in each of the models in more detail as highlight 
some of the aspects of behaviorism that undergird it and the other models listed. 
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 Illustration 3.1 HURIER model of listening (Brownell, 1996, p. 12) 
 
 
Illustration 3.2 Wolvin and Coakley’s listening process (Brownell, 1996, p. 47) 
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 Illustration 3.3 Wolff’s model of the listening process (Brownell, 1996, p. 49) 
 
 
Illustration 3.4 SEIR model of the listening process (Steil et al., 1983, p. 48) 
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 3.3.2 Hearing 
The process of hearing  
According to Wolff and Marsnik (1992), “Hearing is a physical activity that 
occurs automatically as we mentally select to perceive and attend aural messages. 
Although the complete sensory and perceptual system is embodied in the listening 
process, hearing is the primary sensory receptor initiating listening” (p. 25); they call this 
process “almost magical” (p. 26). According to Brownell (1996), while hearing 
represents the first step in the larger listening process, it functions as a process in and of 
itself that “involves three interrelated stages: reception of sound, perception of sound, and 
auditory association. The importance of this process is clear; only when you accurately 
perceive what is said can you focus on the critical matter of assigning meaning to the 
speaker’s words” (p. 77). While in general this statement has a lot of truth, one can also 
consider questions about how one knows when one as perceived accurately? Does this 
involve accurate interpretation of the speaker’s intention or simply accurate recall of the 
specific wording of the message? One might also wonder about people who do not have 
perfect hearing – can they hear what person says accurately and thus perceive and assign 
meaning accurately? This dissertation wants to bring these questions to the forefront.  
After discussing the importance of the process of hearing Brownell (1996) goes 
on to outline the various stages in detail; she writes “First, recall that sound travels in 
waves as it moves through the air. These waves bump into air molecules and create either 
positive or negative pressure. When air molecules are pushed together, positive pressure 
is created; sound waves may pass through the air at up to 760 miles per hours. It is 
actually the sound waves that [a person] hears” (p. 77). Continuing to describe the 
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 process, Brownell (1996) writes: “Your outer ear catches the sound waves and channels 
them through the auditory canal to the eardrum. The sound waves cause the drum 
membrane to vibrate. The small bones on the other side of the – the hammer, stirrup, and 
anvil – amplify those vibrations. Next, sound waves reach your inner ear. Here, the 
cochlea, a snail-shaped structure filled liquid takes over. Inside the cochlea are hair-like 
nerve cells that change pressure vibrations to nerve impulses. These, in turn re 
transmitted to the auditory nerve and then to the brain. Finally – you perceive sound” (p. 
77). This brief summary of how the ear and brain process sound gives the reader insight 
into the different processes involved in the hearing process. Brownell also provides the 
following drawing that may provide even more insight into the process of hearing:  
Illustration 3.5 Parts of the Ear (Brownell, 1996, p. 77)  
 
Three levels of hearing  
Further developing her discussion of the hearing process, Brownell distinguishes 
between three different levels of hearing. Brownell (1996) introduces these levels of 
hearing when she writes: “Establishing control over the listening situation is an important 
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 goal for anyone interested in improving his or her hearing. There are times, however, 
when characteristics of the sound override you voluntary selection and cause what we 
call switching – a change in focus from on sound to another. Switching often occurs 
because there are three levels or types of hearing” (p. 78). Brownell (1996) goes on to 
describe these different levels when she writes: “At the primary level, hearing is 
voluntary. You select the information you want to concentrate on, deliberately tuning into 
certain sounds while ignoring others…At the secondary level, your involuntary or 
automatic nervous system is also at work. You may be focusing on one [listening] 
task…and still be conscious of [other sounds]…Finally, on a tertiary level, you have little 
or no control over what you hear; the central nervous system is not involved in 
processing the stimuli. Rather, the automatic response system responds to a sound simply 
because of its intensity” (p. 78). The description of these levels suggest that in certain 
situations a person may not have a choice about what messages he or she will hear; 
however, without necessarily disagreeing with that statement, this dissertation argues that 
a person always has a choice about the messages to which he or she will listen. 
The Tomatis view of hearing and listening  
If one takes the view of hearing seen above, which Billie Thompson (1993) refers 
to in his work on listening disabilities as the “orthodox view” of hearing, one may 
ultimately see hearing and listening as distinct processes: First one hears; then one listens. 
About this idea, Thompson (1993) writes: “Listening, when it is considered to be distinct 
from hearing, is usually defined conceptually as a cognitive process mediated by the 
brain…Listening is improved through better or more efficient cognitive skills and is 
highly dependent on motivation…Tomatis says that, while motivation is important, the 
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 functional ability to listen is equally important, beginning with the middle ear” (p. 128). 
For Tomatis, then, “Listening is the active focusing of the middle ear to accommodate 
and enhance the sensory perception of those sounds of particular interest…It acts more 
like a directional microphone to highlight the extraneous or background sound” 
(Thompson, 1993, 134). From Tomatis’ and Thompson’s perspective, then, one can see 
the brain and the ear not as two distinct and perhaps even oppositional players in the 
listening process but as members of the same team working together. 
Continuing discussion, one can look at Tomatis’ list of functions that the human 
ear has and see how it differs from those already discussed (Thompson, 1993, p. 129):   
o to transmit energy (cortical charge) to the brain 
o to integrate information from sound and other movements from sound and 
motor movements to enable the development of verticality, laterality, and 
language 
o to establish a right lead ear for efficient audiovocal control 
o to establish balance/equilibrium and to stimulate neurovegetative balance  
o to perceive sound  
o to attend to and to discriminate between sounds we want to hear and to out 
those we do not want (listen)  
o to locate sounds spatially  
From this list, one sees the texture of the Tomatis perspective on hearing. The ear no 
longer has the job of simply to sending signals to the brain; it has a much deeper job. If 
one takes this position, then one begins to question the place of hearing as the “first step” 
in the listening process. If, as Tomatis suggests, listening involves both ear and brain 
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 simultaneously, then hearing alone does not happen first. This dissertation argues that a 
person makes the choice to listen before any specific sound hits the ear and/or the brain.  
Going beyond the idea that listening involves only the ear and brain, Tomatis sees 
the whole body as involved in the listening process and the ear in the role of “integrator” 
among various systems in the body (Thompson, 1993, p. 130). Thompson writes:  
Tomatis describes how the vestibular (balancing) and cochlear (decoding of 
sound) functions of the ear are joined in a single system. Phylogenetically, the 
vestibule analyzes larger movements, those within the body, and the cochlea 
evolved as an addition to analyze smaller acoustical type movement. … 
Anatomically, the vestibular nerve presents itself at every level of the medulla and 
is thereby directly connected with all the muscles of the body. Tomatis proposes 
the vestibular integrator role for the ear, noting that all muscles depend on the 
vestibule for their tone, equilibrium, and relative position with relation to the 
whole body. (Thompson, 1993, p. 130 – 131) 
Here then, one sees an even clearer case that Tomatis believes that the ear has a much 
different position in the listening process than scholars such and Wolvin and Coakley do.  
The place of hearing and stimuli in the process of listening  
Turing back to the models under examination, one can see that, in essence, all of 
the theorists who developed them see hearing as the first step in the listening process and 
that, in the simplest terms, they see the ear as little more than a pathway to the brain. 
When she summarizes her views on hearing, Brownell (1996) writes: “Hearing is the first 
stage in effective listening. In order to hear accurately, listeners must attend to aural 
stimuli and concentrate on a particular message” (p. 90). Steil et al. (183) write: “good 
75 
 
 listening begins at the level of sensing the sender’s message…if the listener does not 
sense the message, he or she can do nothing further with it” (p.21). Wolff and Marsnik 
(1992) demonstrate his commitment to this paradigm when he writes “Aural 
understanding begins with hearing ability…hearing is the initial step in the complex 
process of listening” (p. 43). Finally, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) write: “Listening 
ability depends on hearing acuity since hearing – the physiological act of sound waves 
being received by the ear and transmitted to the brain – is the first step of the listening 
process” (p. 26). The ear-as-pathway mentality critiqued by Tomatis comes through in 
each of these passages. But what happens if a person has hearing disabilities?  
Types of hearing and listening disabilities  
Wolvin and Coakley (1996) describe six different types of hearing impairments. 
The more common ones include: 1.) an accumulation of wax in the outer ear, 2.) 
swimmer’s ear – an infection that results when water remains in the ear canal, 3.) otits 
media – an infection of the middle ear caused by a respiratory infection, 4.) tinnitus, or 
noise in the ear, which can occur if a person has high blood pressure or inner ear damage 
from drugs or exposure to loud sound, and, finally, 5.) presbycusis, loss of hearing due to 
effects of the human aging process on the hearing mechanism (p. 75). Wolvin and 
Coakley (1996) go on to cite a sixth, less common genetic condition primarily affecting 
Caucasian women called ostoclerosis; this progressive disease causes the hard bone of 
the inner ear to become sponge-like (p. 75). Also, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) talk about 
how noise pollution and other environmental factors such as lack of coordinated 
functioning of both ears – which leads to the inability to discriminate the direction of the 
source of the sound, background noise, and auditory fatigue – the overexposure of the ear 
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 to multiple aural stimuli – have on a person’s ability to hear (p. 77, 79). According 
Wolvin and Coakley (1996), citing information from the National Institute of Health, 28 
million Americans suffer from some form of hearing loss (p. 75).    
While Wolvin and Coakley focus on problems with the ear, Thompson and 
Tomatis classify their understanding of similar phenomena and cast their conceptual net 
wider by coining the phrase listening disabilities; Thompson (1993) writes:  
Listening disabilities are the dysfunctions physically, emotionally, and mentally 
caused by the inability of the ear to focus on sounds (movements of the air) it 
wants to hear, to tune out those it does not want, and to naturally integrate and 
analyze those sounds and the internal movements of the body (motor) for our use. 
This definition acknowledges the singularity of the cochlear-vestibular system, 
desire as an important component of listening, and the ear’s role of integrator. 
From this context, a listening exists when we have (a) poor functioning of either 
cochlear or vestibular portions, or (b) poor control and lack of harmony between 
both systems, and/or (c) we are emotionally not willing to tune in. (p. 143).  
For Thompson and Tomatis, then, when someone does not listen effective, the problem 
probably started in the ear, but not necessarily with hearing. This perspective, then, 
allows for connections between listening and hearing impairment that the perspective of 
Wolvin and Coakley and the other scholars highlighted in this chapter does not.   
The position that Wolvin and Coakley (1996) seem to take on the ability of 
hearing-impaired person to listen illuminates one of the major implications of taking a 
behaviorist position on listening; they write: “While an estimated 28 million hearing-
impaired Americans might honestly be able to say ‘I didn’t hear you’ as their reason for 
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 not engaging in the whole listening process, the remaining 230 million Americans must 
attribute their ineffective listening behavior to a factor other than impaired hearing” (p. 
26). One might interpret this as saying deaf or hearing impaired people cannot hear well; 
therefore, they cannot learn to listen well. Wolff and Marsnik (1992) take a somewhat 
different approach, but arguably one with the same outcome, to the question of hearing 
impairment when they write: “It is possible to experience aural understanding without the 
physical ability to sense by hearing. Several years ago, a young deaf woman surprised 
people when they met because they presumed she heard. She became an efficient listener 
by substituting lip reading and nonverbal signals for her hearing loss…She listened 
without hearing ability because she was forced to substitute other senses for hearing” (p. 
43). While this example dispels the notion that the hearing impaired cannot learn to 
listen, it still places the emphasis on the perception of and response to stimuli. This 
dissertation, however, sees the choice to listen as more than a response to stimuli. 
This dissertation argues that people must make the choice to learn and use 
whatever skills they desire long before the opportunity or stimuli to use them presents 
itself. Going back to the example of the deaf woman, from the perspective of this 
dissertation, she listened successfully because at some point she decided she wanted to 
listen and then learned how to do so to the best of her ability given her physical 
limitations; every human being must make this same choice about listening. Put another 
way, one can say that by choosing to go to medical school and learn the procedure, a 
doctor makes the choice to perform an appendectomy when necessary long before he 
responds to his first case of appendicitis; in the same way, a person must choose what he 
or she will listen to long before hearing it. At this point, one can assume that one of the 
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 most obvious objections of the behaviorist might sound like this: the idea of choosing to 
listen sounds like choosing to pay attention to certain stimuli and/or practicing 
discriminative listening; indeed, it does; but, as chapter four will argue in depth, to move 
from believing, as the behaviorists generally seem to, that a person chooses what to 
attend to from a pool of already present stimuli to believing, as this dissertation argues, 
that a person can and should make a choice to attend to stimuli that may yet appear 
requires a different philosophical approach than behaviorism.  
3.3.3 Understanding 
Principles of understanding 
Moving from the process of hearing to the process of understanding, one begins to 
ask questions about how people comprehend the meaning of what they have heard? 
Brownell (1996) addresses this question directly when she talks about her process of 
understanding; she writes: “Prerequisite to listening comprehension is word recognition. 
You must be able to form tentative images from the sound cues you hear. … In addition 
to recognizing sound cues, you must also put incoming data into some kind of framework 
to make it meaningful; you must become the author of your ‘own version of context’” (p. 
110). In this passage one can begin to see the relationship between understanding and 
memory, or the process of remembering; Brownell (1996) talks about this connection 
when she writes: “A listener compares incoming information to previous knowledge, 
forms relationships between new and old ideas, and creates as personalized memory file. 
Individuals who have difficulty scanning their information warehouse often have 
difficulty making use of previous knowledge and so have trouble with listening 
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 comprehension. Here you can appreciate the close ties between comprehension and 
memory” (110); these ties will come under examination later in this chapter.  
One may claim that, from Wolvin and Coakley’s perspective, what Brownell sees 
as the process of understanding happens during or has a part in the process of “assigning 
meaning.” According to Wolvin and Coakley (1996), in the process of assigning 
meaning, “the listener’s goal is to attach meaning as similar as possible to that attended 
by the message sender” (p. 87). One sees similarities between this view of understanding 
or attending to a message and Steil et al.’s (1983) view that: “after the message is sensed, 
a second activity comes into play: accurate interpretation” (p. 21) and that “interpreting 
and recreating is searching and encoding in the listener’s mind, a re-creation of the 
speaker’s intended message” (p. 31). All of these ideas seem to suggest that the ultimate 
goal at this stage of the listening process involves accurately comprehending the intention 
of the speaker. However, without degrading this noble ambition, one must also take in 
account the feasibility and possibility of such an undertaking; it seems many scholars do.  
A rhetorical interpretation of the process of understanding 
Brownell (1996) seems to point towards a rhetorical element in her process of 
understanding when she writes: “Precise and concrete language facilitates shared 
meanings. Yet, regardless of the symbols used to express ideas, your meanings for a 
particular word are never replicated exactly in someone else’s mind” (p. 110). Brownell 
(1996) also discusses what she calls “semantic reactions” but could also fall under the 
heading “semiotic triangle” when she writes: “Some people have such strong reactions to 
words that they have difficulty distinguishing what is real from what is real – out there in 
the environment – and the mental images elicited by words used to describe these objects 
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 or events. These are what are called semantic reactions: you respond to the word as if it 
were the thing described (p. 113-114). Similarly, Steil et al. (1983) write: “The 
assignment of meaning to a term is an internal process…We often misinterpret each 
other’s messages while under the illusion that that a common understanding has been 
achieved (p. 21); and Wolvin and Coakley (1996) write: “Assigning meaning is a very 
personal process. Therefore, because of the senders’ and receivers’ different past 
experiences, present feelings, and even future expectations, we often do not reach the 
desired goal” (p. 87). From these passages, then, one can say that these scholars have a 
rhetorical understanding of the process of understanding – words do not mean, people 
mean, and people must create shared meaning of words in order to understand each other.  
3.3.4 Remembering 
The process of remembering 
The association of listening with memory dates back to Nichols’ definition of 
listening as the faculty of being able to recall sound (Brownell, 1996, p. 144), but each 
theorist in this chapter views memory differently. Wolvin and Coakley (1996) do not see 
remembering as a separate part of the listening process because, in their words:  
Remembering – the process of storing stimuli in the mind for the purpose 
of recalling them later – is probably involved in all aspects of listening and 
is, thus, inherent in the listening process when a listener actively engages 
in the whole process. The importance of remembering can be seen as it 
relates to holding accumulated sound while we are initially attending and 
receiving to a message. Also, it is relevant to the attending to since, in 
general, only those stimuli to which we attend reach the LTM [Long Term 
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 Memory]. Moreover, as we categorize or conceptualize input data, we 
must search our memory bank for a ‘fit’ in order to assign meaning. (p. 
96)  
While Wolvin and Coakley see memory as important in every aspect of the listening 
process, Steil et al.’s (1983) SIER model does not include it at all. Wolff and Marsnik 
meanwhile, see the place of memory in a different light; they write: “Retaining aural 
messages is not a part of the listening process. It is the result of perceptive listening” (p. 
34). Wolff and Marsnik (1992) seem to take almost the opposite view of Brownell, who 
sees remembering as an essential part of the listening process. 
Emphasizing the importance of remembering, Brownell (1996) writes: “It makes 
little sense to develop your hearing and comprehension unless you can use the 
information in some meaningful way. Everything that is remembered is not understood 
and everything that is understood is not remembered (Ortony, 1978)” (p. 144). Though 
she sees the process of remembering as distinct, Brownell (1996) also relates it to the 
concept of attention; she writes, “It is important to remember that the components of 
listening are interrelated…One of the reasons why paying attention to the right stimuli is 
so critical is that memory begins with attention. Unless a stimulus is registered as an 
impression, it will not be remembered and therefore cannot be used. Through focusing 
your attention, you select only a portion of the available stimuli and direct your energies 
along fairly focused paths…A useful way to view attention then, is as a process that 
funnels selected sensory stimuli into your short-term memory” (p. 146). Here one sees 
the essential connection between memory and attention. To begin discussion on attention 
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 and its relation to listening and memory, the following pages will include a description of 
the parts of memory followed by a discussion of different views on attention.  
Memory systems  
To this point, this dissertation has only looked at the outlines of memory and its 
place in as one of the later stages of listening process. Discussing memory more in depth, 
Brownell (1996) writes about three different types of memory or parts of a person 
memory: immediate memory, short term memory, and long term memory. Starting with 
immediate memory, Brownell (1996) writes: “You are always collecting and processing 
information. Most of what you hear, however, passes quickly through your memory 
system and is lost in less than a second. The saying ‘in one ear and out the other’ is not 
far from the truth. Information that interests you – that draws your attention – is briefly 
held in your immediate memory for further contemplation. You must then decide whether 
to snatch it into your short term memory or let it fade” (p. 145). Turning to the next type 
of memory, Brownell (1996) writes: “Intermediate memory is an important filtering 
device, determining what information will be discarded and what will be kept for further 
processing. If information dose not attract your attention, it never gets into your 
immediate memory system, and hence you have no opportunity to put it into short-term 
or long-term memory” (p. 147). Immediate memory, then, functions as the first step in 
the information processing; information must pass the filters of immediate memory 
before going into short-term memory and then long-term memory for permanent storage. 
As one begins to wonder about the relationship between these memory systems, one can 
turn to Brownell (1996) for an illustration of the human memory as she understands it; 
the following illustration shows the three types of memory and how they work together:  
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 Illustration 3.6 Three memory systems (Brownell, 1996, 146)  
 
Now that one has an understanding of the intermediate level of memory and seen an 
illustration of how they all work together, one can turn to the remaining levels.  
 After going though the immediate memory system, information then passes into 
short-term memory. Brownell (1996) defines short-term memory as “working memory” 
(p. 148); she claims that, like immediate memory, it has limited capacity; more 
specifically she writes: “Short-term memory is regarded as a necessary intermediate step 
in processing information that eventually finds its way into your long-term memory. 
Learning, then, only occurs when information is first maintained in your short-term 
memory. The longer the information persists, the more probable it is that it will be 
transferred into your long-term memory” (p. 148). Moving from short-term to long-term 
memory, Brownell (1996) writes: “Think of long-term memory as the ‘data bank’ or 
warehouse for all your impressions and experience. In long-term memory is information 
you heard hours, days, weeks, even years ago” (p. 150). Brownell (1996) continues her 
discussion on long term memory when she writes: “One of the exciting aspects of long-
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 term memory is its limitless capacity; in fact, the more information you have stored in 
long-term memory, the easier it is to remember new ideas. You might envision your long-
term memory as an ever-expanding filing system where the more categories you create, 
the easier it becomes to find appropriate places for new information and retrieve old 
information quickly” (p. 150).  From these descriptions of the levels of memory, one can 
say that Brownell has a somewhat generalized view of memory; Shelia Bentley (1993), 
on the other hand, in her article “Listening and Memory” takes a more detailed look at 
different views of memory and their relationship to the listening process.  
Bentley (1993) starts out her discussion on the various views of memory by 
writing: “For the past 30 years, memory research has taken structure vs. process 
approach. The question has been: Is memory performance due to the physiology of 
human memory and its inherent strengths and physical limitations, or does remembering 
depend on applying appropriate processes at encoding and retrieval?” (p. 81). Bentley 
(1993) discusses structure theories of memory in particular when she writes: “Structure 
theories of memory suggest that what we are able to remember is determined by the 
physiology and biochemistry of the brain…Influential structural theorists have included 
James (1890), Hebb (1949), Broadbent (1958), and Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968)” (p. 81). 
Bentley (1993) points out that the Atkinson-Shriffrin “modal” model represents one of 
the important crossover models between the structure models that have essentially lost 
support and the process-based models more accepted today because “while it focused on 
the structure of types of memory, it introduced the concept that the processes applied to 
the incoming information and during retrieval affect what is remembered” (p. 83). 
Bentley (1993) continues: “A precipitating factor in the decay of the modal model, as 
85 
 
 well as the movement away from structure models of memory, was the development of 
the levels of processing framework of memory, which is a processing model…the 
emphasis [of this model] is on the cognitive processes applied at the time of input of 
information” (p. 85). Bentley (1993) cites Craik and Lockhart’s model as one of the first 
of this type of model; it “stressed processing and suggested that trace durability, and 
therefore memory, were a direct consequence of the process of encoding, with deeper and 
more elaborate encoding leading to more durable memory traces” (p. 85). Clearly the 
models of the listening process under examination in the chapters have come to rely on 
the process rather than structural theory of memory. They do not see memory as a 
structure but as a process in itself or part of the larger listening process.  
The relationship between memory and attention  
After examining the three systems of memory and various views of memory, one 
can move onto to a discussion of the connection between memory and attention in the 
listening process. As stated previously, Brownell sees attention as a process “that funnels 
selected sensory stimuli into your short-term memory” (p. 146). According to her, an 
illustration of the process of attention might look like this:  
Illustration 3.7 Process of Attention (Brownell, 1996, p. 147) 
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 When looking at the previous illustration, one clearly sees the representation of attention 
as a funnel; the lettered arrows represent various stimuli entering the attended sphere; one 
also sees here the behaviorist tendency here: one must sense the stimuli before attending 
to them. The idea of attention has come under much scrutiny in the field of listening; 
chapter four will discuss this issue further so that the reader can make a clear distinction 
between selecting to attend to a stimuli and making the choice to listen. At point, 
however, one can move from a discussion on memory and attention to a discussion of the 
next two steps in the HURIER model of listening – interpreting and evaluating.  
3.3.5 Interpreting and Evaluating 
When one considers the issues of interpreting and evaluating, one quickly notes 
that these two ideas make up the I and E in both Brownell’s (1996) HURIER model and 
Steil et al.’s (1983) SIER model, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) include them in the 
“assigning meaning” component of their model and Wolff and Marsnik (1992) include 
them in the step of the listening process they call interpreting and re-creating. While each 
model includes these actions in general, the theorists approach them differently. Wolvin 
and Coakley’s understanding of these ideas has much in common with Wolff and 
Marsnik’s while Steil et al. and Brownell take an alternative view of them.   
About interpreting, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) write: “The third component of 
listening – assigning meaning – refers to the interpretation or understanding of the stimuli 
heard and/or seen and attended to” (p. 87). Following the lead of Wolvin and Coakley, 
Wolff and Marsnik (1992) write: “Our model of the listening process designates the two 
integrated processes of interpreting and re-creating as occurring after hearing and 
attending to aural stimuli” (p. 31). Here then, one see similarities between these two 
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 views in the sense that, for both, interpretation comes after hearing and attending to 
stimuli. Brownell and Steil et al. see the process of interpretation differently. 
One sees subtle but profound differences between the understanding of “assigning 
meaning” outlined above and those of Steil et al. and Brownell. When discussing the 
difference between interpreting and evaluating, Steil et al. (1982) write: “Active listeners 
go beyond sensing and interpretation to another act: evaluation. Here the listener decides 
whether or not to agree with the speaker…the best listeners delay judgment until the 
message is fully presented [and] work hard at developing their judgmental skills and 
abilities” (p. 21-22). For Brownell (1996) interpretation means taking into account other 
factors beyond the words heard in a particular situation; she writes: “Effective listeners 
take into account the nonverbal and situational factors that influence the negotiation of 
meaning; in effect, they hear what is not said” (p. 179). For Brownell, empathy represents 
“the key element that enables you to go beyond the literal meaning of the words you and 
begin to consider the speaker’s feelings and indirect messages” (p. 179). Thus, empathy, 
for Brownell, takes one beyond interpretation to evaluation, a process which Steil et al. 
also recognize but Wolvin and Coakley and Wolff and Marsnik do not.  
Talking specifically about process of evaluation, Brownell (1996) connects it to 
critical listening when she writes: “In almost all instances, critical listening follows the 
related processes of hearing, understanding, remembering, and interpreting. Until you are 
confident that you share the speaker’s meaning and have taken nonverbal and situational 
aspects into account, you cannot make a wise decision or come to a valid conclusion” (p. 
229). Brownell (1996) also writes: “critical listening is particularly relevant to persuasive 
communication situations. When someone wants to change your opinion or behavior … 
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 you must determine whether to accept of reject what you hear. Persuasion implies free 
choice among alternatives. Your decision is best made rationally, on the basis of clear 
thinking, sound logic, and valid reasoning” (p. 227). Thus, from these passages, one can 
see the relationship between interpreting and evaluating from Brownell’s perspective: one 
must accurately interpret the message before evaluating it; as noted earlier, one can sense 
this spirit in the other models examined in this chapter as well. Continuing the 
examination of the steps of the HUIER model of listening, one can turn to the last step in 
that model – and all the models under examination in this chapter – responding.  
3.3.6 Responding 
The process of responding  
Turning from the processes of interpreting and evaluating to the process of 
responding, one sees that all of the models of the listening process under examination in 
the chapters include as the final step in the process the act of responding or reacting to the 
message heard. Brownell (1996) writes: “An important part of effective listening, then, is 
to respond in a manner that will facilitate shared meanings, contribute to accomplishing 
tasks, and develop satisfying relationships. The term listening response is used to 
describe the mindful behavior that occurs as a result of effective listening” (p. 266). 
Continuing the discussion about responding, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) distinguish 
between covert or overt responses in detail when they write:  
In analyzing responding, we think it is important to determine whether covert 
(internal response perceivable only to the listener) or overt (external response 
perceivable to others) response is intended. If covert response is meant, the 
response could be part of (1) the receiving process as our auditory and sensory 
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 mechanisms respond to the original stimulus, (2) the attention process, since they 
very act of attending to a stimulus is a response by the system, or (3) the 
assignment of meaning process when we respond by categorizing the stimulus 
through our schema so that it matches the intended meaning of the source. 
However, if overt response is indicated, we do not consider responding to be part 
of the listening process. When listeners respond overtly, they are no longer 
listeners; rather, they become senders – that is, the encoders of new messages – in 
the communication process. Although we do not consider overt responding to be 
part of the listening process, we fully acknowledge its primacy in communication 
transactions. It is only through feedback that a speaker can judge whether a 
listener has or has not engaged in the listening process. Indeed, our perceptions of 
others as good or bad listeners are based largely on how others display their 
listening through the feedback that they communicate. (p. 96)  
Building on Wolvin and Coakley’s focus on the difference between overtly and covertly 
responding to the stimuli, Wolff and Marsnik (1992) claim that a listener “is processing 
two kinds of response: covert and overt” responses to the speaker (p. 35-36). While 
Wolvin and Coakley and Wolff and Marsnik agree on this aspect of response, they do not 
see eye to eye on all aspects of it. Unlike Wolvin and Coakley, but like Brownell, both 
Wolff and Steil et al see responding in any form as part of the listening process. Wolff 
and Marsnik (1992) see it as the “final act” (p. 35) and Steil at al. (1983) write that the 
listener must respond in order for the listening process “to be complete” (p. 22). 
However, despite these differences, each of the models seems to treat a response as a 
stimulus.  This goes to show once again the behaviorist tendencies of these models. 
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 Response as stimulus  
While differences do abound between the examined approaches to the place of 
and understanding of response as it relates to the listening process, one can see again the 
one major similarity that has run through all of these models: a behaviorist or 
transactional view of communication. Each of the models begins with a stimulus 
(message) and ends with a response (in essence another message or response). This 
behavioral cycle of stimulus and response creates what Wolff calls the circular process of 
oral-aural communication. This process looks at communication as a transaction that 
starts with a stimulus and ends with the next stimulus. While the scholars highlighted in 
this chapter all have a different take on the on the process of communication and listening 
in general, one could argue that, at least to some extent, they would agree that those 
processes function and work together in some basic way as illustrated here:  
Illustration 3.8 Communication (Wolff and Marsnik, 1992, p. 24) 
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This model represents a standard stimulus-response transactional model of 
communication where one person sends a message, and the other person receives it and 
sends another message. While one certainly cannot discount that much communication 
human beings experience every day – from the morning staff meeting to the call to the 
significant other about dinner – does have a transactional nature to it, this dissertation 
simply wishes to bring a different voice to the discussion by reiterating, without implying 
that the scholars highlighted in this chapter would disagree, that this view does not 
encompass all possible types or categories of communication.  
3.4 Summary  
In conclusion, then, of chapter three, this chapter has taken a look at several 
models of the listening process. That examination determined that all of those models 
under scrutiny take a behaviorist approach to listening; this dissertation wants to bring a 
more philosophical approach to the discussion of the listening process. The next chapter 
of this dissertation will develop that approach more fully by looking in depth at the 
difference between what the behaviorists call attending to or paying attention to a 
message and what this dissertation will call making the choice to listen.  
  
 
Chapter 4  
 
 
Making the Choice to Listen 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Now that has examined the behaviorist tendencies within the literature about 
listening within the field of communication and has looked extensively at several models 
of the listening process based on those tendencies, one can begin to turn towards a model 
of the listening process that offers an alternative to those tendencies. This fourth chapter 
of this dissertation will focus specifically on the notion of making a choice to listen, 
which, it argues, represents the heart of the listening process. First this chapter will 
distinguish that idea from two ideas prevalent in the literature – the ideas of paying 
attention or attending to a message and also the willingness to communicate and/or listen. 
Next, it will examine the philosophical, specifically hermeneutical, underpinnings of the 
idea of making the choice to listen. Finally, it will present a model of the listening 
process that makes choice the heart of the listening process.  
After looking at the different models of the listening process, one has seen that all 
of them, to one degree or another, represent a view of the process based on the 
perspective of behaviorism. This dissertation aims to put forth a different view of the 
listening process based loosely on ideas of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. The 
model of the listening process that this dissertation will put forth begins with a human 
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 being making the choice to listen. To better understand the intended meaning of making a 
choice to listening, one can distinguish it from different concepts that already exist in the 
literature, namely the concepts of attention and willingness to communicate and/or listen. 
Looking at the issue of attention, one will see the prevalence of the notions of 
performance and task; this dissertation does not classify making the choice to listen as a 
task attends to or performs to some measurable degree of effectiveness. Next, when 
considering the notion of willingness, this dissertation will digress from the 
understanding of willingness or will put forth in the literature of the field; thus 
differentiating making the choice to listen from having a willingness to listen. Only after 
understanding these distinctions and the philosophical underpinnings that make up this 
dissertation’s understanding of the listening process can one fully understand its model. 
4.2 Attention 
The first section of this chapter will discuss the notion of attention. It will 
specifically address the history as well as several definitions of attention and models of 
attention. As one examines these definitions and models of attention, one will begin to 
see that, despite their variety, they all demonstrate behaviorist tendencies; mostly this 
stems from the fact that the study of attention has happened mostly within the field of 
psychology, which, as discussed in chapter three, does not necessarily embrace all the 
tenets of behaviorism, still has a close kinship to it. Further, keep in mind that this 
dissertation wishes to distinguish making the choice to listen for a particular message 
from the selection among stimuli that the behaviorist perspective describes.  At this point, 
one might find helpful a brief summary of the study of the issue of attention.  
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 History and definition of attention  
As one begins to get a handle on the lay of the academic landscape surrounding 
this idea that has already been mapped about, one immediately sees that the usage of this 
term creates some difficulty in defining it. In his book Listening and Attention, Neville 
McCray (1969) writes about what he calls “the problem of the operational definition of 
attention or selectivity” (p. 19). McCray (1969) gives a brief synopsis of the history of 
the definition of attention when he writes:  
There was a great deal of research on attention up until about 1910, but 
remarkably little thereafter until the 1950s. The laboratories of Wundt, Titchener, 
and Pillsbury, writers such as Hamiliton and James all dealt exclusively with 
nature of attention. (Bakhan, 1967, provides a good source of readings for this 
early work). But after those workers attention research fell into disrepute, until 
restored by to new respectability through the work of Broadbent in particular in 
the mid-fifties. One reason for this marked break in the continuity of the research 
is without a doubt that the early definitions of attention were tired rather too 
closely to the common intuitive idea that paying attention to a stimulus makes it 
somehow “perceptually clear.” (p-19-20) 
Johnson and Proctor (2004) in their book Attention: Theory and Practice disagree with 
the idea that no research existed between WWI and WWII; they write: “Not only was 
research on attention conducted continuously during the 20th century, but this research 
also provided a close link both to the work done prior to 1910 and to contemporary work” 
(p. 15); in their summary of the trends in attention research, they argue that:  
95 
 Empirical investigations of attention began in the last half of the 19th century. One 
of the major methodological advances at that time was the use of reaction time 
procedures to study attention…much research shifted to a behavioral emphasis in 
the first half of the 20th century, with the study of attention relegated to a 
secondary role. Despite this reduction in importance…research has flourished 
since the middle of the 20th century, in large part due to the development of 
theories and models that characterize human information processing in detail. (p. 
25) 
While different interpretations exist of the history of attention research, one can safely 
say that scholars have studied attention since the dawn of the enlightenment. One can 
now move from a history of attention to an examination of various models of attention.  
Models of attention 
Wolvin and Coakley (1996) offer a helpful summary of the major models of 
attention that have developed as scholars have studied the idea over the decades. 
Highlighting specific models of attention, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) explain that older 
models of attention, such as those developed by Broadbent, Deutsch and Deutsch, 
Treisman, and Neisser, view attention as a step in the information-processing process 
while more recent models, such as the one by Kahneman, treat attention as a limited 
resource “that can be flexibly allocated” to various stages of information processing (p. 
79). This change represents a major shift in thinking about attention; now the question 
about attention becomes:  how much attention does a person to process a certain type of 
information. The chart below offers a description of models used to explain the process 
of attention; these include example of both the processing and resource theories:  
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 Table 4.1 Models of Attention (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996) 
 
Broadbent 
 
 
In this model of attention “aural stimuli enter the nervous system  
through a number of input channels … [these] input channels converge 
onto a sensory filter that functions as a selective mechanism. The filter 
selects stimuli, not on the basis of analysis of meaning but rather on 
certain physical features (such as location in space, pitch, and 
intensity) toward which it is biased. It then allows the selected stimuli 
to penetrate consciousness through a limited-capacity channel [such as 
short-term memory]” (p. 80). 
 
Deutsch and 
Deutsch 
 
 
“Deutsch and Deutsch found Broadbent’s theory attractive when 
applied to simple and few discriminations. The question it’s 
application, however, to cases where numerous and complex are 
required”; thus, they proposed a different model which took into 
account the importance of the message; they assumed that “Only the 
most important signals coming in will be acted on or remembered”. 
[and] “a person will attend to any incoming stimulus [that] is not 
accompanied by a more important one” (p.  80). 
Treisman 
 
 
Treisman “posited that messages…are first analyzed for physical 
characteristics such a pitch, loudness, and location in space. A filter 
uses the information obtained by this analysis to identify the messages 
that will be selected for attention. On other occasions, the filter bases 
its selection on more complex discriminations, such as the analysis of 
syllabic patterns, grammatical structure, or meaning”; he also argued 
that the filter has a flexibility that allows information perceived as 
important to be accentuated (Wolvin and Coakley 81). 
Neisser 
 
 
Neisser proposed a “two-process theory of analysis-by-synthesis. He 
postulated that incoming stimuli go through preattentive processing. 
During this process, stored knowledge is actively used to analyze the 
stimuli’s sensory and semantic features for important information. … 
Discounting the others’ view that some incoming are never attended 
to…Neisser theorized that they are not attended to merely because they 
have not been processed as fully as attended stimuli have been” 
(Wolvin and Coakley 81). 
Kahneman 
 
 
“Kaheman proposed a capacity model that views attention as a limited-
capacity resource that can be flexibly allocated to various stages of 
information-processing.…According to Khaneman, an individual can 
change his or her attentional distribution from moment to moment in 
order to meet the varying attentional requirements of conscious mental 
task (which demand considerable attentional energy…) and automatic 
mental tasks (which demand little attentional energy…)” (p. 81). 
Wickens 
 
 
Wickens posits a “multiple resource theory or attention” in which he 
suggests that “an individual may use attentional resources that are 
specific to a particular modality or to a particular processing task. 
Attention results from activating a sensory modality (visual or 
auditory) through the allocation of attention resources that the person 
has available” (p. 81). In other words, this theory seems to suggest a 
person can watch a television show while listening to music and pay 
equal attention to both. 
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 While one sees examples of a variety of views on attention represented in the chart 
above, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) suggest that the view of attention as a limited 
resource dominates the field of study (p. 82). Again, this view represents a shift in 
thinking from the original conception of attention as simply a part of a larger process to 
something that permeates the process. One can wonder how this understanding could 
impact current ideas of the listening process as articulated in chapter three. Wolvin and 
Coakley’s model of the listening process, for example, lists as its second step “attending 
to” – would this have to change to accommodate the notion that one allocates a certain 
level of attention at each step in the process? One can ponder these questions during the 
following discussion of the place of attention in the listening process.  
Attention in the Listening Process  
Now that one has some general understanding of attention, one can focus on the 
issue of attention as it relates to listening and the listening process. One finds a strong 
articulation of the connection between listening and attention by Mortimer Adler (1983) 
in his book How to Speak, How to Listen; in that book he writes: 
The ears have nothing comparable to eyelids, but they can be as effectively sealed 
as eyelids can be closed. Sometimes both close at the same time, but it is often the 
case that the ear is turned off while the eyes are open. That matters little if, in 
either case, the mind’s attention is turned to other matters than what is being seen 
or heard….Listening, then is primarily an activity of the mind, not of the ear or 
the eye. When the mind is not actively involved in this process, it should be called 
hearing, not listening; seeing, not reading. (p. 85-86) 
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 Clearly Adler sees a connection between attention and listening – one cannot listen to 
what does not attend to; Brownell and Wolvin and Coakley also see this connection and 
give attention a prominent place in their understanding of the listening process.  
Brownell (1996) addresses the place of attention in the listening process in 
general and the process of hearing specifically when she writes: “Attention determines 
which auditory or visual stimuli are processed. If you don’t pay attention to something, 
it’s as if it never existed” (p. 82). Brownell (1996) goes onto clarify her understanding of 
attention when she writes: “Attending to a stimulus, whether auditory or visual, involves 
following its pattern over time against a background of on-going activity in the same 
medium. Hearing trumpets in a particular symphony, for instance, requires that you learn 
what sounds listen for and discriminate among a variety of patterns” (p. 82). Turing to a 
different model of the listening process, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) recognize attention 
in their second step or component of the listening process; they write: “The second 
component of listening – attending to – refers to focused perception on selected stimuli” 
This act embraces the moment before and the moment during the reception of a potential 
stimulus. Many consider the elusive nature of attention to be the major trap that listeners 
encounter in their efforts to focus on messages” (p. 79). Looking at these passages one 
sees a clear connection between listening and attention within the framework these 
scholars work; from this perspective, one must attend to a stimulus before listening to it; 
this dissertation takes a different perspective; it argues that the choice to listen comes 
first. Furthering the discussion about the connection between listening and attention, 
Brownell and Wolvin and Coakley attempt to answer the question of how one attends to a 
stimulus by addressing the issue of auditory discrimination in their research.  
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 Auditory discrimination 
Beginning her discussion about auditory discrimination, Brownell (1996) writes: 
“Beyond the reception of sound, your job also involves distinguishing different sounds 
and identifying what you have heard. Otherwise, sounds would have no meaning for you” 
(p. 80). As she continues her discussion of this, Brownell (1996) makes the case that a 
person begins learning how to discriminate sounds in infancy learn more complex 
discriminating skills within the first eight years of life; she cites research by Weaver and 
Rutherford “who developed a hierarchy of auditory skills that are developed during early 
childhood” (p. 80). Wolvin and Coakley (1996) also cite these researchers: “Although 
[Weaver and Rutherford] have distinguished between environmental skills (pertaining to 
sounds other than verbal) and discrimination skills (pertaining to verbal sounds), both 
sections are relevant to the development of auditory discrimination” (p. 162). A summary 
of Weaver and Rutherford’s findings follow (Wolvin and Coakley, 1996, p. 162-163): 
Environmental Skills  
 
Prenatal  
• Fetal movement in response to sound  
 
Infancy  
• Responds reflexively to sudden loud noises  
• Responds to loud noises by crying  
• Listens to the human voice  
• Is quieted by sound  
• Changes activity in response to the human voice  
• Turns head in search of sound  
• Leans that people and objects make sound  
• Learns that objects make sound with manipulation  
• Localizes sound sources and moves toward them  
 
Preschool  
• Associates a sound with an object  
• Repeats a sequence of sounds  
• Learns that unseen objects make sounds  
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 • Learns that sound sources can be labeled or named  
• Given three noisemakers can find the one that sounds different  
 
Kindergarten – Grade 3  
• Learns that sounds different in intensity, pitch, pattern, and duration 
• Learns the concept distance in relation to sound localization and 
movement  
 
Grade 4 – Grade 6  
• Identifies sounds in the environment at certain times of day and evaluates 
them in terms of orientation and mobility 
• Promotes growth of echo perception and spatial orientation 
 
Discrimination Skills  
 
Infancy  
• Responds differentially to sounds  
• Responds to his or her name 
• Begins imitating speech sounds 
 
Preschool  
• Separates certain sounds from background sounds  
• Indentifies like sounds and different sounds  
• Can match verbal sounds  
 
Kindergarten – Grade 3 
• Recognizes differences in words sounds  
• Recognizes rhyming words  
• Recognizes discrete words and sequences within sentences  
• Differentiates sounds among words parts – syllables, consonants, vowels  
 
As one looks at the skills listed on the previous page, one can see that, in the words of 
Wolvin and Coakley (1996), “developing the auditory discrimination skills is an ongoing 
process” (p. 162). Wolvin, Coakley, and Kelby K. Halone (1995, 1996, 1997) look 
closely at this development across what they refer to as the “life-span” in a series of 
articles. When listing these skills Wolvin and Coakley (1996) clarify that while the 
authors of this hierarchy, Weaver and Rutherford, group the skills according to 
environmental skills – “pertaining to sounds other than verbal” – and discriminative skills 
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 – “pertaining to verbal sounds” – both types of skills “are relevant to the development of 
auditory discrimination;” further, they suggest that, because they acquire them early, 
people may need to refine these auditory skills as they mature (p. 162). Wolvin and 
Coakley focus on the discrimination as the fundamental “purpose” of listening. 
Discriminative listening and Wolvin and Coakley’s taxonomy of listening  
Wolvin and Coakley’s (1996) view of discrimination as the fundamental 
“purpose” of listening has allowed them to organize an entire taxonomy of listening 
around this purpose; as they begin to describe their taxonomy, they write: “At the first 
level, a listening listens for discrimination – to distinguish the auditory and visual stimuli. 
Discriminative listening is at the base of all listening that we do; we must differentiate the 
auditory and visual and distinguish their identifying features before we can process the 
messages at any other level. However, we may not wish to listen to at a higher level” (p. 
152). Clearly, then, Wolvin and Coakley see discriminative listening and auditory 
discrimination as necessary to the listening process. While discriminative listening 
represents the first level in their taxonomy of listening, other levels of listening that 
Wolvin and Coakley outline include comprehensive listening, therapeutic listening, 
appreciative listening, and critical listening. The levels represent higher-order types of 
listening; one can only master these types of listening after one has mastered the skills 
necessary for discriminative listening. About their taxonomy of listening, Wolvin and 
Coakley (1996) write: “This taxonomy could be viewed graphically as a tree, with 
discrimination as the root listening hierarchy and comprehension as the trunk supporting 
in the other listening purposes that shape our behaviors as listeners” (p. 152-153). Wolvin 
and Coakley created the following graphic to illustrate their taxonomy of listening: 
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 Illustration 4.1: Wolvin and Coakley’s Taxonomy of Listening (Brownell, 1996, p. 57) 
 
This model illustrates how Wolvin and Coakley understand that a person can only learn 
how to engage in a somewhat higher-order type of listening after they have learned how 
to listen discriminatively. For instance, one cannot learn how to appreciate a distinction 
between jazz and classical music or between instruments until one has learned how to 
discriminately listen to music as opposed to other stimuli present at any given time. 
Having already examined the idea of discriminative listening, one can begin to look at 
some of the other types of listening represented in Wolvin and Coakley’s taxonomy.  
Before doing that, however, one should mention that Paul G. Friedman (1993) in 
his book Attention, Understanding, Evaluation, paints a picture of listening similar that of 
Wolvin and Coakley both in the way he approaches the listening process and his 
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 taxonomy of listening. His version of the listening process includes elements labeled in 
his title – attention, understanding, and evaluation; one can speculate on at least some 
general connections between his idea of attention and Wolvin and Coakley’s notion of 
attending to as well as his idea of understanding and Wolvin and Coakley notion of 
assignment of meaning. Further, Friedman’s (1993) taxonomy of listening suggests that 
people first listen for content in order to obtain “task-related material” and then they 
listen for emotion because emotions affect “how the speaker or listener is feeling, the 
involvement, the degree of intensity, and the value that each places on a comment” (p. 8); 
finally, a person listen for aesthetic value of a message; he claims that some message 
intend “to be enjoyed or appreciated, to affect the senses. Included are messages 
expressed through the arts – music, poetry, drama, literature, etc.” (p. 8-9). Clearly one 
can see comparisons between Freidmans idea of listening for content and Wolvin and 
Coakley’s understanding of comprehensive listening and Friedman’s view of listening for 
emotion and aesthetic value and Wolvin and Coakley’s understanding of therapeutic and 
appreciative listening. Noting these similarities should not imply that subtle as well as 
significant differences do not exist in the work of these researchers; it merely highlights 
again the fact that much common ground does exist in the field of listening.  
Continuing to examine Wolvin and Coakley’s taxonomy, one can say, based on 
their hierarchy, they see comprehension as the second level of listening followed by 
appreciative, therapeutic and critical at a third level. About comprehensive listening 
Wolvin and Coakley (1996) write: “At the next level, we listen for comprehension. The 
comprehensive listener strives to understand the message in order to retain, recall, and – 
possibly – use that information at a later time” (p. 152). Wolvin and Coakley (1996) the 
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 describe the relationships between the remaining levels and the two already mentioned; 
they write: “Just as discriminative listening forms the base for the Wolvin-Coakley 
Listening Taxonomy, so, too, does listening comprehension serve as a foundation for the 
third level” (152). Describing therapeutic listening in more detail, they write: “At the first 
of the three higher levels of learning, we can listen for a therapeutic purpose – to provide 
help to a person who needs to talk through a concern” (p. 153). Moving on to critical 
listening, Wolvin and Coakley (1996) write: “The second of the three higher levels is 
critical listening – listening to evaluate the merits of the message” (p. 154). Finally, 
highlighting the difference between critical and appreciative listening, Wolvin and 
Coakley (1996) write: “The appreciative listener…must develop the skill of critical 
judgment until after the appropriate comprehension of the piece” (p. 154). So, the 
processes of appreciative, therapeutic, and critical, listening all start with the processes of 
discriminative and then comprehensive listening. One can also see relationships between 
the notion of discrimination and attention. As one considers the concept of attention as 
presented in this section, one can begin to distinguish it from making the choice to listen.  
4.3 Distinguishing a Choice to Listen from Attention 
To this point, this chapter has looked at the metaphor of attention and its 
relationship to listening in general and its place in the listening process by looking closely 
at the idea of auditory discrimination and discriminative listening; this dissertation 
acknowledges these connection and agrees in general principle that in order to listen 
effectively one must pay attention to those stimuli or messages to which one wants to 
listen. However, one must carefully distinguish between the issue of making a choice to 
listen and simply choosing to pay attention to a particular stimulus. On one hand, a 
105 
 person may choose to listen but then fail to pay attention and thus listen poorly. On the 
other hand one may pay attention and hear every word of a message but fail to listen to it. 
The distinction this section seeks to make rests on the idea of performance. One may 
argue that one can measure how well a person has paid attention, but this dissertation 
contends that one cannot measure how well one makes a choice to listen.  
Attention and Performance  
The focus on performance represents one of the main differences between the 
notion of making the choice to listen and the idea of attention. Walter Schneider, Susan 
T. Dumas, and Richard Shiffrin (1984) describe the connection between performance and 
attention in their essay “Automatic and Control Process and Attention” when they write: 
“Human performance in almost any cognitive or motor skill changes with practice….At 
first, effort and attention must be devoted to each movement or minor decision, and 
performance is slow and error prone. Eventually, long sequences of movements or 
cognitive acts are carried out with little attention, and performance it quite rapid and 
accurate” (p. 1). Clearly, from this perspective, performing a task or behavior well or 
effectively requires one to pay attention to that task; Schneider, Dumas, and Shiffrin, 
seem to suggest that one must pay more attention to a task while learning it than after 
already mastering it. According to Schneider, Dumas, and Shiffrin, (1984) this 
connection between attention and performance also must also take into account whether 
the subject has focused or divided attention; other scholars suggest that differences 
between people and environments also influence attention; further, James Reason, relying 
heavily on the work of William James, looks at the issue of habit in relation to lapses of 
attention. All of these have relevance to the current argument.  
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 Divided attention and dichotic listening 
About divided attention, Schneider, Dumas, and Shiffrin (1984) write that “Many 
studies show that subjects exhibit reduced performance when they try to accomplish 
simultaneously to an increased number of stimuli” (p. 3). An example of this that has 
application to listening theory would involve trying to listen to two conversations at once. 
Research into the workings of divided attention has a direct connection to listening; 
Schneider, Dumas, and Shiffrin (1984) describe the issue of dichotic listening and 
associated methodology when they write: 
A major research paradigm used to examine the limitations of information 
processing is dichotic listening, in which subjects are presented different streams 
of auditory stimuli in each ear; the subject is told either to attend to one ear, or to 
attend to both. For the unpracticed subject, target detection performance drops 
substantially when subjects shift from attending to a single ear to attending to 
both ears (Treisman, 1960). However, after extended (4-10 hours) CM training at 
detecting a specific target, performance is equivalent whether subjects are 
attending to one or both ears as long as both channels do not simultaneously 
contain targets (Dunction, 1980; Morary, 1975). (p. 5)  
As one considers these passages, one can see the connection between dichotic listening 
and divided attention: if someone has to listen to two different messages with two 
different ears, then one must divide one’s attention. Some researchers want to find out 
how this phenomenon affects how well someone can listen while others look at 
shadowing, the primary methods used in research into divided attention.  
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  D. R. Davies, D. M. Jones, and Ann Taylor (1984), in their essay “Selective- and 
Sustained- Attention Tasks: Individual and Group Differences” also discuss the idea of 
dichotic listening; they describe the process in detail when they write: 
In both selective and dichotic listening, two different auditory messages 
(continuous prose, words, or digits) are simultaneously presented via headphones 
(one to each ear), with the rate of presentation being generally quite high (often 
between 150 and 200 items/min.).…In dichotic listening tasks, the listener is 
required to attend to both messages, and again either recall both (dichotic 
memory) or to detect target items in both (dichotic monitoring). Dichotic memory 
is exemplified by the so-called “split-span” procedure (Broadbent, 1954), 
involving rapid dichotic presentation of pairs of digits; in this task, subjects 
typically organize their report by ear of input, recalling as many items as possible 
from one ear (the first half-set) before reporting those presented to the other ear 
(the second half-set). For right-handed individuals in particular, the right ear is 
usually given priority in recall, a phenomenon known as right-ear advantage 
(REA). (397).  
While Davies, Jones and Taylor focus on the intricacies of how one creates a situation 
involving dichotic listening, Geoffrey Underwood (1975) writes more about REA in his 
book Attention and Memory; citing Kimura (1961) Underwood suggests that REA “has 
clinical implications and was originally used to determine the location of the speech 
centre (right or left cerebral cortex) in patients prior to cortical surgery. We know that the 
speech centre is generally located in the left cerebral hemisphere (“dominant” 
hemisphere) in right- and left-handed people, but between 10% and 20% of the 
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 population have the speech centre located in the right hemisphere (Milner, Brance, and 
Rasmussen, 1964)” (p. 40).  Turning back to the issue at hand – the phenomenon of 
dichotic listening and its connection to attention – Davies, Jones and Taylor suggest that 
shadowing represents the main method used in dichotic listening research.  
Davies, Jones and Taylor (1984) contend that researchers use shadowing to 
“ensure [subject’s] attention is fully focused on the designated message in selective-
listening tasks” (p. 397). They describe this technique in more detail when they write:  
In this technique, the listener is asked to repeat aloud each word of the message as 
soon as it has been presented, sometimes, while shadowing, the listening is 
additionally required to detect target items….However, individual differences in 
shadowing ability are considerable (Lerner, 1975) and as Underwood (1974) has 
pointed out, shadowing is not “a normal mode of transcription of information, and 
so the unpracticed subject must first master this skill before any experiment can 
be attempted” (p. 368). Not surprisingly, as Underwood (1974) demonstrated, a 
highly skilled shadower can detect many more targets in both the attended and 
unattended message than can relatively unpracticed subjects….Because the 
reliability of shadowing efficiency tends to be fairly low, and such measures do 
not seem to be significantly correlated with measures of selective attention 
obtained from speeded classification and central-incidental tasks (Pelham, 1979), 
there are some grounds for questioning the usefulness of the shadowing technique 
as a means of focusing the subject’s attention, particularly in subjects who are 
unaccustomed to the procedure (Lewis, Honeck, & Fishbein). (p. 397). 
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 So, as one can see here, the use of the shadowing method may not represent the most 
effective means of understanding divided attention or dichotic listening. Further, Davies, 
Jones and Taylor have done research on another type of attention – focused attention.  
Focused attention  
Davies, Jones and Taylor (1984) distinguish between divided attention and 
another category: focused attention. About these two types of attention, they write:  
Selective-attention tasks can be broadly classified as involving either focused or 
divided attention (see Kahneman, 1973; Tresiman, 1969 for classification 
schemes). The former require attention to be focused on one source of kind of 
information to the exclusion of others, for example, one of several competing 
sensory inputs or information channels, or one of several stimulus dimensions or 
attributes; whereas the latter require attention to be divided or shared between two 
or more sources or kinds of information, or two or more mental operations. (p. 
396) 
To more clearly understand the distinction these scholars have made between focused and 
divided attention, one can picture oneself at a dinner party. A person wanting to divide 
his or her attention would try to effectively carry on several conversations at the same 
while a person wanting to focus his or her attention would block out all other 
conversation and noise to fully participate in one conversation. Further, Davies, Jones 
and Taylor (1984) subdivide the category of selective-attention tasks (which involve 
either divided or focused attention) into five categories, naming selective and dichotic 
listening as one; the other categories include: central-incidental learning; speed 
classification and visual search, the Stroop test, and time-sharing (p. 396).  
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 As an aside, one can examine one of these categories in particular: time sharing. 
The issue of time sharing also connects to performance and divided attention. Christopher 
Wickens (1984) in his essay “Processing Resources in Attention” puts forth a resource 
theory of attention that looks at attention as a variable commodity possessed by each 
person; he describes the connection between time sharing and performance when he 
writes: “Tasks are assumed to demand resources for their performance, and these 
resources are limited in their availability, There, when the joint resources demanded of 
two tasks exceeds the available supply, time-sharing efficiency drops and will be more 
likely to do so as the difficulty of either component task increases” (p. 63). As one 
considers the notion of time-sharing and its relation to task performance, on can clearly 
see a connection between it, the more general idea of divided attention, and the questions 
asked by George Sperling. In his essay “A Unified theory of Attention and Signal 
Detection,” Sperling (1984) looks at the issues of divided attention and time sharing in a 
slightly different way when he talks about “concurrent tasks” such as driving a car and 
listening to the radio and asks whether a person can do both tasks simultaneously without 
loss (p. 103); in other words, Sperling wants to know if a person can divide his or her 
attention in such as way as to successfully complete more than one task at a time. While 
Wickens focuses on laying out the problems associated with time-sharing and how to 
measure the phenomena, Sperling offers an answer to the question of what one should do 
when faced with two tasks competing for attention that relies on a theory of optimization 
– finding the most favorable compromise between conflicting agendas (p. 176). While the 
scholars examined thus far divide and then sub-divide the issue of selective attention into 
divided and focused attention, Wolvin and Coakley leave it in tact.   
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 Selective attention 
Of the process of selective attention Wolvin and Coakley (1996) write:   
There are a number of stimuli to which we can attend at any one time. However, 
there is no limit to the number of stimuli constantly competing for our attention. If 
all stimuli seeking our attention at any given time were sent to the cortex, a neural 
overload would result. Thus, we must constantly engage in a process of selecting 
only those stimuli to which we will attend. It is believed that some discriminatory 
mechanism assists us in selecting the wanted from the unwanted aural stimuli. (p. 
79)  
Wolvin and Coakley (1996) also discuss the details and consequences of this process:  
The dominant view of attention presently follows Kahneman’s capacity theory, 
which – like Shiffrin and Schneider’s capacity theory – emphasizes the flexible 
nature of attention. However, disagreements continue as to how selective attention 
operates, where discriminatory decisions are made, and what happens to 
unselected stimuli. There is, though, experimental evidence – as previously cited 
– that attention is selective. As listeners, we base our selection of aural stimuli 
upon a priority system that exists within each of us. This priority system may 
stem from the “tendency for people to pay close attention to information that is 
consistent with their attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors, and little attention to 
stimuli which are inconsistent.” This need for consistency has led McCroskey to 
conclude that “selective attention is not so much the conscious ‘tuning out’ of 
information as it is the unconscious ‘tuning in’ of consistent information….This 
process of tuning in and tuning out on messages has critical implication for our 
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 understanding of listening behavior. Bartlett summaries the relationship of 
selective attention to listener perception: “Selective listening is determined mainly 
by the qualitative differences in stimuli in relation to predispositions – cognitive, 
affective, and motor of the listener” (p. 82). 
From these passages one can see the strong connection that Wolvin and Coakley see 
between selective attention and what they see as the performance of listening. Simply 
put, one can interpret Wolvin and Coakley as saying that people select to pay attention or 
“tune into” information that confirms what they already think and believe; while 
undoubtedly this does happen, this dissertation argues that one can – and often times 
should – choose to listen with an openness to whatever another may have to say 
regardless of how well the message may conform to already held beliefs.  
Factors influencing attention and performance  
Now that one understands the notion of selection attention and the differences 
between focused and divided attention, one can move onto other factors that influence 
attention and thus performance such as the individual trying to pay attention and the 
environment in which the individual finds himself. Davies, Jones and Taylor (1984) cite 
studies which suggest age, sex, personality, and cognitive style as factors that influence a 
person’s ability to attend to and thus perform a task; these scholars pointed out that some 
of these same types of differences manifest themselves whether the tasks in question 
require selective attention or more sustained attention, also known as vigilance. Johnson 
and Proctor (2004) highlight the difference between vigilance and arousal; they write:  
The concept of cortical arousal is closely related to that of vigilance….Both terms 
are often used to refer to a general state of wakefulness, and factors that increase 
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 or decrease arousal are associated with corresponding increases or decreases in 
vigilance task performance. However, the association between cortical arousal 
and vigilance is not perfect, suggesting that vigilance is a multidimensional 
construct (Parasuraman, Warm, & See, 1998). In particular, although arousal level 
seems to determine the overall level of vigilance, it cannot explain why vigilance 
performance typically decreases after a shot (20-30 minutes) period of vigilance 
task performance. (p. 39) 
Here, then, one sees another individual force at work in the arena of attention besides the 
already mentioned: the ability of a person to sustain attention. Proctor and Johnson 
continue their discussion of this topic when they write about conducting studies to 
measure how long people can sustain attention to one task; according the researchers, 
“the most common finding for vigilance tasks is the vigilance decrement: the hit rate 
decreases as the time on the task increases” (p. 257). So, when considering why 
someone’s performance of a task has decreased or increased, one can ask questions about 
a person’s ability to sustain attention as well as questions about the person’s age, sex, 
personality, and cognitive style. In addition to these factors, scholars suggest that one 
must also always consider factors related to the environment in which the task happens.   
Robert Hockey reports on some of the effects of the environment on attention in 
his Essay “Varieties of Attention State: The Effects of the Environment.” After reviewing 
studies to measure the effects on attention and task performance of environmental factors 
such as noise in the situation or the arousal level of the subject, Hockey (1984) concludes 
that these stressors cause “counter-intuitive” effects; he writes:  
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 Although coping with environmental changes will normally require effort, which 
is limited and costly, so that a pattern of decrement will emerge eventually; it is 
nevertheless the case that for any state change, whether it is produced by noise, 
sleeplessness, old age, or drugs, there well may be some task demands that is 
consonant with it. In this case, little or no effort will be required to maintain the 
appropriate state, and no decrement will be observed. The many examples of 
counter-intuitive effects of stressors in the literature provide ample support for 
this predication. (p. 479) 
In other words, while environmental factors do have some affect on task performance, 
ultimately people do adapt to them; Hockey (1984) theorizes about this phenomena as 
Adaptive Resource Management; describing this idea, he writes: “Shifts in state produced 
by environmental changes do not, then, impose and any strict limits on performance 
capabilities. Rather, as I have stated in the preceding they push the system into a different 
baseline state” (p. 477). So, while, for example, a new mother’s performance of everyday 
tasks might decrease for a period due to the environmental change of sleeplessness, 
eventually she will adapt to those changes and her performance of the necessary tasks of 
motherhood will not suffer; in fact, she will develop new skills – such as breast feeding – 
and come expertly to perform old skills – such as diaper changing – that she had only 
previously performed at a mediocre level. As this process happens, Hockey would say 
that she has learned to manage her attention resources in an adaptive way.  
One might question how the issue of the adaption of task performance to a new 
environment ties into the issue of habit. James Reason, relying heavily on the work 
William James, looks generally at this idea; specifically he looks at the issue of habit in 
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 relation to lapses of attention. In his essay “Lapses of Attention in Everyday Life” 
Reason quotes James as saying that “Habit diminishes the conscious attention with which 
our acts are performed (James, 1980 p. 114)” (515). Here, then one sees a dichotomy 
between how the factors already discussed might affect the attention necessary to perform 
a task and the role of habit – how much something has become “old hat” – plays in task 
performance; Reason writes that “Both habit and attention clearly have leading parts to 
play in the guidance of action” (p. 516). Going back to the new mother mentioned earlier, 
imagine that, though she has learned how to expertly change a diaper at three o’clock in 
the morning after only sleeping for two hours, she discovers she has placed a diaper on a 
doll in her baby’s crib instead of her baby. What happened? The performance of the task, 
in one respect, did not suffer – the mother changed the diaper expertly despite the 
environmental factors – but, on the other hand, she had what Reason and James would 
call a “lapse in attention” which caused her to apply the task to the wrong object. Here, 
then, one can see the effect of habit on the performance of a task.  Reason makes the case 
that a pattern exists behind these lapses and explains it using a model of human action 
called the Heuristic Model of Action that looks “beyond the behavioral level of analysis” 
of performance. While this model and understanding of attention may have a closer 
connection to the willingness to listen than some of others previously examined, one still 
must make some important distinctions between the processes of selection and attention 
already discussed and the notion of making the choice to listen. One must also distinguish 
the choice to listen from what some may call the willingness to listen.  
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 4.4 Distinguishing a Choice to Listen from Willingness to Listen 
To this point, then, this chapter has claimed that the idea of making the choice to 
listen differs from the idea of choosing to attend to or pay attention to a stimulus making 
the choice to listen does not involve a measurable performance component. Further, one 
might assume similarities between the idea of making the choice to listen and what James 
McCroskey and other scholars refer to as a desire or “willingness” to communicate or 
listening but this dissertation wishes to distinguish the two ideas. One cannot say that 
simply because one has a willingness to communicate or listen one will choose to do so. 
For example, a student may have a general willingness to listen in class but on any given 
day may choose not to listen. Further, scholars view “willingness” as a measurable 
quality and this dissertation has already argued that the choice to listen does not have a 
measurable quality. This next section, then, will look more specifically at this literature.  
Measuring the willingness to communicate 
According to Anthony Clark (1989), willingness to communicate (WTC) “is 
measured by a self-report instrument called the Willingness to Communicate Scale 
(McCroskey and Richmond, 1987)” (p. 238). Clark starts to make a connection between 
WTC and listening when he writes:  
The WTC scale is intentionally broad-gauged and elicits responses to four 
different types of communication situations as well as three different types of 
receivers (listeners). McCroskey and Richmond claim that findings on the scale’s 
reliability are very promising, and demonstrate that a person’s willingness to 
communicate in one context and/or with one receiver type is closely related to 
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 his/her willingness to communicate in other contexts and with other receiver 
types. (p. 238)  
Here, then one sees the measurability of the issue of willingness. One can find an 
explanation of one of the reasons that scholars have chosen to measure this quality in the 
article “Willingness to Communicate, A Potential Confounding Variable in 
Communication Research” in which McCroskey and Zakahi (1989) write: Researches in 
communication may have failed to consider the impact of communication orientations on 
their own research….If [potential participants] do not like or are unwilling to 
communicate, they may choose not to participate in the study” (p. 98); they go on to 
distinguish between people with “high WTC” and “low WTC” and suggest that 
communication scholars need to “undertake additional research to determine what can be 
done to increase participation in our research by low WTC subjects” (p. 103). In other 
words, scholars devised a scale to measure WTC partly because they believed it had an 
impact on their research. Other scholars, like Andrew Clark, chose to pursue the 
connection between a person’s willingness to communicate and one’s ability to listen  
Clark (1989) takes the next logical leap and hypothesizes that “There is a positive 
relationship between a person’s WTC scores and his/her ability to listen comprehensively 
[and] to listen for emotional meaning in messages” (p. 239). Clark (1989) tests this 
hypothesis and then concludes: “In summary, it seems relatively clear that being more 
willing to communicate and less apprehensive about both speaking and listening is an 
index of better listening comprehension. But, when it comes to ‘hearing what is inferred 
but not actually said,’ as Galvin phrased it, self-confidence may serve as an inhibitor 
rather than a facilitator” (p. 247). Thus, one can say based on this evidence that the 
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 connection between WTC and one’s ability to listen may not have such clear benchmarks 
when the issue of performance comes into play. As Clark’s study showed, just because 
one has a willingness to communicate does not mean one will listen effectively. While 
Clarke did his research to measure one’s ability to listen, other scholars devised a scale to 
take McCroskey’s scale further and measure one’s willingness to listen (WTL). 
Measuring the willingness to listen  
Charles V. Roberts and Larry Vinson (1998) take to task McCroskey and his 
methodology of determining WTC when they state that they “disagree with the tacit 
assumption that to measure the willingness of an individual to talk in a variety of 
situations validly measures how willing a person is to communicate in those situations” 
(p. 46); they posit that a WTL scale “would be very similar in many ways to what 
McCroskey and Richmond, among others, have developed to measure willingness to 
communicate, but would vary in several important ways. It would focus on listening 
rather than speaking. It would also differ due to the intentional nature of encoding” (p. 
46). Roberts and Vinson (1998) go on to make an important statement about how they 
understand listening and speaking and the role of motivation in listening when they write:  
Speaking is generally an intentional act. Listening activity is as often 
nonconsciously increased or decreased as it is consciously adjusted…People 
listen differently due to the motivation they have to listen…they decide, either 
consciously or unconsciously, how much of their optimum listening ability is 
called for by the situation. Motivation alone cannot explain the consistent 
listening pattern that individuals seem to display, since often the motivational 
aspect of communication comes after, rather than before, the actual event (p. 46). 
119 
 In this passage one finds several statements that this dissertation must contest. First, this 
dissertation does not believe listening requires any more or less intention than speaking. 
Secondly, it argues that the motivational aspect of communication comes before, rather 
than after, the event of perception: one does make the choice to listen to a message after 
one hears it; one makes the choice to listen and then perceives or hears it.  
Roberts and Vinson (1998) expand on their understanding of the connection 
between motivation and listening when they distinguish between “open-system 
individuals” with high WTL and “closed-system individuals” with low WTL “who 
monitor cues only briefly except in situations where motivational possibilities are 
patently obvious” (p. 47); they also suggest that “open (high willingness to listen) 
individuals monitor cues longer than close (low willingness to listen) individuals, perhaps 
to search further for possibilities” (p. 47). This issue of motivation also caused Roberts 
and Vinson (1998) to reconfigure their original WTL scale. About that scale, they write: 
We reasoned that that individuals choose to listen differently in situations because 
of differences in their desire to monitor the communication for potential 
motivational possibilities. The data analysis confirmed this. The major problem 
we encountered with the scale seems to have been centered around the level of 
importance of that message. It was strong enough so that it disallowed possible 
weaker influences of situation and speaker to emerge. (p. 48)  
Analyzing these assumptions, one can see a possible flaw in the logic used here. Of 
course, if one knows in advance that a speaker has important information to give then one 
knows to listen; but how does one know what another has to say in advance? One can 
argue that even in the cases where one has knowledge in advance of the gist of a 
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 communication, one still has not listened to the communication. Having some prior 
understanding of what a person has to say and choosing to listen to it based on that 
knowledge has a vastly different connotation and implication than simply choosing to 
listen to another person for the sake of listening to that person. One must acknowledge 
the possibility that often one may think he or she knows what another person has to say, 
and hears that, only to learn later that the other person did not say that at all. 
Willingness and attention 
The idea of willingness to communication or listen calls to mind the idea of will, 
which W. B. Pilsbury (1973) saddresses in his book Attention; he distinguishes between 
external and internal will and talks about their connection to attention when he writes: 
Another function that cannot easily be disassociated from the attention is that 
which results in action – what is ordinarily known as will. One phase of the 
subject has already been discussed and has been found to be practically identical 
to the problem of attention. This is what is ordinarily known as internal will, the 
ability to choose what is to enter consciousness and to direct the course of ideas. 
But the control of the entrance of ideas we have seen to be dependent upon the 
attention, to be conditioned by a series of circumstances rooted in heredity, in the 
social and physical environment, and not to be the exhibition of any new or 
peculiar process. The control of the course of thought is also a function of the 
same influences, and can, as we have seen, be ascribed to attention with equal 
right. There remains to consider the so-called external will, or the manifestations 
of will in control of bodily movements. The close connection of the internal will 
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 and attention would at least suggest that there was a close connection also 
between the attention and the external phase of the will problem. (p. 149) 
Here one sees a view of will as determined by external circumstances; a view that does 
not allow for many options when it comes to human choice. Pilsbury (1973) looks at the 
ideas of choice, action, and attention in this way: “Action…only takes place after 
corresponding sensations have been in consciousness. It follows, then, since attention 
controls the entrance to of sensations that it must also control action” (p. 164); further, he 
writes, “Choice is a result of attending to one of two possible sensations or ideas with its 
corresponding movement” (p. 165). So, for instance, one can interpret Pilsbury as saying 
that in order for a person to choose to take a swim, that person must first know what 
taking a swim would feel like. But how does a person who has never taken a swim know 
what taking a swim feels like? Perhaps a more textured view of will, that of Augustine, 
can clarify issues about will, choice, and action that Pilsbury does not address.   
Augustine’s view of will  
While McCroskey and Pilsbury and others that share their behaviorist point of 
view, implicitly understand a person’s will as that which that person wants to do or 
chooses to do, Augustine takes a much more complex view of will in his Confessions.  
Augustine (1960) refers to a person’s will as incomplete and divided when he writes:  
As for me, when I deliberated upon serving the Lord my God, as I had longed 
planned, it was I myself who willed and I myself who did not will it. Therefore, I 
was at war within myself, and I was laid waste by myself. This devastation was 
made against my will indeed, and yet it revealed not the nature of a different mind 
within me, but rather the punishment of my own nature. (p. 198)  
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 In other words, for Augustine, human beings naturally find themselves conflicted about 
what to do. Now, some might see spin this in terms of a conflict between good and evil 
but, ever complex, Augustine (1960) responds: “If there are as many contrary natures as 
there are conflicting wills, there will not be only two natures but many of them” (p. 198); 
he gives examples of four activities that a person might want to do; “Let us suppose,” he 
hypothesizes, “that all of these occur together at exactly the same time, and that all are 
equally desired but cannot be carried out simultaneously. The rend asunder the mind, 
with these four wills opposing one another, or even many more, in accordance with the 
great range of things that are desired” (p. 199). So, for Augustine, a person can have 
many conflicting wills or desires, far more than Pilsbury’s “two possible sensations or 
ideas” or McCroskey’s singular concept of willingness. Augustine recognizes that people 
make choices while in a particular place and a particular time; as in the example, t one 
may desire to do four different activities at the same time but cannot physically do so; 
thus, one must choose to do one at that moment. Gadamer, whose work underlies the last 
chapter of this dissertation, also sees people and their choices as bound within a horizon 
of a particular time and place. Thus, neither Augustine or Gadamer can say that a person 
has the freedom to simply exercise one’s will and do as one desires; one must always 
consider the whole range of desires competing for recognition at the same as well as the 
range of possible options within the horizon of one’s community and tradition. The next 
chapter of this dissertation will examine Gadamer’s ideas of horizon and tradition more 
closely; this chapter will conclude with a discussion on his ideas about will and prejudice.  
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 Gadamer on will and prejudice 
 Gadamer (1975) associates his understanding of will with Nietzsche’s idea of will 
to power; he writes that “even a slave still has a will to power, which turns against his 
master” but cautions that the master’s understanding of the slave as only a servant to do 
his bidding and the slave’s understanding of the master as simply a tyrant whose bidding 
he does masks the will of both because their “withdrawing from dialectic” of the 
reciprocity of their relationship results in their “reflecting [themselves] out of relation [to 
each other]” and so become “unreachable” to each other; further, he says that “the claim 
to understand the other person in advance performs the function keeping the claim of the 
person at a distance” and thus the relationship becomes “a reflexive form of the power to 
dominate” (p. 323). In other words, two people who do not open themselves to each other 
– who think they completely understand and know each other and no longer have 
anything to learn from each other – can only relate by struggling for power in the 
relationship. On the other hand, Gadamer (1975) claims that when two people do not 
assume they know each other and have an openness to learning, then they have the 
freedom to choose how to relate to each other; he writes: “openness to the other, then 
includes the acknowledgement that I must accept some things that are against myself, 
even though there is no one else who asks this of me” (p. 324). So, for Gadamer, only 
after two people in a relationship agree not to see each other as already known and 
understood can they choose to act out of concern for the other rather than out of duty or 
obligation or to secure a better position in a struggle for power in the relationship.  
 One can also relate the idea of “withdrawing from dialectic of reciprocity” and its 
resulting power struggle to the idea of prejudice, and here one finds the key to 
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 understanding the difference between the behaviorist basis of the listening process as 
generally viewed in the literature and the hermeneutical basis this dissertation seeks to 
establish. The behaviorist understanding seems to suggest that a person involuntarily 
takes in stimuli and then selects the stimuli to which to listen based on what he or she 
wills to hear. Having already distinguished between making a choice to listen and simply 
hearing what one wants wills hear, this dissertation takes a hermeneutical stance that a 
person makes the choice to listen on the basis of one’s given prejudices or biases. 
Obviously, those who believe they either do not or should not have bias or prejudice 
would not agree with this assumption. Gadamer (1975) responds to such criticism with 
the same logic seen in his critique of willing oneself to power over another. He writes: 
A person who imagines that his is free of prejudices, basing his knowledge on the 
objectivity of his procedures and denying that he is himself influenced by 
historical circumstances experience the power of the prejudices that 
unconsciously dominate him…A person who does not accept that he is dominated 
by prejudices will fair what is shown by their light….A person who reflects 
himself out of the mutuality of such a relation changed this relationship and 
destroys its moral bond. A person who reflects himself out of a living relation to 
tradition destroys the true meaning of this tradition in exactly the same way…To 
stand within a tradition does not limit the freedom of knowledge, it makes it 
possible (p. 324).  
So, from Gadamer’s point of view, denying one’s bias means becoming a victim of its 
power or engaging in a constant power struggle with it, just as the slave who chooses to 
deny the personhood of his or her master by seeing the master as a tyrant will constantly 
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struggle for power in that relationship. For Gadamer, whether in relationships or 
interpretation, one only finds the freedom to learn by acknowledging the limits of what 
one already knows. Relating this specifically to the idea of making the choice to listen, 
one can say that, from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, making the choice 
to listen does not mean exercising one’s so-called “free” will to listen to whatever one 
wants because one can only understand one’s self, and thus one’s will, in relation to one’s 
tradition and prejudice. The final chapter of this dissertation will examine Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics and the notions of prejudice and tradition in more detail and 
look at some scholarship that relates these ideas specifically to listening before presenting 
an alternative model of the listening process that takes these ideas into account. 
4.5 Summary  
This chapter has examined how making the choice to listen differs from the idea 
of choosing to pay attention to a stimuli or having a willingness to listen. After looking at 
these distinctions, it argued that a proper understanding of the choice to listen requires a 
different framework than the behaviorist perspective that includes the concepts of 
attention and willingness; it began to introduce Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as 
that alternative framework by looking at differences between his notion of will and the 
notion of willingness discussed in the behaviorist literature. The next chapter, then, will 
examine Gadamer’s work and its connection to listening in more detail.   
  
 
Chapter 5 
 
  
Philosophical Hermeneutics:  
An Alternative Basis for the Listening Process 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
If  making the choice to listen does not involve an act that one performs or that 
one can measure and means more than exercising one’s will, then how exactly can one 
describe the phenomenon? Making the choice to listen, from the perspective of this 
dissertation, goes beyond simply choosing which stimuli to attend to; it includes choosing 
to listen for as well as listening to a particular message while current the models and 
understandings of the listening process only allow a person to choose to listen to a 
stimulus after he or she has perceived it. This chapter then examines how one makes the 
choice to listen. It argues from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics that people 
make the choice to listen based on what Hans-Georg Gadamer would call bias or 
prejudice based in tradition. After outlining philosophical hermeneutics and its 
differences with the behaviorist perspective underlying the models of the listening 
process examined in chapter three, and looking at the work of one scholar who connects 
listening to philosophical hermeneutics, this chapter will conclude by offering a model of 
the listening process as a process that starts with a person making the choice to listen.  
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 To understand the claim that making the choice to listen goes beyond a simple 
exercise of one’s will, one must understand some of the basic tenets of philosophical 
hermeneutics, namely prejudice and tradition. This chapter will give a brief overview of 
philosophical hermeneutics, then focus on the ideas of horizons, prejudice, tradition, and 
the hermeneutical circle, to highlight some of the major differences between the approach 
this dissertation takes and the behaviorist approach then underlies the models of the 
listening process examined in chapter three. As evidenced by the scholarship reviewed 
thus far in this dissertation, most scholarship on listening and the listening process within 
the communication field comes from the perspective of behaviorism and empiricism. The 
scholarship of Gemma Corradi Fiumara, however, actually connects the issue of listening 
to hermeneutics. After looking specifically at her understanding of the concepts of logos 
and benumbment, this chapter will conclude with the introduction of a new model of the 
listening process that takes into account the idea of making the choice to listen as well as 
the principles tested and verified by the empirical methods of the behaviorists.   
5.2 An Overview of Philosophical Hermeneutics 
For a short history of hermeneutics and a sketch of the academic landscape, one 
can turn to the work of Jean Grondin. In the book Introduction to Philosophical 
Hermeneutics Grodin (1994) writes: “Since its emergence in the seventeenth century, the 
word hermeneutics has referred to the science or art of interpretation. Until the end of the 
nineteenth century, it usually took the form of the theory that promised to lay out the 
rules governing the discipline of interpretation…The idea of an art of interpretation can, 
of course, be traced much farther back…even to the tradition of the Greek rhapsodies” (p. 
1). Of course, after the scientific revolution and the enlightenment, people began to seek 
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 an alternative to the undergirding philosophy of the scientific age and this paved the way 
for philosophical hermeneutics. About this kind of hermeneutics, Grondin (1994) writes:  
Philosophical hermeneutics, by comparison, is of very recent date. In the 
ordinary, narrow sense, this term refers to the philosophical position of Hans-
Georg Gadamer, and sometimes that of Paul Ricouer. Significant forms of 
hermeneutics undoubtedly existed before then, but they hardly ever presented 
themselves as philosophical conceptions…Even though Gadamer’s philosophical 
endeavors would have been impossible without Heidegger, Heidegger 
nevertheless could not help stating: ‘Hermeneutic philosophy – that’s Gadamer’s 
business.’ (p. 1) 
Here then one sees the connection between hermeneutics as a school of thought that 
sought rules to regulate interpretation and Gadamer’s fully developed philosophical 
position that begins to question them. While some may suggest that the ideal method of 
interpretation involves a scientific method free of prejudice or bias, Gadamer, particularly 
in his seminal work Truth and Method, questions the pursuit of an ideal methodology or 
science of interpretation; further, he argues that any method or process of act of 
interpretation, a category in which this dissertation would include any act of listening, 
begins with the interpreter’s biases and prejudices.  
Building on the idea that interpretation begins with an understanding of one’s 
being as prejudiced or biased, and also looking at the place of methodology in what he 
calls and Gadamer refer to as “the hermeneutical task,” David E. Linge (1977) writes in 
his collection of essays by Gadamer entitled Philosophical Hermeneutics: 
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 The task of philosophical hermeneutics, therefore, is ontological rather than 
methodological. It seeks to throw light on the fundamental conditions that 
underlie the phenomenon of understanding in all its modes, scientific and 
nonscientific alike, and that constitute understanding as an event over which the 
interpreting subject does not ultimately preside. For philosophical hermeneutics 
“the question is not what we do or what should do, but what happens beyond our 
willing and out knowing.” The universality of the hermeneutical question can 
emerge, however, only when we have freed ourselves from the methodologism 
that pervades modern thought and from its assumptions regarding man and 
tradition. (p. xi-xii) 
One can say, then, that the metaphor of hermeneutical task as ontological refers to 
Gadamer’s notion that one must start the process of interpretation by acknowledging 
one’s biases and tradition; this forms the basis of interpretation as well as the choice to 
listen.  Gadamer goes into detail about this idea in Truth and Method when he describes 
the connection between these biases and horizons in the interpretation process.  
Horizons  
To begin the discussion on the place of bias and tradition in the hermeneutical 
process, one can examine Linge’s (1977) summary of Gadamer’s notion of horizon: 
Hermeneutics has its origins in breaches in intersubjectivity. Its field of 
application is comprised of all those situations in which we encounter meanings 
that are immediately understandable but require interpretive effort. The earliest 
situations in which principles of interpretation were worked out were encounters 
with religious texts whose meanings were obscure or whose import was not 
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 longer acceptable unless they could be harmonized with the tenets of the faith. 
But this alienation from meaning can just as well occur while engaging in direct 
conversation, experiencing a work of art, or considering historical actions. In all 
these cases, the hermeneutical has to do with bridging the gap between the 
familiar world in which we stand and the strange meaning that resists assimilation 
into the horizons of our world. It is vitally important to recognize that the 
hermeneutical phenomenon encompasses both the alien that we strive to 
understand and the familiar world that we already understand. The familiar 
horizons of the world, though perhaps more difficult to grasp thematically, are as 
integral a part of the event of understanding as are the explicit procedures by 
which he assimilates the alien object. Such horizons constitute the interpreter’s 
own immediate participation in traditions that are not themselves the object of 
understanding but the condition of its occurrence. Yet, this reflexive dimension 
has all but been ignored by the “science of hermeneutics” during the last century. 
The result has been a distorted and one-sided picture of understanding and our 
relationship to tradition.  (p. xii) 
With this understanding of horizons as familiar and integral to the interpretation process 
one starts to see one of the basic tenets of philosophical hermeneutics – that people 
cannot escape what they know Also one sees the idea that the study of science in general 
and specifically the “science of hermeneutics” typically does not take into account this 
“reflexive dimension” of understanding. A later section examines differences between 
hermeneutics and science while the next outlines Gadamer’s connections between 
horizons, prejudice, and tradition as they relate to the process of interpretation. 
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 Prejudice  
Gadamer (1975) suggests that a person’s prejudices make up his or her horizons; 
he writes: “We started by saying that a hermeneutical situation is determined by the 
prejudices that we bring with us. They constitute, then, the horizon of a particular present, 
for they represent that beyond which it is impossible to see” (p. 272). Here then one 
begins to see Gadamer’s connection between horizon and prejudice or bias. As one thinks 
about the idea of prejudice one can consider some of the common notions of prejudice as 
negative or wrong and definitely a trap to avoid, but, as Gadamer (1975) points out, 
“historical analysis shows that it is not until the enlightenment that the concept of 
prejudice acquires the negative aspect we are familiar with. Actually ‘prejudice’ means a 
judgment that is given before all the elements that determine a situation have been finally 
examined” (p. 240). Further, Gadamer (1975) insists that “prejudice certainly does not 
mean a false judgment,” but explains that, in the view of those with an enlightenment 
mentality, it appears that this pre-judgment “does not have any foundation in the facts 
themselves, i.e. that it is ‘unfounded’” (p. 240). Gadamer (1975) explains this apparent 
lack of basis in fact “is the reason for the discrediting of prejudices and the claim by 
scientific knowledge completely to exclude them” (p. 240) because “it is only its having a 
basis, a methodological justification (and not the fact that it may be actually correct) that 
gives a judgment its dignity” (p. 240). Here then we his understanding of prejudice as 
integral to interpretation as well as his bias against adhering to a particular method of 
interpretation. He questions the claim that only an interpretation arrived at by a so-called 
objective scientific method has validity. He claims that one can come to a valid 
interpretation of a text based on the acknowledgment of one’s bias and tradition.  
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 Continuing his defense of prejudice as necessary for interpretation, Gadamer 
(1975) critiques the enlightenment philosophy which favors the apparently objective 
reason over an apparently subjective prejudice in matters of interpretation; he writes:  
This recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice gives 
that hermeneutical problem its real thrust. By the light of this insight it appears 
that historicism, despite its critique of rationalism and of natural law philosophy, 
is based on the modern enlightenment and unknowingly shares its prejudices. And 
there is one prejudice of the enlightenment that is essential to it: the fundamental 
prejudice of the enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself” (p. 239-
240). 
For Gadamer, then, the beginning of the enlightenment marks a transition in people’s 
understanding about the nature of reason, prejudice, and interpretation. He continues his 
discussion about the enlightenment, reason, and interpretation when he writes: “it is the 
general tendency of the enlightenment not to accept any authority and to decide 
everything before the judgment seat of reason… It is not tradition, but reason that 
constitutes the ultimate source of all authority… [This] makes the tradition the as much 
an object of criticism as do the natural sciences the evidence of the senses” (Gadamer, 
1975, p. 241-242). Gadamer (1975) goes on to say: 
This is where the hermeneutical problem comes in…That which prevents itself, 
under the aegis of an absolute self-construction by reason, as a limiting prejudice 
belongs, in fact, to historical reality itself. What is necessary is a fundamental 
rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and a recognition of the fact that there 
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 are legitimate prejudices, if we want to do justice to man’s finite, historical mode 
of being” (p. 246).  
Here again one sees the ontological claim of philosophical hermeneutics that unbiased 
human beings do not exist. Further one sees more of the conflict between hermeneutics 
and science – that science does not want to recognize biases. Finally, one sees the 
mention of tradition and Gadamer’s claim that the emergence of enlightenment 
philosophy has changed the place of tradition in interpretation. While further discussion 
about the substantial differences between hermeneutical and empirical processes will 
follow shortly, one can turn to Gadamer for more detail on his understanding of how 
hermeneutics works and the notion of the hermeneutic circle before continuing into a 
discussion about the place of tradition in philosophical hermeneutics. 
The hermeneutical circle  
After discussing the issues of prejudice and the enlightenment’s “prejudice 
against prejudice,” Gadamer (1975) describes how interpretation based on prejudice 
works; he starts with a reiteration of the relationship between the part and the whole:  
We remember here the hermeneutical rule that we must understand the whole in 
terms of detail and the detail in terms of the whole. This principle stems from 
ancient rhetoric, and modern hermeneutics has taken and applied it to the art of 
understanding. It is a circular relationship in both cases. The anticipation of 
meaning in which the whole is envisaged becomes explicit understanding in that 
the parts, that are determined by the whole, themselves also determine this 
whole…Thus, the movement of understanding is constantly from whole to the 
part and back to the whole. Our task is to extend in concentric circles the unity of 
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 the understood meaning. The harmony of all details with the whole is the criterion 
of correct understanding. The failure to achieve this harmony means 
understanding has failed (p. 259)  
Thus, one can envision someone hypothesizing about what a text means, dissecting the 
text to see if it means that, and then checking that evidence against the anticipated 
meaning of the whole and repeating this process until somehow the interpreter knows he 
has the correct interpretation. Gadamer (1975) explains that “this view of understanding 
culminated logically in Schleiermacher’s theory of the divinatory act, by means of which 
one places oneself entirely within the writer’s mind and from there resolves all that is 
strange and unusual about the text” (p. 261). The question then, of course, becomes: how 
does one know what the author intended? Gadamer sees the flaw in this approach and 
offers some thoughts from Heidegger as an alternative paradigm.  
Describing the work of Heidegger as offering an alternative to Schleiermacher’s 
methodological understanding of the hermeneutic circle, Gadamer (1975) writes:  
Heidegger describes the circle in such as way that the understanding of the text 
remains permanently determined by the anticipatory movement of fore-
understanding. The circle of the whole and the part is not dissolved in perfect 
understanding but, on the contrary, it most fully realized. The circle then, is not 
formal in nature, it is neither subjective nor objective, but describes understanding 
as the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. 
The anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act 
of subjectivity, but proceeds from the community that binds us to the tradition. 
But this is contained in our relationship to tradition, in the constant process of 
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 education. Tradition is not simply a precondition into which we have come, but 
we produce it ourselves, inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution 
of tradition and hence further determine it ourselves. Thus the circle of 
understanding is not a “methodological” circle, but describes an ontological 
structural element in understanding. (p. 261)  
From Gadamer’s point of view, then, Schleiermacher’s idea of testing and retesting one’s 
interpretation until one gains absolute certainty in the correctness of his interpretation has 
a methodological basis to it. Gadamer rejects this notion of Schleiermacher’s for 
Heidegger’s understanding of interpretation as a process that starts with a part of the 
ontological nature of human beings – that they have biases – and moves from there.  
Tradition, subjectivity, and the fusing of horizons  
Now, since Gadamer starts with the assumption that people cannot look at a 
situation objectively, one may interpret Gadamer, at least at a first glance, as advocating a 
paradigm of interpretation based on subjective relativism – that an interpreter can 
interpret the text anyway he or she wants. However, Gadamer does not advocate such a 
position. He sees an interpreter’s horizon of possible interpretations of a text as limited 
by his or her tradition. Describing this connection between horizons, tradition, history, 
and the interpreter, Gadamer (1975) writes:  
It is important to avoid the error in thinking that it is a fixed set of opinions and 
evaluations that determine and limit the horizon of the present, and that the 
otherness of the past can be distinguished from it as from a fixed ground. In fact, 
the horizon of the present is being continually formed in that we have continually 
to test our prejudices. An important part of this testing is the encounter with the 
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 past and the understanding of the tradition from which we come. Hence the 
horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. There is no more an 
isolated horizon of the present than there are historical horizons. Understanding, 
rather, is always the fusion of these horizons which we imagine to exist by 
themselves. We know the power of this kind of fusion chiefly from earlier times 
and their naïve attitude towards themselves and their origin. In a tradition this 
process of fusion is continually going on, for there old and new continually grow 
together to make something of living value, without either being explicitly 
distinguished from the other. (p. 273)  
Thus, for Gadamer, understanding becomes a fusion of horizons. He explains that 
horizons do not exist in isolation from tradition and history. This means that horizons do 
not constitute completely subjective constructs based simply on how someone wants to 
interpret a text. To Gadamer (1975), the fact that interpretation within the paradigm of 
philosophical hermeneutics has this basis in tradition and history gives it as firm a basis 
as a so-called scientific fact; he writes:  
The hermeneutical task becomes automatically a questioning of things and is 
always in part determined by this. This places hermeneutical work on a firm basis. 
If a person is trying to understand something, he will not be able to rely from the 
start on his own chance previous idea, missing as logically and stubbornly as 
possible the actual meaning of the text until the latter becomes so persistently 
audible that it breaks through the imagined understanding of it. Rather, a person 
trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something. That is why a 
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 hermeneutically trained mind must be, from the start, sensitive to the to the text’s 
quality of newness. (p. 238)  
For Gadamer, then, the basis of hermeneutical interpretation becomes the question that 
one asks at the onset of the task. Gadamer (1975) expands his notion of sensitivity to the 
text when he writes: “this kind of sensitivity involves neither neutrality nor the extinction 
of one’s self, but the conscious assimilation of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices. 
The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text may present itself in 
all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings” 
(p. 238). So, the fusion of horizons that Gadamer associates with understanding can only 
happen if one asks a question of a text and then opens oneself to an answer to that 
question that may go against one’s acknowledged biases. While this might seem like a 
magic trick of opening the book and having a different meaning appear every time, 
Gadamer uses the issue of tradition to temper subjectivity – what the text yields to the 
interpreter must also make sense to his community and tradition. 
At the conclusion of this overview of philosophical hermeneutics one can begin to 
see some significant differences between an approach to listening based in philosophical 
hermeneutics and one based in the tenets of behaviorism as seen the models examined in 
chapter three as well as the general literature on listening examined in chapter two.  The 
next section of this chapter examines two of those differences in greater detail: first, that 
behaviorists rely on the use of a particular methodology as a verification of their 
interpretation of information while someone working from a position of philosophical 
hermeneutics would check the veracity of his or her interpretation of certain information 
against the background of his or her tradition and community; second, that, from the 
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 perspective of behaviorism, one can only make a choice to listen to a message once one 
has perceived it while, from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, one could 
make a choice to listen for a message within the context of a given tradition but never 
perceive it or choose not to listen to it once one does perceive it.  
Hermeneutics and empiricism: methodological differences 
The most basic difference between philosophical hermeneutics and behaviorism 
lies in their approach to methodology. At this point, one might find helpful a specific 
understanding of hermeneutics that cuts straight to the heart of the issues at hand; for 
such a definition, one can turn to the work of Robert L. Woolfolk, Louis A. Sass, and 
Stanley B. Messer (1988), editors of the book Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory: 
Interpretive Perspectives on Personality, Psychotherapy, and Psychopathology; about 
hermeneutics in relation to psychology and other sciences, they write 
Hermeneutics defies straightforward and concise definition. One negative 
definition is perhaps best stated in relation to positivism: the philosophical view 
which hold that genuine knowledge is scientific and that no procedures other than 
those utilized by the natural sciences can determine truth. Questions that science 
cannot answer are deemed unanswerable. Positivism may be thought of as a 
counterpoint to hermeneutic thought, and one aim that unites such dissimilar 
thinkers as Wilhelm Dilthey, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jurgen Habermas is that 
of countering the misappropriation of natural science models to various spheres of 
investigation. Much hermeneutic thought seeks to criticize the position that the 
methods and criteria of the natural sciences are normative for all forms of 
139 
 
 
 
 intellectual activity and that an ahistorical, objective, empirical account of science 
is sufficient. (p. 3)  
Given this understanding of hermeneutics as a “counterpoint” to positivism after 
examining the dominant trend in the research about the listening process to measure and 
systematize human behavior, but without going so far as calling any specific scholar 
highlighted in this dissertation a pure positivist, one can begin to see the tension between 
the two perspectives. Gadamer (1975) responds to some of this tension by arguing, as 
quoted earlier, that empiricists believe “it is only its having a basis, a methodological 
justification (and not the fact that it may be actually correct) that gives a judgment its 
dignity” (p. 240). He questions this belief by pointing out the problem of the language 
used implementing scientific experiments and describing their results. Gadamer talks 
specifically about the implications of this dilemma for both scientists and those using 
hermeneutics in his essay entitled “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem.” 
In his essay entitled “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,” Gadamer 
(1977) addresses the fundamental problem of how to reconcile philosophical 
hermeneutics, which believes in the “conditionedness of our being” with modern science 
– or any field – “which stands or falls with the principles of being unbiased and 
prejudiceless” (p. 10). In the same essay, Gadamer (1977) says that, while some fields 
may see themselves as exempt from the “conditionedness” of the human beings who 
work in them, he insists that “the problem is really universal” (p. 10) because 
“understanding is language-bound” (p. 15).  In other words, even scientists – and 
behaviorists – have to explain their so-called raw and unbiased numerical data in 
language. Gadamer (1977) also uses his essay on universality to rebut the main 
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 opposition to his view; he quickly shuts down the argument that this fact leads to 
“linguistic relativism” because “while we live wholly within a language, the fact that we 
do so does not constitute linguistic relativism because there is absolutely no captivity 
within language” (p. 16). In other words, the fact the a person must interpret with the bias 
and prejudice inherent in his/her being and given language, that does not mean that 
language cannot open up to the interpreter new and helpful – and true – interpretations 
never thought of before. Further, beyond the fact that they see different bases for 
knowledge and have a different approach towards methodology, philosophical 
hermeneutics and empiricism differ in that the empirical methods used within the 
behaviorist perspective that dominates the literature and research  landscape on listening  
can only test or measure how effectively someone listens to particular stimuli while the 
tenets of philosophical hermeneutics already discussed would suggest that someone can 
listen for a message within the context of one’s tradition and community. A brief 
illustration of this distinction and some further discussion on this idea will follow.  
Distinction between listening to and listening for  
In order to understand what it means to say that an understanding of listening 
process based on tenets of philosophical hermeneutics allows for someone to listen for a 
message while the notion of the listening process based on behaviorism and empiricism 
focuses only on what someone listens to one may find the following illustration helpful. 
The song lyrics listed below, written by V. O. Stamps, represent an excerpt of a 
traditional Christian hymn entitled “I’ll be Somewhere Listening;” a close-text 
examination of these lyrics can shed some light on what it means to listen for a message 
and how this differs from hearing or attending to a message:   
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 Chorus 
I'll be somewhere listening  
I'll be somewhere listening  
I'll be somewhere listening for my name  
Verse 1  
When the Savior calls I will answer  
When He calls for me I will hear  
When the Savior calls I will answer  
I'll be somewhere listening for my name  
Verse 2 
If my heart is right when He calls me  
If my heart is right I will hear  
If my heart is right when He calls me  
I'll be somewhere listening for my name 
Beyond the religious images in this song, one can see the idea of listening for a message 
as well as the distinction between making the choice to listen for a message and actually 
listening to that message. Clearly, the singer of the song has made the choice to listen for 
a message, in this case his/her name. However, while the singer assumes that the other – 
in this case the Christian Savior Jesus Christ – will eventually speak the message for 
which he has chosen to listen, the singer does not assume that he/she will automatically 
choose to listen to that message; this depends on whether or not the singer’s “heart is 
right.” Perhaps one can liken this to the idea to the notion of attending to a message to 
which one has chosen to listen. Even though one may choose to listen for a message, one 
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 must also effectively attend to it once one actually perceives it. Further, one might 
suggest that the question of the rightness of one’s heart within the lyrics resonates at least 
in some way with McCroskey’s notion of willingness discussed in chapter four; one 
might hear a message for which one has already chosen to listen but at that particular 
time, may not have the willingness – or rightness of heart – to attend to that message.  
Listening, then, involves both choice and skill. First one must make a choice to 
listen for what Gadamer would call the newness of what the other has to say; however, in 
order to complete and continue the communication process, one must also have the skills 
of discriminating and attending to that newness, that message, once it has reached the 
senses. This more complex understanding of the choice to listen shows that this 
dissertation does not attempt to invalidate in any way conclusions about listening 
effectiveness derived from empirical methods. However, this dissertation does suggest 
that the dominance of behaviorism and has led to some stagnation within the field of 
listening and hopes to generate some new discussion by adding the to current 
conversation the already-examined work of Gadamer, and the voice of Gemma Corradi 
Fiumara, who takes many of Gadamer’s ideas and applies them to listening.  
5.3 Gemma Corradi Fiumara’s Hermeneutic Approach to Listening  
Fiumara represents one of the few scholars interested in studying listening from a 
perspective other than behaviorism; she works from perspective of philosophical 
hermeneutics and relies heavily on the work of Gadamer. The next section of this chapter 
will focus specifically on the connections she presents in her book, The Other Side of 
Language: A Philosophy of Listening, between some Gadamer’s ideas and listening. The 
ideas that she specifically addresses include questioning and openness; she connects these 
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 ideas to listening and then, after a discussion on the problems of power and benumbment 
that have stemmed from the current understanding of logos in western philosophy, 
suggests that, to use some of the language of this dissertation, making the choice to listen 
can transform a person’s perspective. After the discussion on Fiumara’s work, this 
dissertation will conclude with a presentation of a hermeneutic model of the listening 
process based on the ideas of Fiumara and Gadamer examined in this chapter.  
Fiumara on questioning and openness  
In beginning to describe the connections she sees between philosophical 
hermeneutics and listening, Fiumara (1990) refers to the already discussed notion of 
openness when she quotes Gadamer: “Anyone who listens is fundamentally open. 
Without this kind of openness to one another there is no genuine relationship. Belonging 
together always also means being able to listen to one another” (p. 28).  Fiumara (1990) 
goes on to explain her understanding of fundamental: 
The fact that there is an openness that is more fundamental than the question – the 
openness of listening – seems to be noticed almost en passant….Moreover, the 
general opinion would appear to be that the fundamental openness of listening 
neither needs nor deserves more attention, as if we already possessed the vital 
capacity. The illusion that we can speak to others without being able to listen is, 
perhaps, one that we all share. (p. 29) 
For Fiumara, then, the process of listening starts with the openness to whatever answer 
one may hear, not asking the question. This contradicts models of the listening process 
which start with someone hearing a message and ends with then responding to it. One 
might say, then, that from Fiumara’s perspective, the process of listening could  start with 
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 a person making the choice to listen for an answer, then asking a question, and then 
attending to the other’s response. Fiumara (1990) discusses the drawbacks of focusing on 
asking questions when she writes: 
The “question” then might prove to be an unfortunate procedure, apparently 
philo-sophical but, effectively, simply logocratic. We might be able to learn more 
by stopping to listen, if we were only able to free ourselves from a logico-
dialectical furor that drives us on to come up with ever more critical questions 
while tacitly opposing proper hearing – as the contemporary individual, 
increasingly impoverished by expanding and inexorable logomachies, knows only 
too well. Although the formative value of critical questioning is extolled, 
Tommasone remarked one century ago that “Even when many people hear 
criticism, few listen to it, very few understand it and even fewer feel it. (p. 29) 
Reading this passage, one may interpret Fiumara as criticizing critical thinking; or, if one 
reads the passage with a more textured perspective, one interprets her point as suggesting 
that people spend too much time criticizing others and honing their critical thinking skills 
that they never bother to learn how to listen to criticism about a particular phenomena 
and use it to improve that phenomena. In simple terms, she wants people to stop talking 
and asking questions and start listening. She associates people’s desire to question and 
speak and their lack of focus on listening with the idea of logos so pervasive in western 
thought, which she wants to reconsider. She argues that a reconsideration of logos that 
includes elements conducive to listening will not only give people a philosophical basis 
to focus on listening but also represent a closer interpretation of the original term. 
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 Fiumara’s fuller understanding of logos  
When Fiumara (1990) explores the issue of why people focus on speaking rather 
than listening, she writes: “Invoking Gadamer’s claims, we are confronted by an 
illuminating hermeneutical openness which is, nonetheless impinged upon by those 
prejudicial elements in our philosophical tradition which overshadow the function of 
listening” (p. 28). She connects this to the issue of power and discourse and the idea of 
logos as she outlines what she refers to as a “fuller understanding of logos;” she claims 
that one can begin to come to an understanding of logos that goes beyond simply 
“saying” to include a notion of listening or “proper hearing” by placing it alongside the 
term legein (Fiumara, 1990 p. 2-6). In addition to explaining how she wants to reconsider 
logos, Fiumara (1990) also explains why she wants to reconsider logos when she writes:  
We could…better render the meaning of the term logos if we also refer to the verb 
legein….There is a need…to look further into the possible ways of understanding 
such a pivotal word in the west as logos. Perhaps we could start by admitting that 
there could be no saying without hearing, no speaking which is not also an 
integral part of listening, no speech which is not somehow received. In view of 
the problems and contentions which can be encountered in research into the 
phylogenesis and ontogenesis of language we are inclined to believe that an 
individual can speak only if he is listened to, rather than there being something he 
might say that one would subsequently attend to “by means of” listening. (p. 2)  
In other words, Fiumara wants to understand logos in such a way that it cannot stand 
alone or simply mean “to speak” or some similar notion; she wants to understand logos in 
a way that includes listening and she believes connecting it to the word legein will make 
146 
 
 
 
 that possible. She believes that once people see that logos did not originally mean only to 
say or tell as they have come to understand it today that they will start once again to see 
the importance of listening and take some of their focus off speaking.   
Fiumara’s connections between logos and legein and proper hearing 
Writing specifically about logos and legein, Fiumara (1990) turns to Heidegger, 
who did an “etymological-philosophical study” of the terms; she quotes Heidegger: 
No-one would want to deny that in the language of the Greeks from early on 
legein mean to talk, say or tell. However, just as early and even more originally, 
legein means what is expressed in the similar German word legen: to lay down, to 
lay before. In legen, a “bringing together” prevails, the Latin legere understood as 
lessen, in the sense of collecting and bringing together. Legein properly means the 
laying-down and laying-before which gathers itself and others. (p. 3) 
Fiumara (1990) suggests that this “gathering of itself epitomizes that sort of concentrated 
listening that is required in intellectual midwifery – the maieutic method” (p. 3). Perhaps 
one can interpret the distinction that Fiumara wants to make in this way: logos without 
legein means simply to tell or to speak; logos with legein means laying an idea down 
before someone to consider; one can see why Fiumara would see logos with legein as 
more inclusive of listening and proper hearing and more in line with her philosophy.  
According to Fiumara (1990), the notion of proper hearing comes from 
Heidegger, who started his study of logos and legein with the famous fragment from 
Heraclitus that states: “When you have listened, not to me but to the…logos, it is wise to 
agree that all things are one” (p. 14). Looking at this statement and beginning his inquiry, 
Heidegger asks: “What happens then, when such hearing occurs? When there is such 
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 proper hearing there is omolegein which can only be what it is as legein. Proper hearing 
belongs to logos…this hearing is itself a legein. As such the proper hearing of mortals is 
in a certain way the same as the logos” (Fiumara, 1990, p. 14). In other words, Heraclitus 
separates the logos from his self and lays it down before the other for consideration. 
Fiumara (1990) writes that, by Heidegger’s approach, no logos can be posited apart from 
the ways of legein. No logos outside of proper hearing; or perhaps only a logos reduced 
by half may unfold: overwhelming in its manifold expressions and yet primitive and 
lacking in other basic respects” (p. 14). As she makes her arguments, Fiumara gives 
several reasons why scholars and people in general tend not to share this fuller 
understanding of logos as connected to legein and describes several benefits of doing so.  
Fiumara on logos and power 
In explaining the importance of an understanding of logos as connected to legein, 
Fiumara connects the issues of speaking, power, and benumbment. Fiumara (1990) 
claims that what she calls the “reduced-by-half notion of logos” – that is, logos that does 
not take into account legein – has prevailed in the itinerary of western thinking” and that: 
It should not surprise us to recognize that ‘truth’ is not located outside of power, 
and that it is not power itself. Truth based on multiple constrictions, themselves 
bearers of inevitable effects of power, are generated in our culture….One ought to 
accept as a consequence the prospect that manifestations of truth be linked in a 
circular way to the systems of power the produce them as well as to the conditions 
of power induced by truth (and in which truth is reproduced). (p. 56)  
For Fiumara, then, a reduced-by-half notion of logos implies that one’s speech can have 
power even if no one wants listens to it; she claims that “logic, as the doctrine of logos, 
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 considers thinking to be the assertion of something about something. According to logic, 
such speech is the basic characteristic of thinking. A thinking primarily anchored to 
saying without listening” (p. 3). One can argue that the models of the listening process 
already examined seem to take, perhaps unwittingly, the position articulated above: that 
logos, understood as thought anchored in saying without listening, starts the 
communication process; interestingly, this notion subverts the very process of listening 
they seek to support. On the other hand, one could say Fiumara simply swaps listening 
for speaking when she says: “there could be no saying without hearing.” Putting a twist 
on this stagnant argument, this dissertation contends that focusing only on processes of 
listening or speaking does not give one an accurate picture of the communication process: 
that one may speak a message over and over to which no one listens just as one may 
listen over and over for a message that another never speaks but that communication 
cannot or does not happen until a speaker connects with a listener.  
Further, one could argue that this saying without listening dominates Western 
politics in which people struggle for the power to speak but not the opportunity to listen. 
But when does the struggle for discursive power end? Only by connecting, or anchoring 
as she may say, speaking with listening does Fiumara see a way to truly transform 
language and discourse from a power struggle into helpful communication in a non-
violent way. “If we were apprentices of listening rather than masters of discourse,” she 
writes, “we might perhaps promote a different sort of coexistence among humans: not so 
much in the form of utopian ideal but rather as an incipient philosophical solidarity 
capable of envisaging the common destiny of the species” (Fiumara, 1990, p. 57). In 
other words, she has reconsidered the issue of logos because she believes that a fuller 
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 understanding of logos –one that includes legein – can turn people away from the 
reduced-by-half understanding of logos they currently have and give them a reason to 
stop using language to win some cosmic power struggle to control the world and use it 
talk about the issues and solve problems faced by all those living in the world together.  
Fiumara on benumbment and victimization 
Further, Fiumara believes that people have stopped listening and simply allowed a 
few others to control the discourse because they have become benumbed. Fiumara (1990) 
talks about the philosophical problem of benumbment when she writes:  
In a culture that is almost saturated with the din of innumerable messages intent 
on formulating codes, priorities and orientation, the inhibition of our listening 
potential could be regarded – paradoxically – as a genuine philosophical option. 
In order to safeguard authentic philosophical resources one may develop “non-
listening” defenses which in fact tend to protect one’s inner self, perhaps naturally 
inclined to philosophy. It is almost as though the individual tacitly said to himself: 
“I am trying to find a way of not thinking because I no longer want to think the 
thoughts of others;” or else, “I wonder why I should carry on thinking if I find 
myself entertaining thoughts that do not allow my own philosophical development 
buy only a culturally mimetic form of survival.” (p. 82) 
In other words, Fiumara claims that human beings have a philosophical nature and also 
an innate sense of when the discourse around them does not have anything of 
philosophical value to say; when they sense that unfruitful discourse, they simply choose 
not to listen to it in favor of other discourse and when they begin to sense that all 
discourse has lost philosophical value they stop listening altogether.  Fiumara (1990) 
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 writes that only by listening – by making the choice to listen to stop the benumbment 
process and start to listen to each other again – can people “reawaken” their “epistemic 
potential” because “by remaining vigilant we can attempt to hear without fear of 
becoming victim of what the others are saying. It is almost as if we become amenable to 
being linguistically overwhelmed in proportion to our lack of listening awareness and 
ability” (p. 83).  In other words, Fiumara ironically believes that people make themselves 
susceptible to domination when they choose not to listen; this belief wholly contradicts a 
commonly held misconception of listening, addressed in the first chapter of this project, 
which sees listening as a sign of weakness implying that one not having the power to 
speak. Gadamer also addresses this issue in his work in relation to the idea of openness.  
 Fiumara believe that people have stopped listening in ill conceived attempt to 
preserve an ill conceived concept of freedom. Gadamer (1975) also understands that one 
may choose not to listen out of fear that opening oneself to another might lead to some 
kind of victimization; he refers back to the type of openness described earlier and writes: 
“To hear and obey someone does not mean simply that we do blindly what the other 
desires. We call such a person a slave. Openness to the other, then includes the 
acknowledgement that I must accept some things that are against myself, even though 
there is no one else who asks this of me” (p. 324). Relating this to the idea of making the 
choice to listen, one can see again that making the choice to listen means more than 
simply exercising one’s will to hear what one wants to hear; it includes anticipating that 
one may not like what the other has to say but deciding to listen anyway.  For Fiumara, 
when a person listens, one may make a connection to the other or learn information that 
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 may cause the listener to undergo a transformative experience.  
Listening as a transformative experience 
Rather than conforming to the multiple scholars who see listening as an act, 
Fiumara (1990) suggests that people approach listening as an experience; she writes:  
A listening experience could actually come across like a storm and overwhelm us 
– silently – distancing us from the constant din of discourses that saturate our 
culture, ready at all times to convey on the market the most philosophical devices 
against the storm. At a remarkable distance from such cultural orientation, 
Cannetti suggests that “Most important of all is talking to unknown people. But it 
must be done in such a way that they do the talking, and the only one does oneself 
is to get them to talk. When that is no longer possible for a man, then death has 
begun.” Conversely, we could then justifiably say that until we become capable of 
getting something unknown to talk to us we have not yet begun to live and 
interact. (p. 122) 
Fiumara then looks at listening from the point of view of someone who has decided to 
stop living in the state of benumbment discussed earlier and truly start to listen to others 
and the surrounding dialogue. She describes such an experience – like an overwhelming 
storm – as transformative. Fiumara (1990) writes that when a person listens:  
A transforming relation is set alight, a germinal contact with the word, giddily 
different from dependence upon the sterile din of words in those whose 
transmission we are ensured immobility and isolation. This cognitive dedication 
to the word of the other demands a philosophical methodology that involves the 
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 person entirely, since it demands a kind of inner abnegation. With this inner 
renunciation the individual can only hold a dialogue with himself. (p. 125) 
To experience listening, then, from Fiumara’s perspective, one must undergo a 
transformation from someone who only listens for information relevant to his or her own 
interests to someone who truly wants to engage the other so as to learn and move forward 
in life and make connections to the world. Looking at these passages one clearly sees that 
Fiumara believes in listening for the sake of listening. One should listen simply to 
experience the thrill of hearing the voice of another human being and the possibility of 
learning from what that person has to say. Not surprisingly, none of the listening models 
examined in chapter three creates a space even for the possibility of such an experience; 
nor can any of them take into account any of ideas about how one’s choice to listen has 
its roots in one’s biases and tradition. Given these limitations, one can ask: what would a 
model of the listening process look like that allows for a person’s transformation as a 
result of listening and takes into that each person has to make a choice to listen and that, 
according to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, this choice and the interpretation of 
any message to which a person chooses to listen has its basis in that person’s prejudices 
and tradition? The final section of this dissertation will answer that question by 
illustrating and explaining a model of the listening process based on hermeneutics.  
5.4 A Hermeneutic Model of the Listening Process 
 As one begins to frame a hermeneutic model of the listening process around the 
work of Fiumara and Gadamer, one can begin by picturing the connections between their 
ideas as a series of concentric circles. In the spirit of the hermeneutic circle, a 
hermeneutical process of listening does not represent a linear method that a person can 
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 only follow effectively one way or, if followed exactly, will always produce a desired 
result; it represents a holistic system based on a series of causes and effects in which the 
altering of one part of system affects the whole system. The model as conceived takes 
into account Gadamer’s notions of tradition and bias, his understanding of interpretation, 
and Fiumara’s metaphor of listening as a transformative experience. This dissertation 
argues that a hermeneutical model of the listening process would like the following:  
Illustration 5.1 A Hermeneutic Model of the Listening Process  
 
As one begins to look at the various elements of this model, one notice that this model 
starts with the issue of making the choice to listen; Gadamer’s work suggests that what 
one chooses to listen for – as well as what one ultimately listens to and the meaning one 
interprets from a given text or message – will fall within the horizon of one’s tradition 
and community. Thus, the second circle represents the horizon within which one makes 
the choice to listen, as well the horizon within which one makes one’s interpretation of a 
given text or message. Before making an interpretation of a text, one must have a gestalt 
understanding of the text itself and then acknowledge the biases one brings to that text.  
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 Interpretation in the hermeneutical model of listening  
Looking more in depth at each of these elements, one can recall the discussion 
that the choice to listen does not have a measurable performance component to it; one 
could argue the same holds true for the acknowledgment of the tradition that forms the 
basis of that choice. The acknowledgment of one’s biases does not have to involve a 
public measurable performance or action but simply a self-reflective understanding of 
what Gadamer might call one’s own situatedness. However, this dissertation would argue 
that within the metaphor of interpretation one sees some similarity between this model 
and the models of the listening process discussed in chapter three, although some 
important differences exist between the two, which a later section will detail. At this 
point, however, one should understand that, according to Gadamer, one cannot get 
outside of one’s interpretation; therefore, the choice of what to listen for has its basis in 
one’s interpretation of his/her tradition, the choice of what to listen to or interpret has its 
basis in one’s gestalt interpretation of that text; thus, while the interpretation process as 
listed on the hermeneutical model focuses on the question of what meaning one has 
gleamed from a specific text, one must realize that, interpretation occurs throughout the 
entire listening process as understood in this dissertation. 
Next, one might notice that this model does not have a specific place for response; 
one should remember that in her reconsideration of logos, Fiumara tries to deemphasize 
the prevalence of telling and critical questioning in western philosophy and civilization; 
for her, then, the issue of response may not seem necessary: one chooses to listen simply 
for the thrill of listening. However, both Fiumara and Gadamer recognize the importance 
of questioning in the hermeneutical process; so, on this issue, one can say that, unlike in 
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 models examined in chapter three, this model views response not as a stimulus that 
continues the process so much as an opportunity to ensure that one has interpreted a 
message adequately and communication has occurred; this opportunity may not always 
present itself and does not represent a necessary part of a hermeneutical listening process 
in general or the interpretation process under discussion more specifically. Once one has 
interpreted a text within a given horizon, one has the chance to have a transformative 
experience as Fiumara described it; such an experience would result from choosing to 
listen to the text, the message of the other; thus, one would literally broaden one’s 
horizon within which they could interpret another text or message. At this point, one can 
move into a more detailed discussion about the differences between this hermeneutic 
model and the behaviorist models discussed in chapter three of this dissertation.  
Similarity, difference, and discussion between hermeneutics and empiricism 
As mentioned earlier, the circle of the hermeneutical listening process referred to 
as interpretation share some similarities with the behaviorist models. It encompasses the 
necessary performance component of the process. While the acknowledgement of bias 
and the choice to listen do not have measurable components to them, one can measure, to 
some extent, the accuracy and effectiveness of one’s interpretation. For Gadamer, an 
interpreter measures the accuracy or validity of an interpretation against the horizons of 
possible interpretation offered by the interpreter’s tradition. For the behaviorists, one 
measures the effectiveness of one’s listening skills with tests of recall and various other 
empirical methods. While the behaviorist models may break the act of listening or 
interpretation up into several smaller processes, the question they seek to answer when 
they test effectiveness, from the point of view of this dissertation, ultimately becomes 
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 how accurately one has interpreted the message. Thus, interpretation within the 
hermeneutical process of listening takes into account, at least in some way, the questions 
of effectiveness and the performance of the skills that concern the scholars referenced in 
chapter three; however, by looking at those skills as related to interpretation rather than 
perception, the hermeneutical model of listening by-passes the senses – particularly the 
sense of  hearing –  in so much as one cannot fault his or her senses for faulty 
interpretation or listening. The fact that the hermeneutic view of listening favors 
interpretation while the behaviorist view favors perception represents the main distinction 
between the hermeneutical and behaviorist models of the listening process. Yet, despite 
these differences, this dissertation maintains that, through furthering discussion and 
increased listening, the two approaches can co-exist within the field of listening. For an 
example of how empiricism and hermeneutics can both make contributions in a particular 
field primarily invested in empiricism one can turn to the field of psychology.   
When looking for examples of how empiricism and hermeneutics can both 
contribute to the advancement of a field, one can turn to the field of psychology. The 
field of psychology represents one area of the social sciences in which hermeneutics and 
empiricism have come to coexist. The previously mentioned book, Hermeneutics and 
Psychological Theory: Interpretive Perspectives on Personality, Psychotherapy, and 
Psychopathology, aims at examining some of the connections already made between 
empiricism and hermeneutics within this field. Donald Meichenbaum (1988), in an essay 
for this collection called “What Happens When the ‘Brute Data’ of Psychological Inquiry 
Are Meanings: Nurturing a Dialogue between Hermeneutics and Empiricism,” writes: 
“There is fundamentally nothing incompatible between a hermeneutic approach and an 
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 empirical approach to psychological investigation. In fact, a productive dialogue between 
the two approaches that would benefit each could be established” (p. 116). Hopefully 
scholars within the field of listening can come to share such a tolerable view.  
5.5 Conclusion and Summary 
After introducing a new model into the field, one might find it helpful to examine 
the implications of a hermeneutical process of listening in the classroom; to do this, one 
can begin by thinking about how an instructor would provide some way for students to 
get their heads around a process full of such otherness. First of all, students easily point 
out a distinction between hearing and listening; they say listening involves concentration 
and paying attention while hearing does not; they associate paying attention with some 
kind of choice or selection; building upon this understanding leads one easily to the 
notion of making a choice to listen. Students often cite many obstacles to listening related 
to, in behaviorist terms, their ability to perceive or attend to a message; these include 
external noise, tiredness, disinterest, and distraction. From the perspective of the 
hermeneutical model, however, these primarily physical obstacles do not have any place 
in or any impact on the process; thus, a teacher must encourage students to look beyond 
those physical dimensions to why someone may actually choose not to listen to another 
person. At this point, students can start to examine how their own prejudices, biases, and 
traditions and think about how those may impact their decisions about listening. 
Developing the skills necessary for hermeneutical listening, then, does not mean learning 
how to discriminate between sounds or how to remember what one has heard. Instead, to 
listen effectively according to the hermeneutic model, one needs to develop the self-
awareness to recognize and admit one’s biases enough to recognize something different 
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and new and perhaps have the courage to let that newness and otherness transform 
oneself. The implication of this approach in the classroom – and this has application to 
the social-science laboratory as well – becomes that, while a teacher or researcher can 
test whether a student or subject has retained certain information from a lecture or 
presentation and this will give the teacher or researcher a measure of how effectively the 
student or subject has listened according to the behaviorist model, one cannot test 
whether a person has the self-knowledge necessary for hermeneutical listening. The fact 
that one cannot test how effectively one listens according to the hermeneutical model 
may dissuade some from using it; however, this dissertation argues that one does not 
need to choose one perspective over the other; both can coexist with the field of listening 
and both offer valid interpretations of complex process of listening.  
To summarize this chapter, then, one can say that it has looked in detail at the 
ideas of tradition and prejudice within the framework of Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics and then connected them to the process of listening using the work of 
Fiumara; it then offered a hermeneutical model of the listening process to take into 
account these ideas. To summarize this project in whole, one can say that it has attempted 
to contribute to the ongoing conversation about listening and the listening process by 
outlining an alternative theoretical basis upon which to set the listening process. After 
examining the current research in the field of listening in general and specifically about 
the idea of listening as process, this dissertation saw that behaviorism represents the main 
voice in that conversation; to further the conversation, it wished to add the voice of 
Gadamer and philosophical hermeneutics and the work of Fiumara in the hopes of 
presenting an alternative model of the listening process not based on behaviorist ideas.  
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